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Articles 
The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, 
A National Crisis 
MARY SuE BACKUS* AND PAUL MARcus**' 
I. How CAN THIS BE HAPPENING? 
A. THE EXAMPLES ARE EVERYWHERE 
In a case of mistaken identity, Henry Earl Clark of Dallas was 
charged with a drug offense in Tyler, Texas. After his arrest, it took six 
weeks in jail before he was assigned a lawyer, as he was too poor to 
afford one on his own. It took seven more weeks after the appointment 
of the lawyer, until the case was dismissed, for it to become obvious that 
the police had arrested the wrong man. While in jail, Clark asked for 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. 
•• Haynes Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. 
1. Much of the material found throughout this Article is based on research conducted for a nd by 
the National Committee on the Right to Counsel. The authors serve as Reporters to the Commiuee. 
All conclusions are, however, the authors' own. As of the writing of this Article, the work of the 
Committee has not been completed and its Report not yet finalized. The excellent work of Arnold & 
Porter LLP and the American University Justice Programs Office in the School of Public Affairs was 
extremely helpful in several parts of the Article which follow. This Article was greatly improved by the 
comments on various sections of the underlying report made by Rhoda Billings, David Carroll, Tony 
Fabelo, Norman Lefstein, Ross Shephard, Virginia Sloan, and Scott Wallace. Many useful comments 
were received in workshops conducted with law faculty and students at George Washington 
University, Harvard University, the University of Houston, the University of Oklahoma, Stanford 
University, Wake Forest University, and the College of William and Mary. The authors wish to 
express their deep appreciation to the Law Deans at the University of Oklahoma and the College of 
William and Mary for the s trong and continued support given to this lengthy project. The fine research 
assistance of these William and Mary law students is gratefully acknowledged: Robert Eingurt, Megan 
Kaufmann, Melissa Molt, Andrea Muse, Fumi Nishiyama, Justin Norwood, Matthew Occhuizzo, and 
Marilyn Seide. 
The information that is the basis for many of the observations herein was current during the 
writing of this Article in early 2oo6. With several states s tepping forward very recently to provide 
much needed change, hopefully some of the problems identified here will be eliminated or lessened in 
states such as Montana, Kentucky, North Dakota, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Georgia, 
among others. 
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quick action writing, "I [need to] get out of this godforsaken jail, get back 
to my job . . . I am not a drug user or dealer. I am a tax-paying 
American."2 During this time, he lost his job and his car, which was 
auctioned. After Clark was released, he spent several months in a 
homeless shelter.3 
Two recent Georgia cases can only be seen as shocking, though in 
very different ways. Sixteen-year-old Denise Lockett was retarded and 
pregnant. Her baby died when she delivered it in a toilet in her home in a 
South Georgia housing project. Although an autopsy found no indication 
that the baby's death had been caused by any intentional act, the 
prosecutor charged Lockett with first-degree murder. Her appointed 
lawyer had a contract to handle all the county's criminal cases, about 300 
cases in a year, for a flat fee. He performed this work on top of that 
required by his private practice with paying clients. The lawyer 
conducted no investigation of the facts, introduced no evidence of his 
client's mental retardation or of the autopsy findings, and told her to 
plead guilty to manslaughter. She was sentenced to twenty years in 
prison.4 Tony Humphries was charged with jumping a subway turnstile in 
Atlanta to evade a $1.75 fare. He sat in jail for fifty-four days, far longer 
than the sentence he would have received if convicted, before a lawyer 
was appointed, at a cost to the taxpayers of $2330.5 
A mother in Louisiana recently addressed a state legislative 
committee: 
My son Corey is a defendant in Calcasieu Parish, facing adult charges. 
He has been incarcerated for three months with no contact from 
court[-]appointed counsel. Corey and I have tried for three months to 
get a name and phone number of the appointed attorney. No one in 
the system can tell us exactly who the court[-]appointed attorney is. 
The court told us his public defender will be the same one he had for a 
juvenile adjudication. The court(-]appointed counsel told me he does 
not represent my son. The court clerk's office cannot help me or my 
son. We are navigating the system alone. 
Eight weeks ago we filed a motion for bond reduction . We have heard 
nothing- not even a letter of acknowledgement from the court that it 
received our motion. Without a lawyer to advocate on Corey's behalf, 
we are defenseless. How many more months will go by without contact 
2. Brooks Egerton, They Had the Wrong Man, But No One Believed Him, DALLAS MORNiNG 
NEWS, July 16, 2000, at 27A. 
3· /d. 
4 Our Opinion: Poorest Georgians Get Assembly·Line Defense, THE ATLANTA J .• CoNST .• July 
rs. 2001, at D8; see also Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender A ss'n. Gideon's Heroes: Honoring Those WIJO 
Do Justice to Gideo n's Promise. Mar. 2003, http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defendc r_Gideon/ 
Defender_Gideon_Heroes_Benham [he reinafter Gideon 's Heroes). 
5· Gideon's Heroes, supra note 4-
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from a lawyer? How many more months will go by without 
investigation into the case?6 
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Fifty-one criminal defendants in Western Massachusetts were 
arrested and jailed without any legal representation for many weeks at a 
time. As one government official stated, "One woman has been sitting in 
jail (for two months] without counsel and has not even been able to get a 
bail review. This is an embarrassment. How can we tolerate a system 
where people don't have lawyers?"7 
The Chief Public Defender of Fairfax County, Virginia 
(metropolitan Washington, D.C.) resigned in July 2005, after just ten 
months in the position. She said that even with legislative reforms in 
Virginia her office had so many clients and so few lawyers that the 
attorneys simply could not adequately represent the defendants at trials 
and on appeal. Last year, the twenty lawyers in the office defended more 
than 8ooo clients.8 
A defendant in Missoula, Montana, was jailed for nearly six months 
leading up to his trial. During the months before his trial, the defendant 
met with his court-appointed attorney just two times. That attorney did 
nothing to investigate the defendant 's allegations that police obtained 
evidence against him during an illegal search. A second court-appointed 
lawyer subsequently had the case dismissed.9 
The first rule of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct indicates that "competent representation" requires 
"the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation." Yet in Broward County, Florida, the 
elected public defender felt compelled last year to forbid his attorneys 
from advising indigent criminal defendants to plead guilty unless they 
have had "meaningful contact" with their clients in advance. The head of 
the office said that public defenders are often ill-informed about their 
6. Testimony of Grace Bauer, Lake Charles, Louisiana, presented to the House Committee on 
Administration of Criminal Justice, June 7, 2005, in support of SB 323 by Senator Lydia Jackson. 
The situation in much of Louisiana is dire. The Calcasieu Parish Public Defenders Office 
represents nearly 90% of the approximately 3000 persons accused of fe lony crimes in that 
Parish . . . . cases often languish three years or more before they are finally resolved, and 
then it is almost always by plea bargain. Thus, innocent people may sit in jail for months 
awaiting trial if they are unable to make bond. while those who can make bond are forced 
to live in a prolonged world of uncertainty. 
Sylvia R. Cooks & Karen Karre Fontenot, The Messiah is Not Coming: It's Time for Louisiana to 
Change its Method of Funding Indigent Defense, 31 S.U. L. REv. 197, 208 (2004). The Honorable Sylvia 
R. Cooks is an Appellate Judge of the Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit. 
7· David Weber, Indigent Defendants Languish WithoU/ Counsel in W. Mass., BosTON HERALD, 
July 1, l004, at 34· 
8. Tom Jackman, Fairfax's Chief Public Defender Quits, WASH. rosT, July 8, zoos, at BS. 
9· Matthew Kowalski, Defensi~e Holding: ACLU'S Public Defender Lawsuit Deferred to 2005 
Legislature, MissouLA INDEP., Apr. 13, 2004, available ar http://www.missoulanews.com/ 
Archives/News.asp?no=4044. 
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clients' cases and circumstances before advising them to take pleas 
offered by prosecutors at arraignment. "It's not fair to make life-altering 
decisions while handcuffed to a chair with fifty people standing 
around ... . They meet with an attorney for sixty seconds, then they plead 
guilty and surrender their rights .. . . That's going to stop," the director 
stated.'" 
Roberto Miranda was charged with first-degree murder with a 
deadly weapon, robbery with a deadly weapon, and larceny. He was 
appointed a public defender who was just out of law school and had 
never defended a murder suspect. Miranda vigorously maintained his 
innocence throughout the proceedings and supplied his defender with 
numerous people who would testify on his behalf. Miranda claimed that 
of the forty people who could have served as witnesses, the lawyer only 
interviewed three and did not serve a subpoena on a single one. Miranda 
also asserted that the lawyer's trial performance was equally deficient, 
resulting in him being found guilty of all charges and sentenced to death. 
After having spent fourteen years in prison, Miranda was found 
innocent, his conviction was reversed, and he was released." 
B. MANY oF THE SYSTEMS Do Nor FuNCTION 
Poor people account for more than 8o% of individuals prosecuted." 
These criminal defendants plead guilty approximately 90% of the time. 
In those cases, more than half the lawyers entered pleas for their clients 
without spending any significant time on the cases, without interviewing 
witnesses or filing motions. Sometimes they barely spoke with their 
clients. '3 
10. Dao Christensen, No More Instant Plea Deals, Says Public Defender, DAILY Bus. REV. , June 6, 
2005, available at http:llwww.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1II778952036o. While the Florida defender is 
remarkably candid, he is not the only lawyer taking this approach. In St. Louis the public defender's 
office recently began to refu.,e to represent defendants charged with minor offenses because of 
concerns with rising caseloads. The Missouri State Defender supported the move away from the 
current system which he described as "meet 'em and greet 'em and plead 'em." R obert Patrick, Public 
Defender Rules Are Set to Change: Lawyers Say it's Unethical to Represem Some with so Little Time to 
Prepare, ST. LoUIS PoST-DISPATCH, July 3, 2005, at E t. 
11. Miranda v. Clark County, 279 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002). Clark County ultimately settled 
with Robert Miranda for $5 million after the Ninth Circuit ruled that counties can be sued for failure 
to provide adequate representation. Carri Geer Thevenot, Settlement Ends Ex-lnmate's Saga, LAs 
VEGAS REv.-J .. June 30, 2004, AT 1A . 
12. See CAROLINE WoLF HA KLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTicE, DEFENSE CouNSEL IN CRIMINAL CAsEs 1 
(2000); STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEfRANCES. U.S. DEP'T Of JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE I ( 19!)6). 
See generally William J. St untz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J. L. & PuB. 
PoL 443. 452 (1997) . And the actual number of such individuals will increase as the number of poor 
people in the United States (currently estimated at 37 million) goes up. See A ssociated Press, U.S. 
Poverty Rate Rises to 12.7 Percent, CBS NEWS, A ug. 30, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/ 
2005/o8IJolaplbusiness/mainD8CABQ081.shtmL 
IJ. Many sources substantiate these statements. For an excellent overview of the entire area (and 
a fine discussion of these points), see DEBORA!! l. RHODE, ACCESS TO JuSTICE 122- 24 (2004). 
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An attorney was found to have entered pleas of guilty for more than 
300 defendants without ever taking a matter to trial. '4 In one case from 
Mississippi, a woman accused of a minor shoplifting offense spent a year 
in jail, before any trial, without even speaking to her appointed counsel. •s 
In some places, one lawyer may handle more than twenty criminal cases 
in a single day, with a flat rate of $50 per case.'6 In others, some defense 
lawyers providing counsel to indigent defendants under a state contract 
system can be responsible for more than rooo cases per year.'' In one 
major metropolitan area, San Jose, California, numerous defense 
attorneys failed to take simple steps to investigate and prepare their 
cases for trial. Some attorneys went to trial without ever meeting their 
clients outside the courtroom. Some neglected to interview obvious alibi 
witnesses. Some accepted without question reports from prosecutors' 
medical and forensic experts that were ripe for challenge.'8 
Entire systems have been viewed as essentially incapable of 
preserving fundamental constitutional rights. Here are a few examples: 
• Georgia: " [T]he right to counsel guaranteed by the state and federal 
constitutions is not being provided for all of Georgia's cit izens."'9 
• Virginia: "[The] indigent defense system is deeply flawed and fails to 
provide indigent defendants the guarantees of effective assistance of 
counsel required by federal and state law."'" "The deficiencies in 
Virginia's indigent defense system are notorious and have persisted 
despite production of ~~merous reports documenting the problems in 
the last three decades." 
• Louisiana: "[T]he indigent defense system devised by the legislature 
in Louisiana delivers ineffective, inefficient, poor quality, unethical, 
conflict-ridden representation to the poor."12 
• Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania does not guarantee indigent criminal 
defendants adequate, effective representation.23 
14 Jd. at 126. 
15 Id. 
r6. /d. 
17. /d. at 128. As Professor Rhode explains. the resulting situation is dreadful. "Unsurprisingly. 
these attorneys frequently missed deadlines a nd courl appearances, and many would have been unable 
to pick their own clients out of a lineup." /d. 
18. Frederic N. Tulsky, The High Cost of a Bod Defense, MEkCUR:Y NEws (San Jose, Cal.), Jan. 24, 
2006, at3A. 
19. REPORT OF CHIEF JusncE's [GA.) COMMISSIOI" ON INDIGENT DEFENSE PART I , a t 3 (2002) 
available at http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/press/idc/idchearings/idcreport.doc. 
20. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF li"DIGENT D EFENSE IN VJRGrNIA I 
(2004) [hereinafter INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA]. 
21. /d. at 7· 
22. NAT' L LEGAL Ato & DEFENDER Ass'N, IN DEFEI"SE OF PUBUC A CCESS TO J USTICE: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF TRIAL·LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LoUISIANA 40 YEARS AF1'ER GIDEON 56 
( 2004), available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/I 0']8863541·49/ A voyelles%2oParsh% 
20Body%20Tex1.pdf )hereinafter TRtAt·LEVEL INDIGEN1' DEFENSE). 
23. Nat' l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n . Gideon Reviewed: The State of the Natio n 40 Years 
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL 
• North Dakota: "The current system is in danger of failing to fulfill 
its constitutional mandate of providing indigent defendants with 
effective assistance of counsel. "'4 
One point must be emphasized here. In reviewing the difficulties 
found throughout the nation with right to counsel for poor people in 
criminal cases, many have expressed special concern regarding the 
relationship between the right to a lawyer and wrongful convictions. 
Apart from the constitutional right, for many people this concern can be 
an extremely compelling argument for having a functional strong 
defense. And, in light of the Supreme Court's right to counsel decisions, 
one of the most important changes in indigent defense is that we now 
know with certainty that we sometimes convict innocent people. Until 
the past decade, an argument about wrongful convictions as a basis for 
enhanced defense services was unavailable. But it is available now. We 
now have evidence that overworked and incompetent lawyers contribute 
to wrongful convictions and that truly well-prepared defense lawyers, 
with adequate support services, can attack the other causes of wrongful 
convictions, such as mistakes m eyewitness identifications and 
insufficient investigations. 
Is there a remedy for an outrageous state of affairs that leads to 
greater risks for the public and the deprivation of constitutional rights? 
Of course, such a remedy exists, and we have known this for decades. 
The remedy is the well-recognized approach of decent financial support 
from the government for indigent defense, and the presence of well-
prepared, reasonably paid, resourceful lawyers. Former Attorney 
General Janet Reno stated the matter forcefully: 
A competent lawyer will skillfully cross-examine a witness and identify 
and disclose a lie or a mistake. A competent lawyer will pursue 
weaknesses in the prosecutor's case, both to test the basis for the 
prosecution and to challenge the prosecutor's ability to meet the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A competent lawyer will force a prosecutor to take a hard, hard look at 
the gaps in the evidence . ... A competent lawyer will know how to 
conduct the necessary investigation so that an innocent defendant is 
not convicted .... In the end, a good lawyer is the best defense against 
wrongful conviction. '5 
While tremendous problems exist in providing "legal services to poor 
people in criminal cases, it is important to note that the Committee and 
its Reporters were greatly impressed with the services offered by many 
Later, http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/ro47 416381 .38/Gideon %2oReviewed%2o-%2oThe %20 
State%2oof%2othc%2oNation%2040%20Years%2oLater.pdf (last visited Apr. 14. 2006) . 
24. ABA, REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE S ERVICES IN NORTH DAKOTA I (2004) . 
25. Janet Reno, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks at the National Symposium on Indigent Defense (J u ne 
29, 2000), in OrncE oF JusTicE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF JuSTICE, REDEFINING L EADERSmP FOR EQUAL 
JUSTICE: A CONFERENCE RF.PORI' vi (2000) (hereinafter Reno Remarks). 
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dedicated defense lawyers across the nation. Moreover, despite the 
systemic difficulties documented in the pages that follow, one can 
certainly identify-and we do-some fine defense programs that function 
effectively. 
II. AN OVERVIEW 
Many features of the criminal justice system in the United States are 
often severely criticized, and fairly so. Complaints are common as to 
problems about sloppy investigative work, rules of evidence in 
prosecutions, the plea bargaining process, and a shifting focus in 
sentencing. In one area, however, lawyers and judges most often speak of 
the tremendous progress and foresight of the United States in promoting 
equal rights for all in the criminal justice system. This area is, not 
surprisingly, the right to counsel for indigents in virtually all criminal 
cases in the United States. The United States Supreme Court has twice 
spoken with great eloquence of the need for such rights, and has 
responded accordingly to difficult situations. 
In Powell v. Alabama, the Court struck down convictions in an 
egregious case involving indigent defendants: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and 
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of 
law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining 
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar 
with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be 
put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent 
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. 
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his 
defense, even though he may have a perfect one. He requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. 
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. '6 
In the landmark decision Gideon v. Wainwright, Justice Black wrote 
eloquently: 
(I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer , cannot be assured a fair trial 
unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious 
truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast 
sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of 
crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to 
protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are 
few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the 
best lawyers they can to prepare and present their defenses. That 
government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the 
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the 
26. 287 u.s. 45. 6~ (1932). 
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widespread belief that lawyers in criminal cases are necessities, not 
luxuries.'' 
The impact of the Gideon decision, especially, was amazingly broad. 
It was held to have full retroactive impact, the violation of the rule can 
never be deemed harmless error, and the right to counsel was extended 
well beyond the trial itself soon after the Court's decision.'8 The right 
extends to the vast majority of defendants.'9 
The Supreme Court did not give as full a right to a lawyer as it could 
have, leaving to the discretion of trial judges the appointment of lawyers 
for activities that occur prior to a formal charge,30 non-mandated 
appeals,3 ' and the minor cases where no imprisonment will be ordered.3' 
Still, in the main, our Justices deserve a reasonably high mark for taking 
action in a relatively short period of time to extend the right to a lawyer 
to most indigents in most important proceedings in most criminal cases.33 
It is, in addition, gratifying to realize that our fellow citizens have reacted 
positively to the broad Sixth Amendment rulings. The most extensive 
polling data available indicates that the public is both overwhelmingly 
satisfied with this direction and supportive of spending government tax 
dollars to pwmote this Sixth Amendment right.34 
27. 372 U.S. 335,344 (ISJ03)- See generally JAMES J. ToMKOVlCZ, THF. RIGHT ro THE AssJSTANCF. OF 
CoUNSEL ( 2002). 
28. The counsel right applies to post-charge interrogations. Massiah v. U nited States, 377 U.S. 201 
(I964). It a lso applies in some identification procedures which occur before trial. United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 2I8 (It)6']). The defendant is entitled to a lawyer at various pretrial proceedings such 
as arraignments and preliminary examinations. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I (1970). The 
defendant must be represented by counsel at sentencing, Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002). and 
with any automatic appeals, the right to counsel is applied automatically. Douglas v. California, 372 
u.s. 353 (1963)-
29- HARLOW, supra note 12, at 1; CAROL J. DEFRANCF.S & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, U.S. DEP'T OF 
JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LARGE COUNTIES, I999 I (2000), available at 
http:l/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjslpub/pdF/idslc9<).pdf; Bill Rankin, Indigent Def ense Rates F, ATLANTA J.-
CoNST., Dec. I2, 19<)0, AT I A (Georgia); NEBRASKA MINORITY & JUSTICE TASK FoRCE, [NDIGENT DEFENSE 
SYSTEM IN NEBRASKA (2004), avuilab/e ar http://court.nol.org/communitylind_deLstudy.pdf (Nebraska); 
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREM~ COURT COMMITTEE ON Gt;NDER & RACIAL BIAS IN TilE JUSTICE SYSTEM, FINAL 
REPORT I64-193, available at www.courts.state .pa.us/Jndex/Supreme/BiasCmtefFinaiReport.eh5.pdf 
(Pennsylvania); Hon. Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana, Address to 
the Joint Session of the Louisiana Legislature (May 3, 2005) (Louisiana). See generally RliODE. sup ra 
note 13, at 122. 
30. Kirby v. Hlinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). 
31. Ross v. Moffitt, 4I7 U.S. 6oo (1974). 
32. Scott 11. minois, 440 U.S. 367 ( 1979). 
33- One notable exception has been the Supreme Court's disturbing and disappointing view of 
the requirement of effective assistance of counsel for defendants. ln a series of cases, the Justices have 
established a low standard for re presentation (reasonable competence) and a tough requirement for 
impact (competent counsel would have affected the outcome of the proceeding) before the Sixth 
Amendment right will be violated. See infra, text accompanying notes 294-3T0. 
34· BELDEN RussENELLO & STEWART, AMERICANS CoNSIDER INDIGENT DEFENSE: ANAI.YSIS OF A 
NATIONAL STUDY OF Puauc OPINION (2002). A few points are especially worth noting. W hen presented 
with the statement " (p ]roviding competent legal representation is one of o ur most fundamental rights 
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If the public appears supportive, if the judiciary and the organized 
bar are justly proud of the right to counsel, how can those deeply 
disturbing and widespread problems discussed at the start of this Article 
be found so readily? The answer is that the promise of Gideon, giving 
fair and adequate representation to all criminal defendants in almost all 
prosecutions, simply has not been fulfilled as a matter of practice in 
many parts of the United States. To be sure, in a host of areas, thoughtful 
commentators refer to the justice system, at least with respect to the right 
to counsel, as being in critical disarray.3' 
The practical problems are widespread in the system, and shared by 
most states throughout the country. Indeed, details of such problems in 
any one jurisdiction can fill hundreds of pages, as indicated in the many 
in depth studies produced over the past two decades.36 Five years ago, a 
U.S. Department of Justice report indicated that "indigent defense in the 
United States today is in a chronic state of crisis."37 That state of crisis 
has certainly not been eliminated in this brief period. As one astute 
observer has stated: 
The goal in providing lawyers, as Gideon emphasized, is to assure 
fairness in our adversary system of justice and prevent the conviction 
of innocent persons. Yet, forty years after Gideon, this nation is still 
struggling to implement the right to counsel in state criminal and 
juvenile proceedings. Sadly, there is abundant evidence that systems of 
indigent defense routinely fail to assure fairness because of under-
funding and other problems. It is also more evident now than ever 
before that innocent persons, sometimes represented by incompetent, 
in the U.S.," 88% o[ those polled found this statement convincing and 65% very convincing. !d. at 5-
The report found that a majority of Americans believe that low-income people who are charged with a 
crime should be represented by attorneys with small enough caseloads to provide the necessary time 
to prepare a defense for each person they represe nt: 94% think it is important, and 57% say it should 
be guaranteed. /d. at 3- A majority of Americans also believe that low-income persons' altomeys 
should have the same resources per case that prosecutors have: 88% support the idea and 64% 
support il strongly. /d. at 4· A majority also believes that low-income persons should be provided with 
the resources to hire investigators to check evidence and find witnesses (91 % think it is important and 
55% guaranteed}, and the resources to obtain DNA and other scientific testing (94°/o important; 64% 
guaranteed). /d. at 3· More recent poUing data from the Commonwealth of Virginia is similar. See 
VIRGINIA IND~PENDENT DEFENSE COALITION, PUBLIC OPINION IN VIRGINIA ON INDIGENT DEFENSE {l004) . 
35- See, e.g. , Barbara Allen Babcock, The Duty 10 Defend. II4 YALE L.J . !489. 1515 (zoos); Cooks 
& Fontenot, supra note 6 at I<J7; Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto fur Public D ef enders, 39 
VAL U. L. REv. 91L 912 (2005); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon 's Promise: Lessons from 
England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HAsTINGS L.J_ 835, 838 (2004); Lawrence C. Marshall, 
Gideon's Paradox, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 955, 956 (2004); Pamela R. Metzger, B eyond the Brighl Line: 
A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doclrine, 97 Nw. U. L REV. r635, 1636 (2003); George C. Thomas 
III, llistory 's Lesson for the Right lo Counsel, 2004 U . ILL, L. REv. 543, 544 (2004); Jeffrey Levinson. 
Note, Don 't Lei Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective A ssistance of Counsel, 38 AM. 
CRTM. L REv. I47, I49 (2001 ). 
36. Almost all of the reporh have bee n compiled by the National Committee and arc now readily 
accessible. See infra, text accompanying notes 55-56. 
37· OFFICE Of JUSTICE PROGRAMS & BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, IMPROVING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Svsrf.Ms THI<OUGH E x PANDED STRATEGIES AND INr<OVATIVE CoLLABORATIOr<s IX ( 19 99). 
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unqualified, or overburdened defense lawyers, are convicted and 
imprisonedY 
A recent ABA Report also highlights this dismal picture: 
Overall, our hearings support the disturbing conclusion that thousands 
of persons are processed through America's courts every year either 
with no lawyer at all or with a lawyer who does not have the time, 
resources, or in some cases the inclination to provide effective 
representation. 39 
Many thoughtful Americans believe that we must take a very close 
look at the indigent counsel problems that are present throughout our 
nation.40 It is beyond time to have a serious discussion about how such 
problems can be addressed nationally. To that end, the Constitution 
Project and the National Association of Legal Aid and Defenders two 
years ago established the National Committee on the Right to Counsel, 
bringing together interested citizens from across the country in a 
bipartisan effort to create consensus recommendations for reforms. The 
Committee consists of state and federal judges, prosecutors, law 
enforcement leaders, policy makers, defense lawyers, and academics.4 ' 
38. Lefstein, supra note 35. at 838. As an example of this problem, a recent report from Oregon 
describes a "fiscal and public safety crisis." PUB. DEF. SF.Kvs. CoMM'N, ExEcUTIVE DIREcTOR's BmNr-IIAL 
REPORT 1'0 ·mE OREGON LEGISLA"IlVE ASSEMBLY 7 (2005). By early 2003, Oregon's public defense and 
public safety systems had suffered unprecedented setbacks: a cut of more than r6 % in the 2001-{)3 
budget for public defense services during three of the five Special Sessions of the Legislative Assembly 
in 2002. ld. This resulted in disruptions in public defense services, catastrophic losses to public defense 
contractors. and threats to the continued operation of the state's public defense system. /d. Further, 
this resulted in the postponement of the appointment of public defense counsel in more than 27-'Joo 
eases unt il the 2003-{)5 biennium; delays in the prosecution of those 27,000 cases increased threats to 
the public safety of all Oregonians as a conseq uencc. !d. 
39- AMERICAN BA~ AssociATION STANDING CoMMfiTEF. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEIT.NDANTS, 
GwEoN's BROKEN PROMISE tv (2oo4), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/ 
brokenpromise [hereinafter GwEON's BROKEN PRoMISE]. 
40. One well-knm'l'll lawyer sadly reminds us that "[n]o constitutional right is celebrated so much 
in the abstract and observed so little in reality as the right to counsel." Stephen B. Bright, Gideon "s 
Reality: After Four Decades Where Are We?. ABA CRIM. JUSTICE MAG., Summer 2003, at 5· 
4t . There are two honorary chairs. Fonner Secretary of the United States D epartment of 
Transportation William T. Coleman, Jr. serves on the American Law Institute Council and is a 
member of O'Melveny & Myers LLP. Former Vice President Walter Mondale, who also served as 
United States Senator, and-as Minnesota Attorney General-organized the amicus brief of twenty-
two states in support of Gideon in Gideon v. Wainwright. He is currently a partner at the law firm of 
Dorsey & Whitney LLP. The three co-chairs arc: Honorable Rhoda Bryan Billings, Professor of Law 
Emeritus, Wake Forest University School of Law [formerly Chief Justice of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court]; Honorable Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Attorney [Minnesota]; Honorable 
Timothy K. Lewis, Of Counsel at Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis [formerly of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit]. Members of the Committee are: Shawn Marie Armbrust , 
Esq., Washington, D.C.; Honora ble Jay Burnett of Houston; Colonel Dean M. Esserman, Chief of 
Police of Providence; Dr. Tony Fabelo of Austin; Professor Monroe H. Freedman, Hofstra University 
Law School; Susan Hermann of New York; Robert E. Hirshon, CEO of the Tonkon Corporation; 
Professor Bruce R. Jacob of the Stetson University College of Law; Abe Krash of Washington, D .C.; 
Professor Norman Lefstein of the Indiana University School of Law Indianapo lis; Honorable Larry 
Thompson, Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, General Counsel of Pepsi Co., Inc.; and 
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The Committee's work was informed by several nationwide research 
efforts, and also received valuable assistance from organizations such as 
the ABA, the National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA), 
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the ACLU. 
In this Article we will follow up on the work of the National 
Committee by looking to the background of the right to counsel in our 
nation and the problems encountered throughout American jurisdictions. 
We will also discuss remedies proposed to solve those problems. We start 
with a brief review of the constitutional right. 
III. THE BASIS OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL41 
In the early part of the zoth Century, little concern was expressed 
about the right to an attorney in criminal cases. The Supreme Court 
began a significant expansion of the right starting in the 1930s. In 1932, 
the Court decided in Powell v. A labama that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment required that an indigent defendan t on trial 
for a capital offense be provided counsel.43 While the facts there were 
extreme,44 the Justices' language, as noted earlier, was very broad. The 
Court expanded the right to representation when it later held in Johnson 
v. Z erbst that an individual accused of a felony in a federal court has a 
right to appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment if he or she is 
unable to afford an attorney.45 In a major retreat, however, the Justices 
soon decided in the well-known case of Betts v. Bradl~ that the right to 
counsel in the federa l constitution could not be applied routinely to 
Hubert Williams, President of the Police Foundation. Mr . Johnson is a past president of the National 
D istrict Attorneys A ssociation. Dr . Fabeto previously served as Director of the Texas Criminal Justice 
Policy Council; Ms. Herman was the Executive Director of the National Center for Victims of Crime; 
Professor Jacob and Mr. Krash both served as counsel in Gideon v. Wain wright; Professor Lefstein was 
the Chairman of the American Bar Association Section of Criminal Justice; Mr. Thompson was the 
De puty A ttorney Genera l in the United States D epa rtme nt of Justice; and Mr. Williams was the 
Police Director of New Jersey. 
42. These matters are explored in fa r more deta il in several of the a rt ides cited supra note 35· 
43· 287 U.S. 45, 68-7I (1932). 
44. This was the famous "Scottsboro Boys" case in which police officers pulled nine young black 
me n off a t rain alter two white women on the train accused the men of rape. Alabama taw r equired 
the appointment of counsel in capital case s, but the attorneys did not substantively consult with their 
clients and had done little more than appear in order to represent them a t the t rial. In fact. the 
de fendants did not speak with the lawyers until just minutes before their trial. An all-white jury 
convicted them of murder, and all but the youngest was sente nced to death. The tria ls were rapidly 
conducted, taking less than one day. See generally JAMES E. GooDMAN, STO~IES o F SC0 1TSBORO (1995). 
45· 304 u.s. 458, 463 (1938) . 
46. 316 u.s. 455. 473 (1942) . 
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states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47 
The Betts decision lasted for two decades. 
Finally, in r963, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed Betts and 
ruled in Gideon v. Wainwright41l that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel applied to defendants charged with felonies in state court under 
the Due Process Clause. In oft-cited language, the Justices concluded 
that "any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, 
cannot be assured of a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."49 
Justice Black, writing for the Court, found that average citizens lack the 
necessary legal skills to be able to mount an effective defense. The result, 
he stated, is that indigent defendants cannot be ensured a fa ir trial 
without the guiding hand of counsel.50 The decision in Gideon was based 
on the principle that all individuals in the criminal justice system must be 
offered a fair opportunity to defend against charges brought against 
them. The Court reasoned that the lack of counsel for most indigent 
defendants presented a direct threat to the equality and fairness of the 
judicial process: 
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws 
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards 
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every 
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be 
realized if the poor man char~ed with crime has to face his accusers 
without a lawyer to assist him.5 
A criminal defendant's right to counsel "may not be deemed 
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in 
ours."~, 
47· The case was decided ove r the vigorous dissent of Justice Blac k: 
A practice cannot be reconciled with "common and fundamental ideas of fairness and 
right," which subjects innocent men to increased da ngers of conviction merely because of 
their poverty. Whether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a trial in which, as 
he re, denial of counsel ltas made it impossible to conclude, with any satisfactory de gree of 
certainty, that the de fendant's case was adequately presented ... . 
Denial to the poor of the request for counsel in proceedings base d on charges of serious 
crime has long been regarded as shocking to the "unive rsal sense of jus tice" throughout this 
country . . . . 
It is not to be thought of, in a civilized community, for a moment, tb.at any citizen p ut in 
jeopardy of life or liber ty should be debarred of counsel because he was too poor to employ 
such aid. No Court could be respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear sucb. a trial. The 
defense of the poor in such cases is a duty re sting somewhere, which will be at once 
conceded as essential to the a ccused, to the Court. and to the public . . . . [Most states] assure 
that no man shall be deprived of counsel me re ly because of his poverty. Any other practice 
seems to me to defeat the promise of our democratic society to provide equal justice under 
the law. 
! d. at 476--]7 (Black, 1., dissenting) (internal quotation omitted). 
48. 37~ U.S. 335 (I')6J). 
49· /d. at 344, 343· 
so. ! d. at 345· 
51. !d. a t 344· 
52. /d . O f course, the right to co unsel in criminal cases is not just a federal right. It is also 
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Gideon certainly did not answer all the key questions involved with 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.53 Still, it set the principal 
benchmark against which the American criminal justice systems today 
must be measured. 
IV. THE RESEARCH CONDUCtED 
A. THE NATIONAL CoMMITTEE oN THE RIGHT TO CouNSEL 
For the first time in their histories, the Constitution Project and the 
National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) joined forces 
in early 2004, in a partnership to work on this crisis with the right to 
counsel. Together, they established the National Committee on the Right 
to Counsel. 
The Constitution Project is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization that 
seeks to educate and promote reform in areas involving controversial 
legal and constitutional issues. In recent years, the Project has sponsored 
successful initiatives dealing with sentencing, separation of powers, 
liberty and security, constitutional amendments, the death penalty, and 
the courts. 
The NLADA is the nation's leading advocate for legal professionals 
who work with and represent low-income clients, their families, and 
communities. Speaking on behalf of legal a id and defender programs, as 
explicitly guaranteed in most state constitutions. Most specific, perhaps, is the Louisiana state 
constitutional provision. Article I . Section 13, which directs the legislature to '·provide for a uniform 
system for securing and compensating qualified counsel for indigents" at "each stage'' of criminal 
proceedings. See also Ariz. Con st. art. II, § 24 ("In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person, and by counsel."); Miss. Const. art Ill,§ 26 ("In all criminal 
prosecutions the acctL-;cd shall have a right to be heard by himself or counsel, or both."); Ncb. Const. 
art. I, § II ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person or by counsel."); N.H. Cons!. art. IS ("Every person held to answer in any crime or offense 
punishable by deprivation of liberty shall have the right to counsel at the expense of the state if need is 
shown."). It is not only a constitutiona l right that is at stake in indigent defense. As recently noted in 
the report on the Oregon defense system, broader issues of safety, economy of resources. and public 
confidence are also of concern: 
The legal services provided ... represent an essential component of [the) . .. public safety 
system. Without public defense services, the ... [state] could not prosecute crime, protect 
children and families or hold offenders accountable ... . 
[The ] public defender attorneys also contribute directly to public safety by advocating for 
effective criminal sentences. correctional programs, family placements and juvenile 
dispositions that promote the reduction of crime and delinquency. 
PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES COMMISSION, THE E XECUTIVE OtkECfOR'S BmNNJAL REPORT TO THE OREGON 
LEGISLATIVE AsSEMBLY (JULY I, 2003- JUNE 30, 2005) l . available at http://www.ojd .state.ot.us/ 
oscalopds/Reports!Executive%2oDirector's%2oBiennial%2oReport%2o2oo3-os%zowith%zoappendiccs.pdf. 
53· Later Supreme Court decisions were to determine, for instance. when the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel attaches, what level o( counsel and counsel·related services is guaranteed, a nd how to 
measure the effective assistance of counsel. See generally Tomkovicz, mpra, note 27; Amanda Myra 
Hornung, Note, The Paper Tiger of Gideon v. Wainwright and the Evisceration of the Right ro 
Appointment o[Coun:;elfor Indigent Defendants, 3 C ARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 495 (2005). 
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well as individual advocates, it devotes its resources to serving the broad 
equal justice community. The NLADA provides a national voice in 
public policy and legislative debates on the many issues affecting the 
equal justice community. 
In their joint endeavor, the two organizations brought together on 
the Committee an extraordinary group of Americans: those with 
experience as judges, prosecutors, defenders, academics, victim 
advocates, law enforcers, and policymakers. Their task was to examine 
whether indigent criminal defendants across the nation receive 
competent assistance from attomeys/4 and also to create consensus 
recommendations for any necessary reforms. 
B. THE COMMITrEE'S RESEARCH AGENDA 
Several research projects were initiated by the Committee in order 
both to inform the members and to provide a basis for later action. These 
projects will soon be available in electronic form on the website of the 
Constitution Project.55 The law firm of Arnold & Porter LLP, on a pro 
bono basis, prepared a substantial report that traced the historical setting 
for the evolution of the law under the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, reviewed the key United States Supreme Court 
decisions in the area, explored current litigation regarding the right to 
counsel, and offered a set of innovative recommendations for change. 
The American University School of Public Affairs Justice Programs 
Office conducted an exhaustive literature review and analysis of every 
report, judicial, legislative, professional, and academic, written in every 
jurisdiction in the United States. The results are staggering, with literally 
hundreds of such reports now available in one place for consideration. 56 
Law students at the College of William and Mary worked to collect, 
organize, summarize, and analyze a representative sample of media 
coverage of indigent defense issues nationwide over the past ten years. 
While not intended to be an empirical study, the goal of the project was 
to compile a substantial sample, the breadth and depth of which would 
fairly reflect the salient issues confronted by states in attempting to 
provide poor criminal defendants adequate legal representation. The 
resulting database contains more than 900 newspaper articles and 
54· At no time during the past thirty years has any other person or organization undertaken a 
comprehensive analysis of the problems with the right to counsel in criminal cases in every American 
jurisdiction. 
55· See Constitution Project , ht!p:l/www.constitutionproject.org/ (last visited A pr. r 4, 2006). 
56. For the first time, these hundreds of reports are now available electronically in one place for 
those researching right-to-<:ounsel issues. It should be noted that other older studies do exist and are 
not part of the fina l American University product. References to these reports were found in the 
Commiucc's research, but the reports themselves could not be located by the Committee, William and 
Mary law students, or American University. 
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editorials from state and national newspapers from all fifty states, the 
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico from 1994 through 2004.57 
Newspaper coverage is best viewed as a broad reflection o f non-legal 
views from news reporters and the general public; still, the startling 
consistency of the media coverage across the nation suggests that there 
are well known problems with the indigent defense system nationwide. 
In addition , members and staff of the Committee .visited a number of 
cities and met with numerous criminal justice professionals during early 
2006. The visits helped inform the Committee in a very real way of the 
problems being encountered across the country. But they also showed 
that while the public seems strongly supportive of the right to counsel for 
all Americans,5R one task of the Committee will be to educate the nation 
about the inequities and problems that members found almost 
everywhere. All too often, the discussion among non-criminal justice 
professionals begins with the expression of surprise that there are any 
serious problems with the constitutional guarantee. A s one well-known 
non-law commentator wrote recently, "the right to an attorney ... [is] 
taken for granted today. "59 
The research projects taken together reveal that there are 
overarching, common issues facing state and local gove rnments in 
meeting the constitutional obligation established by Gideon and later 
federal and state cases. The committee obtained compelling evidence of 
a true constitutional crisis. The problems documented by the research 
are all the more startling given their breadth and depth. In the remainder 
of this Article, we discuss these problems and lay out broad proposals for 
changes that need to be initiated if our nation is to adhere to the 
mandate of the Sixth Amendment and the desires of our fellow citizens. 
V. THE CRISIS 
A. FINANCIAL SuPPORT 
By every measure in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice 
system, the defense function for poor people is drastically 
underfinanced.6o This lack of money is reflected in a wide range of 
57- The end product , though huge in scope and reasonably comprehensive, is understandably 
incomplete due to limitations of time, newspaper postings on web sites, and restrictio ns of licensing 
agreements with LexisNcJds and We stlaw. Nevertheless, we believe strongly that the result is a good 
overview of the national picture . It certainly cannot be taken, howeve r, as laying out eve ry article in 
every newspa pe r in every state. For instance, in large states such as California, New York, Te xas and 
Florida. the participa nts were able to look a t several of the leading papers in each s tate, but not at 
every one of the many papers in each. 
58. As refl ected in the polling data di scussed supra note 34· 
59· A nna Quindlcn, Keeping the Robes Clean, NEWSWEE K, July 25, ~005, at 68. 
· 6o. The disparity in funding between defense and prosecution is estimated to be enormous. We 
currently spend about one hundred billion dollars each year on criminal justice, but only about 2-3% 
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problems, including poor people's limited access to attorneys and the 
resulting ineffective assistance of counsel, both of which are discussed 
later in this Article. Here, however, we examine the broader impact of 
inadequate funding, excessive public defender caseloads and insufficient 
salaries and compensation for defense lawyers. 
I. Funding 
Methods of funding indigent defense differ among all fifty states and 
the District of Columbia. A nationwide study a few years ago revealed 
that in twenty-three states the state government is responsible for 
providing 100% of funding for indigent defense.6' In contrast, two states, 
Pennsylvania and Utah, provide no funding at the state level and leave 
the responsibility solely to individual counties. The District of Columbia, 
of course, receives all of its funding from the federal government. 
The remaining states vary greatly in the amoun t of funds provided 
by the state and by county governments and the methods through which 
those funds are derived. In some states, the public defense system is 
financed mainly by the state with minimum contributions by counties. 
Other states leave it to the county to establish a system of public defense 
and then either reimburse a percentage of the costs or provide 
supplemental funding. A few states, on the other hand, require counties 
to pay all costs at the trial level; the state then bears the responsibility for 
any appea ls. 
While commentators have long been concerned with the funding 
problems for indigent defense,62 most state and local governments have 
of that total goes to indigent defense . ROBERT lCA.GAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
LAW 94 (2001). Mo reover, poo r d efe ndants, in one commentato r's words, "receive only an eighth o f 
the resources p er case available to prosecuto rs. The d isparity is still greater when adjusted for the 
amounts ava ilable to other law enforcement officials for assistance in investigation and trial 
preparatio n." RHODE'. , supra no te I J , a t 123: accord DAVID Co LE, No EQUA~ JuSTICE 64, !4 (1999); 
D o uglas McCollam, The Ghost of Gideon, AM. LAw. , Mar. 2003, at 63 , 67; Editorial, Stare Should Pay 
for lndiger11 Defense. ATLANTA J.-CoNST. , Dec. 31 ,2001, at A·II (an eight-to-one disparity). T his is not 
to suggest that prosecutors m ay no t also have serious funding problem s. as they we ll m ay. See R onald 
George, Chief Justice, Califo rnia S upreme Court, State o f the Judiciary Address by Chief Justice 
Ro nald George to a Joint Session of the California Legislature (Mar. 23, 2004) ; Ronald Goldstock c t 
a l. , Justice That Makes Sense: Prosecution & Def ense Find Common Ground, 
THE CHAMPION, 2001 , h ttp://www.criminalj ustice.org!public.nsfChampionArticles/97decor? 
OpenDocument; Marcia Coyle & M arianne LaveUe, Legal Safeguards Don't Hamper Crime-Fighting, 
NAT' L L.J., D ec. 12, 1988, at 5· Still, the striking numbers re fl ect ed above and be low must give concern 
as to the par ticular needs fo r indigent defense. See generally Rona ld F. Wright, Parity of Resources for 
Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219 (2004). 
61. THE SPANGENBERG G ROUP, STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 
IN FisCAL YEAR 2002 34- 35 (2003). The most recent count indicates the number has risen to twen ty-six 
states. See T HE SPANGENBERG GRouP, A ssESSMENT OF THE Mrssouru PuBLIC D EFENDER SYSTEM. 
ArrACHMENT B r (2005) (hereinaft er MJsso uiu A ssESSMENT]. D at a o n the fifty s tat es was 
commissioned by the ABA and prepa red by The Spangenberg Group. It a ppears o n t he ABA website, 
http://www.abanet.o rg/legalserviceslsclaid/defe nder (last visited Apr . 14 , 2oo6) . 
62. II is not jus t t he low levels of financial s upport for the defe nse progra ms which a re 
June 2oo6] THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 1047 
only come to this realization relatively recently.63 Connecticut is a good 
example of a state that has taken strong steps to bolster its system. There, 
public defense is organized by the state and administered through 
regional offices. These offices handle nearly all indigent defense. In 
2003-2004 they took on more than 89,000 cases and had a budget of $35 
million.64 For this amount the state was able to provide 188 attorneys and 
181 administrative and support staff.6s The ACLU sued Connecticut a 
decade ago because of its inadequate system of public defense. In 1999, 
Connecticut reached a settlement with the ACLU in which the state 
agreed to reform the system and p.r:ovide better funding, lower caseloads, 
and improved training. Between 1997 and 1999, the state legislature 
increased public defense funding to a level that allowed for the hiring of 
approximately eighty additional attomeys.66 That is about 44% of the 
current number of Connecticut public defender attorneys made available 
in 2003-2004. Today, the state describes its public defender system as 
cost-effective67 and as having adequate funding and resources to keep 
case loads within mandated goals. 68 
troublesome. In addition, as one thoughtful commentator noted, there are invisible but great financial 
advantages given to prosecution offices, but not defense offices. 
Finally, prosecutors have greater access to investigators and experts than the typical 
publicly funded defense attorney. Putting aside the police resources necessary to build a 
case file to present to the prosecution, the governme nt often spends further resources for a 
follow-up invest igation to strengthen the case in ways identified by the prosecutor's reading 
of the file. Prosecutors also tum to expert assistance and testimony relating to scientific 
evidence more often than the defense. All of these components-salary, workload, and 
support services- combine to produce an overall gap in spending between the prosecution 
and defense functions. 
Wright, supra note 6o, at 232. The issue is discussed later in this Article. 
63. The impetus for change differs greatly throughout the United States. In some states such as 
Texas and North Carolina, dedicated legislators promoted movement. See infra Part Vl.A. In others, 
such as Georgia, Washington, and Virginia, it was the result of a shaming process coming from 
shocking exposes in news articles or comprehensive studies. The process of change in those states is 
also explored in Part Vl.A. Of coun;e, one should not discount the role of litigation here. As discussed 
in Part VI.B, actual or threatened litigation led to substantial changes in "states as varied as Arizona, 
Michigan, and New York. See Wright, supra, note 6o. for a thoughtful analysis of the role of litigation 
with attorney funding. 
64. CONN. DIY. Of PUB. DEFENDER SERVS., ANNUAL REPOH: COST OF PuBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES 
(zoos), available at http:l/www.ocpd.state.ct.us/Content/Annual2oo4f2oo4Chap4.htm. 
6s. Jd. 
66. Press Release, Am. Civil Uberties Union, Settlement Reached in ACLU's Class-Action 
Lawsuit Alleging Inadequacy of Cf Public Defender System (July 7, 1999), available at 
http:llwww.aclu.org/crimjustice/gen/IoiJ8prstfJ9'P'70'7·html. 
67. CONN. DIY. OF PUB. D~FENDER SERVS.,supra note 64. 
68. /d. Another good example is North Dakota. Until last year, per capita spending on indigent 
defense in North Dakota was among the lowest in the country. In 2005, the state legislature doubled 
the funding, from approximately $5 million in the last two-year period to $10 million for the next two-
year period. See N.D. CENT. ConE § 29-07-ol.l (2005). See generally Nat'! Ass'n of Criminal Def. 
Lawyers, North Dakota's Indigent Defense System, http://www.nacdl.orglpublic.nsf/defenseupdatesf 
Northdakotaooz (last visited May, 15, zoo6). Connecticut and North Dakota are not unique in 
increasing funding, several other states have also boosted financing here substantially. Still, on a 
nationwide basis, the funding levels remain te rribly low. 
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However, the budget picture in most other states is not nearly as 
positive. The Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy (DPA) received 
increased appropriations in Fiscal Year 2004,6<) but the amount spent per 
case still declined by 4.2% from 2003.7" This is due to a 12% increase in 
public defender cases during Fiscal Year 2003 and Fiscal Year 2004.7 ' The 
increase in overall funding in 2004 followed a reduced budget in FY 2002 
that was held over in FY 2003.72 The current level of funding in Kentucky 
permits public defenders to spend, on average, a total of 3.8 hours on 
each case.73 Earlier, DPA adopted performance guidelines for public 
defenders, under which they were to complete all of the following in the 
time allotted: review the charges, obtain and review discovery, meet with 
the client, interview witnesses, appear for arraignment, research and 
write motions, enter guilty plea or conduct a judge or jury trial, and 
attend a sentencing hearing.74 
In Ohio, where counties can seek partial reimbursement from the 
state, the costs of public defense are climbing. Summit County, which 
includes Akron, has seen its share of the costs (after state 
reimbursement) rise from $r.g million in 2000 to more than $3 million in 
2004. This is due to increasing caseloads and a decreasing percentage of 
reimbursement from the state. Criminal cases prosecuted in Summit 
almost doubled from 2000 to 2004. As these prosecutions increased, Ohio 
reduced its reimbursements from 45% of the cost to 27%.75 The Ohio 
Public Defender Commission, in its 2004 annual report, listed the total 
costs reported by the counties to the state and the amount the state 
reimbursed. For the thirty-five counties that sought reimbursement, Ohio 
paid approximately 31% of the total cost.76 In Fiscal Year 1998, Ohio 
reimbursed 44% of the costs to counties seeking payment.77 
6g. Ernie Lewis. Rising Caseloads Continue to Threaten Kentucky p,.b/ic Defender System, 
LEGISLATIVE UPDA'fll (Department or Public Advocacy), Fall 2004, at r, available at http:l/dpa .ky.gov/ 
library/legupdfFallo4_L.egUpdate.pdf. 
70. Associated Press. Public Defenders Say Money Short for Indigent Defendants. AP A LERT· KY. 
May 21, 2005. The problems in Kentucky continue. See Press Release, Ky. Dep't of Pub. Advocacy, 
Despite Modest Gains, KY Public Defender.; Experience Caseload Growth for s th Consecutive Year: 
KY Public Advocacy Commission Responds, http://dpa.ky.gov/m:wslpressRelease.php (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2oo6). 
71. Ky. Dep' t of Pub. Advocacy, supra note 70. 
p. Lewis, 'upra note 6<], at 2 . 
73· ld. at 4; see also Associated Press. supra note 70. 
74- Lewis, supra note 6g, at 4· 
75· Phil Trexler, Summit May Alter Its Legal Aid: As Criminal Def ense Ctm Rises, Non-profit 
Lawyers Group Has Plan to Take on Some Work, AKRON BEACON J., May 15,2005, at Br. 
76. O!iiO PuB. DEFENDER CoMM., 2004 ANNUAt RF.PORT 20 (2004), available at hllp://www.o pd. 
uhio.gov/us/us_2004.pdf. 
77· OHIO PUB. D EFENDER CoMM., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 36 (1999), available at 
http://www.opd.ohio.gov/us!us_l999·Pdf. 
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Indigent defense in Minnesota has been funded fully by the state for 
more than a decade. Public defender budgets there were cut in 2003 and 
2004. In 2003, the Minnesota Board of Public Defense asked the 
legislature to add an additional ro2 public defender positions. Instead, 
twenty attorney and staff positions were cut.78 In 2004, Minnesota public 
defenders operated on a budget of $53 million, which provided for about 
380 full-time staff attorneys. However, a plan to provide more funding by 
charging co-payments was found by the Minnesota Supreme Court to be 
unconstitutional, depriving the public defenders of $7.6 million in 
expected funds .79 
A new statewide public defender system m Georgia was 
implemented in 2004 in response to a 2002 Georgia Supreme Court 
ruling that the old system was "a hodgepodge of uneven, under-funded 
and overwhelmed county-run programs" that "heightened the risk of 
innocent people being wrongly convicted."A<' The new system is funded 
through increased court costs, criminal fines, and bonds. Nevertheless, 
the director of the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council said, 
"Our budget is as bare-bones as we can come up with .... Anything Jess 
would put us in a position of not being able to fulfill our mandate."8' 
In Louisiana, the issue of indigent defense funding is at the center of 
a statewide debate. In a recent editorial, The Shreveport Times wrote: 
Overhauling Louisiana's woefully under-funded indigent defense 
system to provide competent legal counsel to crime suspects isn't a 
social program for the poor. It's about justice for the accused, yes, but 
also about protecting the interest of crime victims .... 
"We owe it to our citizens," [Louisiana Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Pascal) Calogero said, in an account in the Advocate of Baton Rouge, 
"especially to the victims of crime, to do what we can to ensure that 
convictions are obtained that will survive the appellate process and 
constitutional challenge . . . so another victim does not have to go 
through the agony of an overturned conviction."'' 
The comments of the Chief Justice and The Times follow an April 
2005 ruling by the Louisiana Supreme Court that funding for indigent 
defense is not a local government responsibility.83 In its editorial, The 
78. Tom Robertson, Minnesota Lawyers Fru.<trated Over Shortage of Public Defenders, 
MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO, Sept. 30, 2003, available at http://news.minnesota.publicradio.orgl 
features/zOOJ/ayf?,a_robertsont_pdshortagel. 
79· State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.zd 403, 4IO (Minn. 2004). See Tim W. Budig, Budget Cuts, Lack of 
Funding Puts Public Defender Effectiveness in Jeopardy, ECM CAP. REP., June 22, 2004, available ur 
http://www.hometownsource.corn!capitoVzoo4fjune/2zpublicdcfcnse.h1ml. 
80. Bill Rankin, Defender System Gets Early Praise; State Indigent Program Off to Quiet Slart, 
AnANTAJ.-CoNST., Feb. 6, 2005, at 1F. The new system is discussed in Part VI.A. 
81. /d. 
82. Editorial, Don 'r Allow Justice /o Derail, SHREVEPORT TIMES, May 8, 2005 , at 6!. 
83. State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 335 (La. 2005). In sharp contrast, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court recently held that the state legislature's failure to fund a statewide public defender program did 
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Times further points out that a 2003 United States Department of Justice 
report revealed Louisiana to have the highest adult incarceration rate in 
the nation. However, the state only spent $2. IO per capita on indi~ent 
defense; neighboring states spent two to four times that amount. In 
2005, the state public defender system received funding of about $32 
million, $20 million below the level thought to be needed.85 Only $9 
million of that $32 million currently comes from the state, with local 
parishes responsible for funding the remainder primarily through court 
fees associated with traffic fines.&~> However, in some parishes, ticket 
writing can decrease and the court fees may not be imposed, which 
leaves certain locales without the necessary revenue stream for adequate 
indigent defense.87 As an example of inadequate funding, the public 
defender's office in Lake Charles, Louisiana had a negative balance of 
$16,ooo though it still had six capital murder cases remaining in the 
year.68 The local court was then forced to order the parish council to 
provide $275,000 for defense attorneys and other resources.89 In 2005, the 
state legislature began to take action aimed at reforming the system. 
Among the elements of a bill passed by the state Senate and approved by 
a House committee was a uniform statewide fee from traffic fines that 
replaces the varying fees assessed locally throughout the state.90 The bill 
also would provide guidelines for judges to follow before declaring a 
not violate the Constitution, as the county could not show that the system resulted in "systemic 
ineffective assistance of counsel in [the county] and throughout the state." Quitman County v. State, 
910 So. 2d 1032, 1048 (Miss. 2005). The dissenting justices strongly disagreed: 
The trial court ignored the foUowing evidence: 
a. There are a substantial number of instances where neither lawyer nor defendant 
recognize each other at arraignment, and prisoners remain in jail up to 4 to 5 months 
without any contact with their attorney. 
b. Client meetings a rc held in groups in the courtroom within earshot of the prosecutor 
and the judge. 
c. Public defenders routinely waive preliminary hearings, accept facts in indictments, 
and do not ask. for investigators or experts. 
d. There is no opportunity for the investigation or communication necessary to make 
an informed decision when pleas are e ntered on arraignment day. 
e . There is a vast disparity between the resources of the Stale and public defenders. 
/d. at roso-st (Graves, J ., dissenting). 
84. Editorial, Don't Allow Justice to Derail, supra note Sz. 
85. Elizabeth Fitch, Indigent Defenders Overloaded, Underfunded, NEWS-STAR (Monroe, La.), 
May 5, 2ous, at rA. 
86. /d. 
87. Editorial, Don't Allow Justice to Derail, .!upra note 82. 
88. Talk of the Nation, Radio lnrerview with Mark Ballard of The Advocme (Baton Rouge, La.), 
(Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast Apr. 13, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templales/ 
story/story.php?storyld=4598755· 
89- /d. 
90. John Hill, Indigent Defender Reform Heads into Final Screech, THe SHREVEPORT TIMES . June 8, 
200j . 
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defendant to be indigent, as opposed to the current practice of relying 
solely on the discretion of the judge. 
Missouri provides the most stark illustration of the funding problem. 
The state bears full responsibility for funding the indigent defense 
system. It provides a statewide public defender program. The state is not 
generous, however, in its funding, giving the lowest financing, on a cost-
per-capita basis, of any state in the nation. Moreover, Missouri has failed 
to provide any additional funding to the system in the past four years.9' 
No other state in the nation has done that, and most states have 
increased budgets by more than 10% during this time.9' 
Many states, including California, Mississippi, and Arizona, starkly 
illustrate the funding problems of indigent defense programs. None, 
however, is more startling and sobering than the Massachusetts 
experience, and this in a state which provides excellent oversight and 
training for its defense counsel. In 2003, court-appointed attorneys 
representing indigent defendants in Suffolk County, Massachusetts 
refused to take on new cases.93 Their stand was the result of a dispute 
over back pay from the previous year. After two days, the Governor 
signed a spending measure that made up for the amount owed.94 
The concern of public defenders and appointed counsel in 
Massachusetts is not simply that they are not getting paid what they are 
owed, but that the rates at which they are paid are desperately 
inadequate. In 2003, the state paid its appointed counsel the third-lowest 
rate in the nation. For district court cases, court-appointed attorneys 
received $30 an hour, which was five dollars less than they had been paid 
seven years earlier. For superior court cases, the rate was $39, and in 
murder cases an attorney could earn $54 an hour.95 Believing these rates 
to be so low as to violate the defendants' right to effective assistance of 
counsel, attorneys sued the state to force an increase.96 The 
Massachusetts defenders sought raises in hourly rates to $6o for district 
court cases, $90 for superior court cases, and $120 for murder cases.97 
Because of the low pay and high caseloads, the number of attorneys 
willing to act as appointed counsel declined by 9% from the late 1990s 
through 2003.;~~~ In some places the number of available attorneys 
9!. Joe Lambe, Public Defeme System in Dire Slate, Report Says, KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 8 , 2oo6, at 
84 (discussing the 2005 evaluation of the Missouri System). 
92. M1ssouR1 AssESSMENT. supra note 61, at app. 81. 
93· Kathleen Burge, Ending 2-Day Scandoff, Lawyers Now Accepting New Cases, Bosro N GLOBE, 
Aug. 8, 2003, at BJ. 
94- /d. 
95- /d. 
96. Thanassis Cambanis, Poor Lack Counsel; /~wyers Cice Low Pay, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 13, 
2003, at AI. 
97· Jd. 
98. Jd. 
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declined by 10%.9'1 The same problem surfaced with state-employed 
lawyers: 
Across the state right now, people are leaving our agency and we can't 
fill [the jobs] because they've under-funded us again this year. It's a 
critical situation .... We have been cut for about three years in a row; 
it's around another 5% this year, to the point where we have about an 
$8oo,ooo shortage in the budget to pay the staff salaries around the 
state. Right now, there's the possibility that we're going to have 
voluntary furloughs next spring, the end of the fiscal year.""' 
The chief counsel for the governing state agency illustrated the 
problem with ensuring quality counsel in Massachusetts for indigent 
clients. His example focused on an attorney who had come to 
Massachusetts from the University of Michigan. However, after five 
years of service, the $39,000 annual salary she made in Massachusetts 
could not compete with the $74,000 salary she received when she 
accepted a position with the Washington, D.C. Public Defender 
Service.'o' 
Their paltry salaries are a disgrace to the quality of justice in 
Massachusetts, and the Commonwealth is ill-served by not being able 
to retain the services of these dedicated public servants. Yet it does not 
have to be this way. For less than $1.5 million, all Committee for Public 
Counsel Services (CPCS) staff attorneys could be raised from their 
current financial abyss to the salary levels of other state counsel. For 
another $7 ·5 million, all assistant district attorneys and assistant 
attorneys general could receive identical financial justice.'"' 
In 2004, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that 
indigent defendants were in fact not receiving the constitutionally 
guaranteed right to counsel. The ruling said that, as a consequence, 
defendants could be jailed only for seven days without a lawyer and that 
after forty-five days without seeing a lawyer charges would be dropped. '03 
One county judge followed the ruling and, despite objections, released 
three defendants charged with drug offenses.' 114 What the court did not 
99· ld. 
100. Hamilton Kahn, Court Appointed Attorneys Face Budget CuiS, Heavy Case/oads, THE 
PRoVINCETOWN BANNER (Mass.), Oct. 9, 2003 (quoting Bill Robinson, attorney-in-charge of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services in Massachusetts). 
IOI. William J. Leahy, Editorial. As You Were Saying: State Pays Third Rate Wages !0 First-Rate 
Public Attomeys, BosTON HERALD, Apr. II , 2004, at 26. 
102. ld. 
103. See Lavallee v. Justices, 812 N.E.2d 895, 911 (Mass. 2004). 
104. See Jonathan Saltzman, Court Slams Low Pay Rate For Defense Lawyers SJC Says The Poor 
Are Denied Rights, THE BoSTON Gl.OBE, July 3, 2004, at B1. With terrible shortages of defense lawyers 
in New Orleans-the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and severe funding problems-"[t]wo of the 12 
judges in the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court have ra ised the prospect of mass releases of 
defendants by suspending prosecutions in their courts." Laura Parker. Lack of Public Defenders May 
Force New Orlean• to Free Accused Felons, USA ToDAY, Feb. 14, 2oo6, aliA. 
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do, however, was order a pay raise for defenders, though the judges' 
language is strong: 
Public safety .. . comes with a cost. One of the components of that cost 
is the level of compensation at. which counsel. for indigent defendants 
will provide the representation required by our Constitution .... The 
inadequacy of compensation for private attorneys who represent 
indigent criminal defendants has persisted for many years. The 
continuation of what is now an unconstitutional state of affairs cannot 
be tolerated.'"' 
In 2004, the Massachusetts legislature did raise fees for appointed 
counsel, but not to the levels sought. Instead of hourly increases to $6o, 
$90, and $120, legislators added an addition $7.50 per hour."16 A state 
commission had recommended much greater increases in hourly pay 
rates. w7 Two years after the Suffolk County defenders refused to take on 
further cases, threats of a work stoppage arose again. ,o~~ 
A major, and potentially very positive, legislative development then 
occurred in July 2005, whe n the state legislature passed even more 
significant changes for Massachuse tts. This legislation raised 
compensation levels higher, with counsel in district court receiving $50 
per hour, lawyers in superior court getting $6o ($100 per hour for 
homicide cases), and restrictions being imposed on th e number of hours 
court-appointed attorneys could bill the state annually (1400).'09 
2 . Caseloads 
Firmly enmeshed in the funding dilemma is the problem of 
overwhelming caseloads carried by public defenders and appointed 
counsel.'"' As a result, defendants can often spend weeks or months 
105. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 910. 
ro6. See Michael Levenson, Pay Controversy !.eaves Attorney Struggling, A ngry Says Family 
N eeds Must Come First. BoSToN GLOBE, Aug. 18,2004, at B4. 
107. See Editorial, Fair Pay f or Defenders, BaSTON HERALD, June 20, 2005, at 28. 
108. See Maggie Mulvihill. Public Defenders' Thrc«l Over Pay: 'It Will be Chaos', B osTON H ERALD, 
J une 17, 2005, at 7· The problem s in Massachusetts have continued. and t hey are not lintited to one 
county. Just this past year, as explained in o ne news article: 
[J)u dges in Middlesex and Suffo lk counties sent court officers to scour t he ha llways of their 
cour thnuses to solicit attorneys willing to represent indigent clients ... t here was no lawyer 
ava ilable in Chelsea District Court, where sixteen new defendants were 
cha rged .... Attorneys were not available for t he domestic violence session at D orchester 
District C ourt o r Boston Municipal Court, (and in) Roxbury District Court, m o re t han fifty 
criminal cases wer e continued . . . so attorneys could be rounded u p. . . . In April, a 
commiss io n appo inted by t h.e governo r to study the pay-rate issue recommende d fee hikes, 
but the Legislat ure has fa iled to fund them. 
M aggie Mulvih.ill, Kerry Decries States" 'Unconstiluriona/' Law Crisis, BosTON H ERALD, J u ly 7 , 2005, at 
7-
109 . S ee Tnn S PANGENB ERG GROUP, I NDIGENT DEF~NSE IN MASSAC HUSET TS: A CAsE HIS fORY o t· 
REFORM 5 (2005), available at http:Jiwww.abanet.org flegalserviccsldo wnload slsc laidfindigcnlddense/ 
MAindigdcfrefornuoos.pdf [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS R EPORT). It is estim at ed tha t M assa chusetts 
now spends $120 milli on annually on indigen t d efense. I d. at 6 . 
no. Part of the difficulty is that no uniform syst em natio nwide defines " caseloads." In some states, 
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without meeting their attorneys and defense lawyers sometimes have just 
minutes to prepare for court hearings or even trials. At a 1998 press 
conference, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers president 
Gerald B. Lefcourt commented: 
But no matter how dedicated or idealistic. a public defender carrying a 
caseload of as many as 700 cases a year, with no investigator, no 
secretary, no paralegal, no law library, no computer, none of the 
resources that police and prosecutors take for granted-that lawyer 
cannot effectively represent his clients."' 
In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals set forth recommendations for limits on public 
defender caseloads. The NAC stated that a single attorney in a year 
should not carry more than rso felonies, or more than 400 
misdemeanors, or more than 200 juvenile cases or more than twenty-five 
appeals." ' If an attorney handles the limit in one category then those are 
all the cases that person is to handle. Many lawyers throughout the 
nation do not come close to meeting that standard."3 
the number of cases a public defender carries is the actual number they report. However, other states 
create formulas through which certain types of cases arc given greater weight than others. ln Benton 
County, Washington, objections were voiced in 2001 to a plan by which the county would count " less-
serious" cases as one-half of o ther more serious cases. Janine Jobe, Defenders Reject Benton's Offer, 
TRl·CnY HERALD (Wash.), Nov. 28, 200r, http:JJwww.tricityherald.com/news/200 l/ 1128/Story3.html. 
However, in Connecticut, weighting of cases has become standard. Caseloads in Connecticut arc 
defined as "new cases assigned." DIY. OF PuB. DEFENDER SERV., STATE OF CoNN., THE D EMAND FOR 
PuBuc DEFENDER SERVICES, available at http://www.ocpd.state.ct.us/Content!Annuahoo4f 
2004Chap2.htm. Depending on the type of public defender office the case comes to, Connecticut 
identifies "new cases assigned" differently. In Judicial District offices, caseloads are calculated by 
noting each murder and non-death penalty capital case as two cases. Each capital felony case in which 
the death penalty is sought is counted as ten cases. Then, minor felonies, misdemeanors, motor 
vehicle, cases transferred by the Special Public Defender, and other case.' are subtracted. 
Geographical Area public defender offices determine caseload by subtracting transferred cases from 
the Special Public Defender a nd "cases that are nolled or dismissed on the date of appointment and 
bail only appointments." !d. And. finally, Juvenile Matters offices subtract various categories of cases. 
/d. For many years, commentators have argued for a unifom1 reporting system. See NAT'L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, STAn; COUNT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING, (2003) , available a l 
http://www.ncsonline.org/D_Researchlcsp/StCtGuide_StatReporting_Comp lete_ 
colorro-26-os.pdf.; NAT'L CtR. FOR STATE COUJ!TS, STATE CouRT Moon STATISTICAL 0JCnONAl!Y: A 
JOINT EFFORT OF TilE CONFERENCE OF STATE CoURT ADMINISTRATORS AND THE NAT'L CrR. FOR STATE 
CouRTs, (198<)). NLADA has also prepared materials on case weighting and analysis. See NLADA 
Defender Legal Services- Standards http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/ 
Defender_Standards_Homc (las t visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
I I 1. News R elease, Nat' I Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Wenatchee Witch-Hunt Emphasizes 
Need for Public Defender Funding (June 2, 199ll}, available al http://www.nacdl.org/MEDW 
prOOOI I8.htm. 
II2. ABA STANDING CoMM. ON LEGAL Am AND Ir-onmENT DEFENDANTS. TEN PRINCIPLES OF A 
PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVE RY SYSTEM 5 n.I') (2002}, available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/ 
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/lenprinciplesbooklet. pdf [hereinafter TEN PRINCIPI"Es OF A PuBLIC 
DEFENSE). 
113. Workload limits have been reinforced by a number of systemic challenges to under-funded 
indigent defense systems, including judicial determinations that a defender' s caseloads may preclude 
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By 2001 the Clark County (Nevada) Public Defender Office had 
juvenile caseloads at about seven times the NAC recommended limit. 
Each of the two attorneys on the juvenile division staff had caseloads 
approaching 1500.''4 A NLADA survey found that as the cases in the 
division increased from I993 thmugh 2001, the focus of the attorneys was 
not so much on representing their clients as it was "about processing 
cases. ""5 The evidence they present shows a more than so% decrease in 
the amount of time available to the office to dispose of a case. In 1993, an 
average case took about sixty-three days to complete. By 2001, it was 
down to approximately twenty-six days. 
In Louisiana, a public defender in Rapides Parish told the judge in a 
recent murder prosecution that she could not adequately defend the 
accused because she was so overwhelmed with cases that "if you divide 
the number of hours in a day by the number of cases ... , I would be 
allowed ... to devote eleven minutes ... to each of the Public Defender 
files that I have .... (I]t's just not humanly possible for me to do that.""6 
Each defender there has a caseload of 472 clients."7 Because of the 
caseload burden, Rapides Parish public defenders began to refuse new 
clients, so a judge in Louisiana's Ninth Judicial District used the 
telephone book to call attorneys and appoint them to represent indigent 
defendants. Recognizing the situation as dire, the judge said, "We've run 
into a real crisis that we just can't address on the local level. What we 
need to do is hire more attorneys and pay them well, at least as much as 
h k . !18 t e prosecutors are rna mg." 
The ninth Judicial District in Minnesota covers seventeen counties 
and has the highest caseload in the state."9 The chief public defender in 
the district has had to deal with lawyer resignations-eight within one 
year-and says that without additional funding the situation could be 
the furnishing of adequate defense representation. See, e.g., Luckey v. Harris, 86o F.2d 1012 (nth Cir. 
1988); State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Hanger, 7o6 P.2d 1240 (Ariz. Cr. App. IC}Ss); 
Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770 (Ark. 1991); Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 682 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1'}84); 
People v. Knight, 239 Cal. Rptr. 413 (Ct . App. •987): Hatten v. State, 561 So. zd 562 (Fla. 1990), cert. 
denied. 495 U.S. 957 (1990); Jn re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial 
Circuit Public Defender, 561 So. 2d I 130 (Fla. 1990); State ex rei. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 8r6 (Kan. 
1'}87); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993); Kennedy v. Carl>on, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996); State 
v. Robinson. 465 A.2d 1214 (N.H. 1983); State ex rei. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.ld fi4 (Mo. rg8l), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. II42 (1982): State v. Lynch. 796 P.2d IISO (Okla. 1990); Mount Vernon v. Weston, 
844 P.2d 438 {Wash. Ct. App. 1992). This matter is discussed further in detail in Part VJ.B., infra. 
II4. See NAT'L LEGAL Am & DEFENDER Ass'N, NAT'L CoMMITTEE oN THE RIGHT TO CouNSEL, 
ExcF.sSJVE CASEWADS, a"ai/able at http://www.nlada.org/Ddender/Defender_Kit/NCRC. 
115 See id. 
r r6. State v. Bell, 8g6 So. 2d 1236, 1240 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
ll7. See id. 
u8. Mark Ballard, Public Defender Changes Sought. TnE SuNDAY Aovoc. (Baton Rouge, La.), 
May 23, 2004, a t r·A. 
r rg. See Roberrson, supra note 78. 
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disastrous. On the whole, public defenders statewide each handle more 
than goo cases a year."o 
The Colorado State Public Defender Office says that the number of 
cases handled by its attorneys is both growing in number and in 
complexity. 121 Also, the increase in the number of cases has outpaced 
population growth in the state-5% versus 1.8%.= 
In 2004, the Washington State Bar Association released a paper that 
revealed that even in places where public defender programs are strong, 
they are far from perfect: 
Despite the existence of strong public-defender programs, and able 
individual (sic] assigned counsel and contract defenders in Washington, 
there are many cities and counties where the lawyers are totally 
overwhelmed by crushing caseloads .... Often, they are coping with 
their caseloads, but do not have the resources to send lawyers to 
arraignment hearings."' 
In Seattle, a 2004 plan to revamp public defender services was met 
with criticism by the King County Bar Association. One of the 
complaints against the proposed system, designed to eliminate the 
county's role in public defense and allow the city to contract directly with 
private attorneys to handle indigent defense, was that it did not impose 
stricter limits on caseloads. '"' The fear was that the city's misdemeanor 
caseloads (about 380 cases per year) were perilously close to the ABA 
recommended limit of 400 cases. The caseloads of Seattle defenders had 
already exceeded the state bar's limit of 300. ,,s This followed on the heels 
of a 2001 situation in Washington State in which Benton County public 
defenders-all of whom are part-time-rejected a contract offer because 
of overwhelming caseloads beyond suggested limits."6 One mayor, also a 
public defender, said, "They can't do the numbers they do and expect a 
first-rate defense. " 117 
The need for reduced caseloads is central to improving the defense 
for indigent clients. In Virginia, Fairfax County public defenders asked 
that traffic violations be dropped from their assignments in order to 
120. See id. 
121. See Office of the State (Colo.) Public Defender, http://www.state .eo.us/defenders/ 
services.htrnl. 
122. See id. 
123. Robert C. Boruchowitz, The Right to Counsel: Every A cwsed Person's Right. WAsfl. STATE 
BAR A ss'N BAR NEws, Jan. 2004, avClilable at www.wsba.orgfrncdialpublicationslbamewslzoo<Jfjan-o4-
boruchowitz.htm (last visited Apr . 14, 2006). 
124. See Ken Armstrong, L egal-Defense Cost Cutting? Mayor Urged Not to Tinker, SEAtTLE TtMES, 
May 14, 2004. at Br. 
125- See id. 
126. See Jobe, supra note uo. 
127. /d. 
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lighten caseloads."R That request was granted. What was not granted was 
a request to hire more attorneys."9 In 2004, Fairfax County public 
defenders represented more than 8ooo clients and currently carry a 
caseload of more than 400 cases each.'30 . James .M. McCauley, ethics 
counsel to the Virginia State Bar, wrote: 
Overwhelming caseloads, especially for public defenders, contribute to 
the perception by many that "assembly-line" justice is all one can 
expect. Effective assistance of counsel means "that the lawyer not only 
possesses adequate skill and knowledge, but also that he has the time 
and resources to apply his skill and knowledge to the task of defending 
each of his individual clients." Case loads (or Virginia indigent defense 
counsel render effective assistance impossible in many instances. 131 
A plan in Wisconsin would decrease caseloads by decriminalizing 
driving without a license, an offense that makes up 70% of the cases in at 
least one Wisconsin county's court. '31 Though the plan appears to have 
been pushed principally in order to reduce the workload on prosecutors, 
the plan would remove state public defenders from those cases entirely.'33 
In Kentucky, the need to overhaul the indigent defense system led to 
the creation of the Blue Ribbon Group, which recommended in 1999 that 
the state provide additional funding to hire thirty-five more attorneys to 
help alleviate caseloads. In 2000, the state legislature provided funding 
for adding ten new lawyers.'34 However, further reductions in the budget 
decreased that number to five attorneys. '35 In 2004, caseloads per 
attorney averaged 489-4'36 with sixteen offices in Kentucky having 
caseloads ranging between 500 and 6oo, and with another office 
registering an average caseload more than 6oo. The Department of 
Public Advocacy has deemed these offices at a "critical" level.'37 For 
128. See Tom Jac kman, With Staff Stretched Thin, Chief Asks Judges to Curtail Caseload, WASH. 
Posr, Mar. 20, 2005, at Co4. 
129- See id. 
IJO. /d. While the Fairfax County case reduction plan may assist the public defenders in providing 
better service to some clients, courts are then faced with finding counsel willing to handle the traffic 
and misdemeanor cases at very low compensation rates. See id. 
131. James McCauley, Excessive Workloads Create Ethical Issues for Court-Appointed Counsel 
and Public Defenders, VA. LAw., Oct. 2004, at 2, available ar http://www.vsb.org/publications/valawyer/ 
octo4faccess.pdf. 
132. See Andy Neleson, Law Change Could Jump-Start Courts, GREEN BAY PREss-GAZE'ITE, June 
5. 2005, at lA. 
133· See id. 
134 ERNIE LEWIS, DEP'T OF PuB. ADVOCACY, LEGISLATIVE UPDATE CovERING CRJM. JusTicE 
LEGISLATIVE IssuES, No. 14, DEFENDER CASELOADS RisE JN FYo1 AND FtllST NINE Moi'IT!ts OF FY02 6 
(2002), available al http://dpa.ky.gov/libraryllegupd/Juneoz_LegUpdate.pdf. 
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LEGISLATIVE I·ssuES, No. 20, RrstNG CASELOADS CoNTINUE TO THREATEN KENTIJCKY PUlll.IC DEFENDER 
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2003-2004, at 16 (Sept . 2004), available ar http://dpa.ky.gov/librarylcaseloado4.pdf. 
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Fiscal Year 2005 the DPA anticipated funding for ten caseload relief 
attorneys, but even with such funding, the caseloads per attorney would 
only drop to 471, from 489, and that is "only if the recent trend upward in 
overall caseloads ends."'38 The Kentucky DPA releases a legislative 
update twice a year. In fall2004, the focus was on the caseload dilemma: 
When caseloads are as high as they presently are in Kentucky ... 
neither the client nor the individual public defender is being treated 
with fundamental fairness. It is unfair to give an indigent accused a 
lawyer who does not have time to handle his case .... Kentucky relies 
upon its public defenders to ensure that when liberty is taken from a 
citizen, we can rely upon the judgment that took that liberty. Public 
defenders truly operate as a check on government, to make sure that 
the police are arresting properly, that prosecutors are charging 
properly, and that sentences are fair and just. When caseloads are so 
high that a public defender can only spend 3.8 hours per case, including 
serious felony cases, Kentucky's public defenders cannot ensure 
reliability. '39 
The problem of heavy caseloads caused a stir in New Mexico when, 
seeking to alleviate the burdens on state pu!)lic defenders, government 
officials placed an ad in the New Mexico Bar· Bulletin seeking private 
attorneys willing to work for free for indigent defense at the appellate 
level.'40 
In 2000, the President of the Florida Public Defender Association 
wrote to the Governor under the specter of statewide budget cuts. The 
letter spotlighted the fact that the more anti-crime initiatives the state 
legislature passed, the more work public defenders were responsible for 
handling. Though remaining sensitive to the priorities of anti-crime 
legislation, the writer pointed out that chaos would result if budgets were 
slashed. The resultant backlog of cases would render public defender 
offices unable to perform their functions.' 4 ' 
In Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, nine defendants waited two years for 
their trials to begin. As a result, the state supreme court said that courts 
could stop capital prosecutions against indigent defendants until more 
funding became available.'4' Because of lack of funding, public defenders 
in Calcasieu Parish carry caseloads at nearly four times the ABA 
recommended Ievels.'43 Another account put the number in Calcasieu at 
138. ld. at 3· 
139- I d. at 4· The problems in Ke ntucky remain. See supra note f19. 
140. See Jeremy Pawloski, State's Ad Has Defense Lawyer Up in A rms. ALBuQuERQUE J. , Apr. 9, 
2005, at 1. 
I4L See Letter from Howard H. Babb, Jr .• President. Fla. Pub. Defender Ass'n, to Gov. Jeb Bush, 
Gov. of the State of Fla. (Nov. r , 2000), available at http:f/www.pbs.orgfwgbh/p agesffronlline/shows/ 
bostondalelsewherefbabb.htrnl. 
142. See Editorial, Don't Allow Justice to Derail, THE SHREVEI'ORTTIMES, May 8. 2005, at 61. 
143. Seeid. 
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almost six times the ABA limits.'44 In Louisiana's Ninth Judicial District, 
public defenders have caseloads much closer to the ABA limit than in 
Calcasieu. But in the Ninth District it is estimated that nine more 
attorneys are nevertheless needed to meet the caseload burden.'4s 
J. Compensation 
Of course, a great deal of funding for indigent defense goes into 
paying the attorneys representing the defendants. Depending on the type 
of indigent defense system used by a state or county, payment may be in 
the form of set salaries linked to full or part-time employment, or fees 
based on a contract rate, or on an hourly basis. And, as with the general 
funding issue, the question is whether the amount available is sufficient. 
The answer, generally, is no. 
a. Fees 
For court-appointed counsel, states or counties often set limits on 
the hourly rates and total compensation for the attorney. The most 
discussed, and criticized, system is Virginia's. Here there are "hard caps" 
on the amount a court-appointed attorney is to be paid, regardless of the 
length of the trial or the total hours she spent working on it. The 
Washington Post editorialized: 
[Virginia] too has abdicated its responsibility to provide reasonable 
counsel to defendants, a constitutional obligation the U.S. Supreme 
Court articulated more than four decades ago. The problem in Virginia 
I44. Fitch, supra note 85. 
145· /d. As statewide remedies are sought, a large part of the problem in Louisiana is inadequate 
record keeping. Without proper records on the number of cases, those trying to fix the indigent 
defense system really have no idea about bow serious the caseload problem is. The Execut ive Director 
of the Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board told The Ne ws Star (Monroe. LA), "I think we 
need to have some system of counting cases so we can detennine case load that is unifonn throughout 
the system .... If they are all counting cases in the same manner we can talk apples and apples." 1 d. 
Nevertheless, under any set of calculations, it is clear that the State of Louisiana has extremely serious 
problems in this area. See Cooks & Fontenot, ~upra note 35. at 2o&-o9, stating: 
!d. 
[T]he caseload for the average public defender in Calcasieu Parish is more than three times 
the caseload recommended by the Louisiana Indigent Defender A ssistance Board and more 
than four times the caseload recommended by the National Advisory Commission on 
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. Seven staff attorneys handle an average of 590 fe lony 
cases and rso misdemeanor cases. 
While the average time from arrest to disposition for felony cases nationwide is 214 days, 
in Calcasieu Parish it takes an average of 501 days to dispose of a felony case, with only 
20% of all felony cases disposed of within one year oftbe date of arrest. 
The greatest disparity is in time spent with the client. Jail visitation logs "identified a 
total of 31 trips by public defenders to visit clients, an average of w visits per month for the 
entire office. By comparison, private attorneys made 236 trips to visit incarcerated clients. 
The difference is pretty dramatic when one considers that the private attorneys handle only 
15% of the felony cases in Calcasieu Parish. while public defe nders handle the rest. 
The problems throughout the gulf coast states will likely worsen after Hurricane Katrina, as 
discussed supra note I04. See Henry Weinstein, Evacuated Prisoners are Captive to Legul Limbo, LA. 
TIMES, Oct. I6, 2005, at 26. 
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is not that funds run out but that payments to court-appointed lawyers 
are capped at levels so absurdly low as to be inconsistent with a 
constitutionally adequate defense in any case that is the least bit 
complicated. A lawyer facing a potentially lengthy trial for a pittance 
has an overwhelming interest in a quick guilty plea, not an aggressive 
defense. The Virginia courts cannot order the legislature to lift the fee 
caps. They could, however, bar prosecutions when the state refuses to 
pay adequately for an indigent's defense.'•" 
While court-appointed attorneys in Virginia may claim up to $90 per 
hour in fees, they are faced with the lowest payment cap in the nation, 
$1235.'47 But, that total is only for attorneys representing defendants who 
face twenty years to life in prison; if the potential sentence is for fewer 
than twenty years in prison the cap is $395.'48 And, for a misdemeanor 
punishable by jail time the cap is $112. '49 These caps are not waivable. 
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia touched on the 
subject briefly, but accurately: 
The issue of funding for court-appointed counsel has been a major 
concern for many years. When the Supreme Court submitted its 
budget request for the current biennium, the Court sought funds to 
increase significantly compensation paid to court-appointed counsel 
who represent criminal indigent defendants. Court-appointed counsel 
in Virginia are the poorest paid in the nation, and we must work hard 
to eradicate this problem .... For the first time in many years, the 
General Assembly allocated additional funding of $2,ooo,ooo for court-
appointed counsel who represent indigent criminal defendants. This 
increase is a small but important step in the right direction. However, 
we need more money to improve compensation for these attorney.' 5" 
Caps exist elsewhere in the country, too, though they can be waived. 
In Ohio, a recent case highlights the inability of court-appointed 
attorneys to be compensated at levels that make it possible for them to 
offer an adequate defense. The caps, set by Miami County, limited the 
compensation for a death penalty case to $4o,ooo, which was to be split 
between two attorneys and had to be used by them to pay support staff 
and take care of other expenses. '5' This total compensation may be 
146. Editorial, Louisiana's Wise Word, WASH. PosT, Apr. 12,2005, at A2o. 
147- Christina Nuckols, Legal Reform Lags in Year-Old Effort, VJRGJNJAN-PlLOT, Apr. 25, 2005, at 
Bj. 
148. See id. 
149. McCauley, supra note IJI, at 2. 
150. See Hon. Leroy Rountree Hassell , 2005 Virginia State of the Judiciary Address, available at 
http://www.courts.state.va.uslscv/statc_of_thejudiciary_address.html. Additionally, the Virginia 
Indigent Defense Coalition gave the state a grade of "F" for being unable to reach the goal of placing 
defense counsel in parity with the prosecution. See VA. iNDIGENT DEFENSE COAlffiON, VIDC REPORT 
CARD, www.vidcoalition.org/reponcard.html. Proposed legislation has recently been introduced in the 
Virginia legislature which would eliminate the caps. See Hugh Lessig, Virginia Warned on Poor·~ Legal 
Aid, DAILY PRESS, Feb.~. 2006, at AL 
151. Nancy Bowman, Lawyers Shun Death Cases Because of Low Pay, DAYTON DAILY News, May 
9, 2005, alAI. 
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compared to the $40,000 spent by the prosecution in the same case 
merely to have one witness give expert testimony.'52 However, Miami 
County is in the middle of the pack in terms of caps set by counties in 
Ohio. The caps range from·$3000 in one county through a maximum of 
$75,000 set by two counties.'53 
In Iowa, the former president of the Iowa State Bar Association 
decried the use of caps in paying for indigent defense. He asserted that 
the system actively discouraged competent attorneys from taking 
appointments. Recent law school graduates can no longer seek viable 
employment in the area because the debt loads from law school are too 
much and the compensation for indigent defense appointments is too 
little. "There is no chance," he wrote, "of servicing a $75,000 debt, let 
alone paying for a car, house and family, on the fees from indigent 
defense."' 54 In 2003, Iowa defenders could claim an hourly fee of $50 an 
hour for misdemeanor and some felony representation, but were faced 
with a $rooo cap for felonies and $soo for misdemeanors.'55 
Assigned counsel rates in New York increased in 2004 for the first 
time in seventeen years. From the mid-r98os through the turn of the 
century, lawyers received $40 per hour for in-court time and $25 per hour 
for work outside the courtroom. The new rates were set at $6o per hour 
for misdemeanors and $75 per hour for felonies.'56 
In 2001, Bexar County (San Antonio), Texas raised fees for indigent 
defense for the first time in thirteen years. Prior to the increase an 
attorney could make a maximum of $200 per day in court, but could now 
earn up to $750 per day on a first-degree felony.'57 
In California, where some counties pay private attorneys a flat 
contract fee to handle indigent defense, the state bar is critical of the 
results such contracts achieve. A study by the State Bar of California 
stated, "flat rate compensation ... encourages attorneys to do what is 
most profitable for them and what is efficient for the system ... but not 
what is in the best interest of clients."'56 
152. See id. 
153- !d. 
154. Alan Fredregill, A Changing Oil vs. Changing Vemte-A Case Study on Sociew/ Val11es, IowA 
LAw., Mar. 14,2003, at 5-
155· /d. 
156. John Caher, Statewide Standardf Urged for Indigent Defense CowiSel, N.Y.LJ. , Apr. 26, 2005, 
at r. 
157. Lisa Sandberg, Poor's Counsel to be Quicker, Better Paid, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, D ec. 
4, 2001, at IA. 
158. John F . Berry, County's Cost-Saving Practice Draw• Criticism from Review. PREss-
ENTERPIUSE, May 28, 2005, at B8. 
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b. Salaries 
In addition to fees and flat contract rate payments, there are 
thousands of public defenders who receive annual salaries. Salaried 
public defenders sometimes face paychecks that are less than their 
counterparts in prosecutor offices, despite an ABA-adopted standard 
that public defenders and prosecutors be paid at "comparable" rates.'59 
In many states the parity does exist. roo In others, however, the defense 
lawyers receive lower salaries. 
In Baton Rouge, the twenty-seven attorneys earn between $18,ooo 
and $35,000 annually, figures that are about 30% less than the salaries in 
the district attorney's office. '6' Public defender salaries in Alameda 
County, California ranged much higher than in Baton Rouge, anywhere 
in excess of $so,ooo to greater than $130,ooo, but the top prosecutor 
salaries there far exceeded those of the public defender office. '6' In 
Georgia, entry-level district attorney and public defender positions both 
start out a t the same annual salary, but the upper limit on the public 
defender salary scale is lower than tha t of the district attorney salary.'63 
The average salary for a Portland, Oregon public defender in 2000 was 
$45,426 compared to $61,638 for a prosecutor there.'64 
The key problem may not necessarily be a disparity in salaries 
between prosecutors and defense lawyers, though such a disparity 
certainly exists in many parts of our country. '6s Rather , the more serious 
dilemma may be that both sets of lawyers, at the state level, are paid too 
little. '66 In many states, including Alaska, Maryland, Idaho, Mississippi, 
Ohio, Illinois, California, Massachusetts, and New Mexico, prosecuting 
and defending lawyers are paid less than $4o,ooo per year.'&; 
159. See generally Wright, supra note 6o, at 232. 
r 6o. !d. at 232- 33. A 2004 survey by Na tional Assnciation fo r Law Placement (NALP) reve aled 
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the eleven·to-fifteen-year milestone, public defenders fall slightly behind with a $65,000 median versus 
$6<),255 a nd $68,139 for local a nd state prosecutors, respectively. Press Release , Nat'! Ass·n of Law 
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31, 2004), available al http://www.nalp.orglpress/details.php?id=6. 
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r 62. PBS, Presumed G uil ty (2002), http://www.pbs.orgikqedlpresumedguilty/3 .2.0.html (last visited 
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163 . Da na Mulhauser , Pay Dirt: Slates Are Beginning To Pay Public Defenders A s Much As 
Proseculors. That's The Wrong Solution To A Big Pro blem , LEGAL A FF., Nov. 2004, available at 
http:J/www.legalaffairs .org/issues/November·December-2oo4fargume nt_mulhauser_novdeco4.html. 
164. M ichelle Roberts. Public Def enders Go On Strike: Contract Discussions Break Down, THE 
O REGONIA N . June 27. 2000. a t Br. 
r6s. See W right, supra note 6o, at 230. 
r66. The federal e xperience is quite diffe rent. See What Lawyers Earn 2000, 
http:J/www.law.cornlspecia llprofessionalslnljleam/earns_4.html (last visite d Apr. 14. 2006). 
rfq . For ins tance , in Fairfax County. V irginia, a very high-cost community in the Washington, 
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The 2004 annual report by the Missouri Public Defender 
Commission cites low pay as one reason for the chronic problem of 
attorney retention. '68 The current annual turnover rate in Missouri is 
more than 21%. Those leaving the system include entry-level attorneys 
and other more senior attorneys who depart for careers in the private 
sector. A targeted pay raise has not occurred there in ten years, and 
general state employee raises were not sufficient to retain attomeys.'69 
The high turnover rate resulted in a backlog of almost 22,000 cases.' 70 
B. THE SPECIAL AND HIDDEN CosTs: FINDING LAWYERS TO R EPRESENT 
UNPOPULAR CLIENTS 
Our country has a proud tradition of providing defense to even the 
most hated defendants. A defendant's right to a fair trial was not only 
embodied in the Constitution by our founders, but also exemplified by 
their actions. In 1770, John Adams showed his belief in this right by 
defending British soldiers charged with manslaughter for their part in the 
Boston Massacre. He won an acquittal for the commanding officer and 
six of the eight accused soldiers. As a patriot, he chose to defend them 
because of his belief in a principle and not because he had sympathy for 
their cause. He took the case despite much criticism from his fellow 
patriots and risk to his business and personal safety.''' It is in this 
tradition that many modem defense attorneys follow. 
The law finn of Arnold & Porter LLP is well known for its public 
service representation of unpopular clients and causes. '72 In her essay 
D.C. area, the starting salary for a public defender is $41,000 with senior defenders making up to 
$ss.ooo. Jackman, supra note 8. One promising approach here is the innovative legislation rece ntly 
offered in the United States House and Senate. The Prosecutors and Defenders Incentive A ct would 
autl10rizc funding for student-loan repayment for public attorneys working in the criminal justice 
system. lts purpose "is to encourage qualified individuals to enter and continue employment as 
prosecutors and public defenders." H.R. 198, 109th Cong. (2005). See Rhonda McMillion, A Lighter 
Load, 91 A.B.A. J. 64, 64 (2005). 
168. J. M. ROBINSON & KATHLEEN L. LEAR, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE STATE PuBLIC 
DEFENDER SYSTEM IN MISSOURI 6:3 (2004), available at http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/ 
about/FY2oo4AnnualReport.pdf. 
169. /d. The most recent Missouri findings show that the turnover rate for lawyers over the past 
five years was almost roo% . See M1ssou Ju AssEsSMENT. l·upra note 6r. 
170. ROBINSON & LHAR, supra note 168, at 64. A recent article recounted the financial difficu lties o f 
two lawyers working in the Nashville criminal justice system, one a prosecutor the other a public 
defender. Each had multiple jobs in addition to her legal work. because "a lot of young attorneys in 
our office live from paycheck to paycheck." Each of the lawyers had a law school debt of $roo,ooo or 
more. Each s tarted work for the government at just over $40,000 per year. Sheila Burke, Government 
Lawyers Try to Make Ends Meet, TENNESSEAN, July 18, 2005, at rB . 
171. See DAVID McC ULLOUGH, JoHN ADAMS 66 (2001). 
172. And, of course, the firm acted as counsel to Clarence Earl Gideon in Gideon v. Wainwright. 
372 U.S. 335 ( I 963). 
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honoring Professor John Ely, Professor Barbara Babcock recounts the 
way in which the firm responded long ago to concerns over such work. 
In the summer of 1962, John Ely and I were law clerks at Arnold, 
Fortas & Porter. This was a very hot ticket, and we were proud to win 
it because the firm was the model for doing good while doing well. The 
principals were major New Dealers, now corporate lawyers and 
Washington insiders, who also represented poor criminal defendants 
and the politically oppressed. 
Notably, they had taken on the cause of accused communists, clients 
many lawyers turned away as the Cold War raged on. And Abe Fortas 
had been the lawyer for Monte Durham, the indigent defendant whose 
case established the [then] modern insanity defense. Firm members 
often told about the big business executive (and potential client) who 
asked Paul Porter whether the firm in fact represented the likes of 
communists and rapists. "That's right, we do," Porter responded. 
"What can we do for you?"'73 
According to ABA model rules and guidelines, defense attorneys 
should not consider the unpopularity of a potential client when deciding 
whether to accept a case. ABA Defense Function Standard 4-r.6(b), 
states that "all .. . qualified lawyers should stand ready to undertake the 
defense of an accused regardless of public hostility toward the accused or 
personal distaste for the offense charged or the person of the defendant." 
ABA Defense Function Standard 4-1.2(a) stresses the importance of 
defense counsel: "Counsel for the accused is an essential component of 
the administration of criminal justice. A court properly constituted to 
hear a criminal case must be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the 
judge (and jury, where appropriate), counsel for the prosecution, and 
counsel for the accused." The Model Code of Professional Conduct 
maintains that "a lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its 
duty to make legal counsel available."'74 The point is further made in the 
Ethical Considerations from the ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility. EC 2-27 notes that, "History is replete with instances of 
distinguished and sacrificial services by lawyers who have represented 
unpopular clients and causes. Regardless of his personal feelings, a 
lawyer should not decline representation because a client or a cause is 
unpopular or community reaction is adverse." EC 2-29 is similar: "When 
a lawyer is appointed to defend an unpopular client by a court, a 
'compelling reason' that might justify the lawyer's asking to be excused 
from the appointment does not include such factors as the repugnance of 
the subject matter of the proceeding, the identity or position of a person 
involved in the case." 
173. Babcock, supra note 35, at 1490. 
174- ABA MoDEL CoDE oF P~of·L RE.Sf'ONSIBILITY Canon 2 (198o). 
June 2oo6] THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ro65 
The Model Rules also discuss a lawyer's duty to defend unpopular 
clients. While the Ethical Considerations were only recommendations 
with no consequences for violation, violation of the Rules can result in 
disciplinary action. Model Rule 6.2 addresses the issue with regard to 
appointments. "A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a 
tribunal to represent a person except for good cause." The comment to 
Rule 6.2 states: 
All lawyers have a responsibility in providing pro bono public 
service .... An individual lawyer fulfills this responsibility by accepting 
a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients. A 
lawyer may also be subject to appointment by a court to serve 
unpopular clients or persons unable to afford legal services. 
Unfortunately, not all members of the public understand why an 
attorney should be willing to represent the accused. They may have little 
knowledge of a lawyer's professional obligations or the workings of an 
adversary system of justice. This creates the perception of lawyers as 
"hired guns," willing to represent anyone who can pay the fee (ironically, 
these difficult cases are often taken on appointment for little or no pay). 
This misperception leads to criticism. making it even harder to find 
attorneys willing to take on difficult cases. Large law firms may want to 
avoid being associated with unpopular causes because of the way it 
affects their professional image. Lawyers in smaller communities could 
risk losing a significant amount of business by defending someone 
unpopular in their community. 
An attorney with political aspirations may have to worry about 
being labeled soft on crime and criticized for trying to help criminals 
exploit loopholes in the law. The 2005 Virginia gubernatorial race is a 
sad example of this. During the campaign, one of the candidates was 
criticized in print and in television ads for being an "ACLU lawyer" who 
defends death row inmates.'75 The attorney, then state lieutenant 
governor, had handled two death-row appeals cases, though not with the 
ACLU. He was appointed counsel in both cases. The criticism was most 
unfortunate as it received wide coverage and it was so misguided. Death 
penalty appeals can be especially time consuming, difficult, and 
thankless. There is a great deal of pressure because a person's life is on 
the line. The pay, if any, is almost always well below what a lawyer could 
make in private practice. Taking on these cases shows the kind of 
character and professionalism that a lawyer should be able to cite with 
pride in an election campaign.'76 
175. Magaret Edds. The ACLU, Death Penalty and Gubernatorial Spin, VrRGll' IAN-PlLOT, Jan. 2. 
2005, at JI; Editorial, Death Penalty Smear, WASH. POST, Oct. r2, 2005, at AI6. 
176. As stated most recently by Justice Stevens at the A BA Annual Meeting in August 2005: 
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To counter the public criticism and misperception of criminal 
defense attorneys, it is important that members of the bar strongly 
recognize and praise attorneys who represent unpopular clients. One way 
to encourage this behavior is for organizations to acknowledge the effort 
and sacrifice of the lawyers who do such pro bono work. Highlighting the 
reasons this work is necessary would help counter the criticism those 
defenders receive. Fortunately, those who see the value of defending 
unpopular clients have already begun to take such steps. The John 
Adams Award, given to defenders in the Baltimore area, was created in 
1997 for this purpose. "I wanted to send the message that the work that 
these lawyers do in defending the people who live in the shadows is an 
act of patriotism," its founder notes. "I believe most of them do it out of 
a love for their country and a love for this wonderful justice system we 
have."m One recent recipient of the award is Joshua Treem, a successful 
private defense attorney who regularly accepts appointments to defend 
indigent defendants. Perhaps his more famous unpopular client was Lee 
Malva, one of the I-95 snipers.'78 
Another way to keep down the hidden costs of having counsel 
available to represent the unpopular client is to have prominent 
members of the bar visibly accept such representation. In his biography, 
the well-known Washington lawyer, Edward Bennett Williams, wrote of 
his commitment to such representation. 
[I am obliged because of] the right to counsel guaranteed by the 
Constitution and the role of the advocate in Anglo-Saxon 
jurisprudence .... (F]or the trial lawyer the unpopular cause is often a 
post of honor. Like other lawyers who try criminal cases, I have taken 
on many difficult cases for unpopular clients, not because of IDJ own 
wishes, but because of the unwritten law that l might not refuse.' 
A recent example can be shown with the activities of law dean, and 
former federal judge and United States Solicitor General, Kenneth Starr, 
who took on a death row inmate as a client. He and his law firm, 
be justly proud of their work." Hon. John P. Stevens, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, 
Address at American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner Honoring Abner Mikva 
(Aug. 6 2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speechcs/sp_o8~5-html. The 
Virginia lawyer who was attacked was elected governor in November 2005. 
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downtrodden." See Press Release, University of Wyoming, Public Defenders Office Honors University 
of Wyom.ing Professor (Oct. ro, 2005), availab{e at http://www.uwyo.edu/newsl 
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Kirkland & Ellis LLP, accepted the matter pro bono and Starr handled 
the representation personally.'& The client always maintained his 
innocence with regard to the murder. Starr, in the appeal before the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, asserted that the 
State had acted improperly by destroying the DNA evidence linking the 
defendant to the murder weapon. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
conviction and sentence,'8 ' and the Supreme Court denied review. '&> Starr 
then sought clemency for his client. The Virginia Governor granted the 
request, sentencing the client to life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole.'~3 Starr's efforts, as a widely known and well-qualified attorney, 
set an outstanding example for the rest of the profession, and made a 
clear statement to the public about the necessity of such work by 
attorneys. 
Other lawyers and law firms, too, have joined to provide competent 
legal assistance to poor people in the criminal justice system, or to 
challenge insufficient indigent defense systems. Atlanta-based King & 
Spalding is now sending attorneys to a Georgia county to represent 
indigent defendants in a variety of criminal cases. The presiding judge 
there commented that the addition of these attorneys is "certainly a 
blessing."'84 The overworked defender office had been handling more 
than twice the maximum number of cases recommended by the Georgia 
Supreme Court.' 8~ The Washington, D.C., office of O'Melveny & Myers 
LLP operates a similar program, but it works through the Public 
Defender's Office of Montgomery County, Maryland. The firm receives 
both felony and misdemeanor files and assigns a junior lawyer to the 
individual cases. Those young attorneys operate under the direct 
supervision of a senior partner in the firm, handling all matters and 
taking the cases to verdict, if necessary. rR6 Many firms throughout the 
nation actively involve their lawyers as counsel for indigent criminal 
defendants. Jenner & Block LLP of Chicago, and Williams & Connolly 
of Washington, D.C. are especially well known for their involvement. A 
striking example of such work involved our newest United States 
Supreme Court Chief Justice, John Roberts, who participated in a 
18o. Donna St. George, Starr, in New Role, Gives Hope to a Needy Death Row Inmate, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 14, 2005, at AI. 
181. Lovitt v. True. 403 F.3d 171, 188 (4th Cir. 2005). 
182. Lovitl v. True, 403 F. 3d 171 (4th Cir. 2005), c:ert. denied, !26 S. Ct. 400 (zoos). 
183. Frank Green, Warner Extends Clemency to Death Row's Lovill, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, 
Nov. 30, 2005, available at http://www.timesdispatch.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=RTD/ 
MGAnicle/R TD _BasicArticle&c=MGArticle&cid=l 128768421539· 
184. Bill Rankin, Premier Law Firm Defends /ndigems, Al'LANTA J.-CoNsr., Aug. 31, zooz, at 1H. 
!85. ld. 
186. See Correspondence from K. Lee Blalack, Partner, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, to Paul Marcus 
(Nov. 7, zoos) (on file with author). 
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difficult capital case in F1orida while he was in private practice at the law 
firm of Hogan & Hartson LLP. '87 
In 2002, Davis Polk & Wardwell represented the New York County 
Lawyers' Association against New York State and New York City in a 
suit seeking to raise the rates of compensation paid to assigned counsel 
who represent children and indigent litigants in family and criminal court 
proceedings in New York City. The rates were $25 and $40 per hour for 
out-of-court work and in-court work, respectively. The trial judge 
granted NYCLA's motion for a preliminarrs injunction and ordered the 
City and State to raise compensation rates.' In response, the legislature 
lifted rates to $6o and $75 per hour. 
All of these activities are in the grand tradition of our profession: 
The Constitution does not contemplate that prisoners shall be 
dependent upon government agents for legal counsel and aid, however 
conscientious and able those agents may be. Undivided allegiance and 
faithful, devoted service to a client are prized traditions of the 
American lawyer. It is this kind of service for which the Sixth 
Amendment makes provision. And nowhere is this service deemed 
more honorable than in case of appointment to represent an accused 
too poor to hire a lawyer, even though the accused may be a member 
of an unpopular or hated group, or may be charged with an offense 
which is peculiarly abhorrent. '89 
187. The case is Ferguson v. Scare, 417 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1()82). See generally Myrna Oliver, Hard 
Work, Low Pay: Death Row, Few Lawyers for Big Task, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1()88, at Ar. A large 
number of law professors have also provided representation in many well-known matters. For 
example, Abner Mikva, University of Chicago (and formerly judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit) was counsel in United Scares v. Ward, 146 F. App'x !47 (7th Cir. 2005) (appeal of 
bank robbery conviction); Sheri L Johnson, Cornell Law School, in Wilson v. Ozminr, 352 F.3d 847 
(4th Cir. 2003) (habeas corpus appeal in death penalty case); David Siegel, New England Law School, 
in Commonwealth v. Laguer, No. 83103391,2001 WL II94619 (Mass. Super. May 2, 2001) (motions for 
DNA testing for defendant with rape conviction); David D. Cole, Georgetown University, in AI Najjar 
v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330 (uth Cir. 2001) (habeas corpus appeal for relief pe nding deportation 
proceeding); Barry Scheck, Cardozo Law School, in Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408 (zd Cir. 1997) 
(appeal of grant of habeas corpus for denial of right to counsel); and Robert D . Bartels, Arizona State 
University (formerly at University of Iowa), in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (19'77) (confession 
voided due to famous "Christian Burial Speech" by interrogating police officer) . 
188. N.Y. County Lawye rs Ass·n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397,419 (Sup. Ct. 2003). Other major law 
fim1s have also worked ha rd to ensure success in law reform efforts in this area. One prominent effort 
was with Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP assisting the ACLU in the legal act ion which ultimately 
resulted in major changes to the Montana indigent defense system. See Press Release, Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, ACLU Files Class-Action Lawsuit Against Montana's Indigent Defense Program 
(Fe b. 14, 2002 ), http://www .aclu.org/crimjusticelindigenth o I27pts20020214.h!ml. 
189. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725 (1948). Perhaps the surest way of guaranteeing high 
quality representation is to have experienced and well regarded private lawyers leave individual 
practice to work as public defenders. While not a common occurrence, it does happen. A very visible 
recent illustration took place in Tucson, Arizona when two of the best-known trial lawyers in the 
community agreed to become, respectively, the Public Defender and the Chief Public Defender of 
Pima County. See Tom Beal, Flashy Lawyers Leave Private Practice for Public Def ender Jobs, ARIZ. 
DAILY STAR, Apr. 24, 2005 , atA1. 
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Many lawyers and law firms throughout our nation tirelessly devote 
their time to assisting in the quest for competent legal assistance for poor 
people. These efforts of well-known and highly qualified attorneys set a 
fine example for the profession and help to educate the public as to the 
importance of lawyers being willing to represent all defendants, even 
those charged with or convicted of vile crimes. No responsible observer, 
however, would suggest that volunteer lawyers can discharge the duty of 
indigent defense given the massive nature of the undertaking and the 
constitutional responsibilities of government. Such pro bono work is an 
important supplement to the public defense work authorized and funded 
by state and local governments. It is certainly not a substitute. 
C. INDEPENDENCE 
Virtually everyone working in the criminal justice system appears 
strongly to agree with the notion that the defense function should be 
independent. It should not be too closely linked with, or controlled by, 
the legislature, the executive, the judiciary or the prosecution. As 
explained in one national report, "[T]he ethical imperative of providing 
quality representation to clients should not be compromised by outside 
interference or political attacks."'90 To be sure, the very first of the 
ABA's Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System makes clear 
that the "public defense function, including the selection, funding, and 
payment of defense counsel, is independent."' 9' No one truly disputes this 
view in theory. Judges should not be making assignments for personal 
reasons, and defenders should be held responsible for their actions in a 
careful professional setting. In practice, however, one finds very 
troubling situations involving a genuine lack of independence with 
indigent defense in several key areas. 
• Virginia: These comments from experienced lawyers are, sadly, 
heard throughout the nation and make clear the scope of the problem 
with appointments: "You have to have a bar card, you have to have a 
rgo. OFFICE oF JusncE PROGRAMs R~ron, U.S. DEPT. OF JusTtCE, IMPROVING Clllr.tiNAL Jusn c E 
THROuGH ExPANDED STRATEGI~:s A.ND INNOVATIVE Cou.AnoRATIONS: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE X (2000), available ac http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefense/ 
icjs.pdf. 
191. The comments to the Principles explain further: 
The public defense function should be independent from political influence a nd subject to 
judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the same extent as retained counseL To 
safeguard independence and to promote efficiency and quality of services, a nonpartisan 
board should oversee defender, assigned counsel, or contract systems. Removing ove rsight 
from the judiciary ensures judicial independence from undue political pressures and is an 
important means of furthering the independence of public defense. The selection of the 
chief defender and staff should be made on the basis of merit. and recruitment of attorneys 
should involve special efforts aimed at achieving diversity in attorney staff. 
TeN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DeFENSE, supra note Il l, at Z (internal citations omitted). 
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pulse, and you have to know a judge willing to make the 
appointment."'9' 
• Texas: "Judges who are in charge of paying the defense lawyer's bill 
should not be presiding over the case; there are supposed to be two 
teams and a referee. The way it actually works is, it 's just one big 
team.";'93 "[S]ome attorneys seeking court appointments believe they 
must contribute to judges' reelection campaigns if they are to receive 
appointments";'94 and, [by a state judge] "I don't like making 
appointments. There's something inherently political about making 
appointments." '95 
• In several states, the public defender is appointed by a government 
official that "further exacerbates the risk that the state public defender 
will not ,~;mrsue necessary resources and technical support when 
needed."' Yet with jurisdictions that have more separated contracting 
systems for the appointment of defense attorneys, such systems may be 
"created for the sole purpose of containing costs, [and] they pose 
significant risks to the quality of representation and the integrity of the 
criminal justice system."''ll 
• In Washoe County, Nevada within the past year, a search committee 
was formed to select a new Chief Public Defender. The entire 
committee initially consisted of two county commissioners, the 
prosecuting attorney, and a judge. There were no other lawyers, no 
members of the .jovernment, no one with any connection to criminal 
defense activity.' 
• The public defender office in St. Louis recently announced that it 
could no longer represent a class of defendants charged with minor 
crimes because its lawyers did not have enough time to adequately 
provide competent assistance. The head of the Missouri system stated 
that the "meet 'em and greet 'em and plead 'em" system was 
constitutionally invalid. In response to this action, the local criminal 
192. Laurence Hammack, Virginia May Raise Standards for Couri-Appoimed Allom eys, ROANOKE 
TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2003, at Br (quoting Matthew Geary, head of Virginia Trial Lawyers Association's 
criminal section), 
193- Diane Jennings, Legiilators Make Case for System Reform, DALLAS MoRNING NEws, Apr. 8, 
2001 , at 20A (quoting Law Professor David Dow). 
194. These remarks are reported in TEXAS APPLESEED fAIR DEFENSE PROJ ECr, TH P. FAIR DEfllNSE 
REPORT, ANALYSIS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE PRAcrtCES IN TEXAS 21-22 ( 2000) , availab le at 
http:ffwww.equaljusticecenter.org/Fair%2oDefense%20Reference%2oReport.pdf. 
195 - ld. at 22. In fairness. T exa s has made progress here, as noted in Part VI.A. See generally 
ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, MUTING GwcoN's TRUMPET: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT 
DEFENSE IN TEXAS (2000). 
I96. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, iNDIG ENT DJ;FENSE SERVICES IN TilE STATE OF NEVADA 75 (2000) 
[hereinafter NEVADA INDIGENT DEFENSE). 
197. U.S. DEPT. O F JuSTICE, CoNTRACITNG FOR INDIGE N'r DEFENSE SEkVrCES, INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SERIES #J, at I (2000). 
1()8. Susan Voyles, Board Under Fire fur Putting DA on Selection Panel, RENO GAZElTfi·J., Apr. 
20, 2005, at 2A. In response to harsh criticism, the committee was ultimately expanded to sixteen 
people with community representative s, though the prosecutor re mained a member. D ennis Myers, 
New Defender, R E NO N Ews & REv. , June 2 3. 2005, available at http: //www.newsreview.com/ 
reno/Content?oid=24938. 
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court judge announced that he "would no longer allow public 
defenders to postpone trials, would go with prosecutors' recommended 
sentences over public defenders' recommendations and would no 
longer reschedule hearings to avoid conflicts with the public defenders' 
schedules."'99 
• With the appointment of counsel, lawyers across the country, as in 
the state of Washington, voice concern that judges "play favorites" and 
have wide d}1cretion in determining financial support for investigators 
and experts. 
• When A voyelles Parish in Louisiana created a local indigent defense 
oversight board, its members were appointed directly by the local 
judges. No member of the board had any prior experience in the 
criminal justice field.'0 ' 
• Entire statewide systems have been sharply criticized for having a 
"pervasive absence" of independence for the defense function from the 
judiciary (North Dakota}'"1 or giving far too much discretion to judges 
with the appointment of defense counsel (Texas),WJ or not providing 
defense counsel who are independent of judges and politicians 
(Georgia),104 or not having independent oversight commissions 
(Tennessee):05 or requiring defense services to compete for financial 
support with other government agencies (Nevada)."J6 
Many steps have been taken throughout the nation to combat these 
sorts of problems. Independent oversight commissions operate in a 
number of states."n Some states very carefully keep the assignment of 
lawyers apart from the pre-trial process involving criminal defendants.2oR 
199. Robert Patrick, Public Defender Rules Are Set To Change, ST. LOUIS PosT-DISPATCH, July 3 
2005, at E1. 
200. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP. 0VEIIVIEW OF THE CLARK COUNTI, WASffiNGTON INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SYSI'E.M IN 2002 15-16 (2002). 
20r. TRIAL-LE.VIlL INUJG~NT DEFF.NSE. supra note 22, al 29. 
202. THE SPANGENBERG GaouP, REVIEW oF INDIGENT DEFENsE SEkvlcEs TN NoJ<TH DAKOTA (2004). 
North Dakota recently established a statewide commission on legal counsel fo r indigents. The 
commission is to develop and oversee the state-funded defense services program for indigents accused 
of crimes. ll will also establish standards for eligibility for services, qualifications for attorneys, and 
attorney performance. NAT' !. Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, NOI\Til DAKOTA'S INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SYSTEM , available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsfldefenseupdates/Northdakotaooz. 
203. TEXAS A PPLEsEF.o FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, supru note 194, at 21. For a discussion of the recent 
efforts to subs tantially alter the system here, see infra Part VLA. 
204. Bill Rankin, Experts Indict Indigent Defense, ATLANTA J .-CQNST. , D ec. 9 , 2002, at rA. For a 
discussion of the recent efforts to s ubstantially alter the system here, see infra Part VI.A. 
205. This concern goes back many years, but rem ains a constant refrain today. One of the earliest 
complaints can be found in NAl'' L LEGAL Am & DEPENDER Ass'N, THE RIGIIT TO CQuNSiiL IN 
TENNESSEE 83 ( 1977 ). 
206. NEVADA INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 75· 
207. The matter is discussed in some detail infra Parts V l.A. and VI.B., looking at the reforms that 
have been taken both legislatively and in response to judicial rulings. 
208. T he ABA's guidelines here are quite clear. Standard 5-1.3, Professional Independence, 
provides: 
(a) The legal representation plan (or a jurisdiction should be designed to guarantee the 
integrity o( the relationship between lawyer and client. The plan and the lawyers serving 
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Still others lay out in some detail the eligibility requirements for counsel 
who seek appointments.l09 The serious problems remain, however, across 
the nation in many places."o 
D. ACCESS TO COUNSEL 
Although constitutionally entitled to legal representation, a 
surprising number of indigent criminal defendants are denied counsel 
entirely. Referred to as "the dirty little secret of the criminal justice 
system,""' poor defendants are often pressured into pleading guilty, 
waiving their right to counsel or representing themselves without ever 
speaking to a lawyer about the merits of their case or the legal 
consequences of their actions. Stringent eligibility requirements, which 
can result in coerced self-representation, and the high incidence of 
defendants ill-advisedly waiving their right to counsel, systematically 
deprive poor defendants of their legal representation. 
These routine practices, in addition to abuses of the plea bargaining 
process, dispose of cases quickly, but a crowded court docket moves 
under it should be free from political influence and should be subject to judicial supervision 
only in the same manner and to the same extent as are lawyers in private practice. The 
selection of lawyers for specific cases should not be made by the judiciary or elected 
officials, but should be arranged for by the administrators of the defender, assigned-counse l 
and contract-for-service programs. 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 5·I.J(a) (1992). See also, the broad 
structural changes made in New Mexico, as discussed in the ABA Report, Gideon's Broken Promise, 
supra note 39. at 36. The state has established a statewide Public Defender Department which 
maintains trial public defender units across New Mexico. These units have updated technology, are 
supported by a staff including paralegals, investigators, social workers, alternat ive sentencing 
advocates, technology, and administrative staff. The units have specialty sections for appeals, death 
penalty, post..::onviction, and mental health cases; they oversee contracts with private attorneys to 
provide services in conflict with the defender's office. Contract counsel must also comp ly with state 
performance standards. 
209. Interesting developments have occurred in North Carolina. T here, s teps were first 
systematically taken to go through the court appointme nt list and take off the names of ineffective 
attorneys and to organize the remaining lawyers into groups based on the cases to be handled 
(misdemeanors, low-level felonies, and serious felonies). Each list required a varying number of years 
of experience. Andrea Weigl, Wake to Review Defeme System, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), 
Dec. 28, 2001, at 81. Also, North Carolina's r ecent legislative reforms include establishing higher 
qualificat ion standards (or attorneys seeking appointment to capital cases and appeals, as we ll as 
developing performance guidelines for appointed counse l in non-capital cases. See NoRTH CAROLINA 
INDIGENT D EF. SERVS. , IDS's MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENTS S!NC~ JULY 2001 (Jan. 2006), available a/ 
http:/lwww.ncids.org/News% 20&% 2oUpdatcs/ids % 2oaccomplishments,% 20 1-o6% 2oupdate.pdf 
[hereinafter IDS' s MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENTS); NORTH CAROLINA INDIGENT DF.F. SERVS., REPORT OF THE 
CoMMISSION ON INDIGRNT DEFENSE SERVICES (2005), available al http://www.ncids.org/ 
Reports%zo&%2oData!Legislature%2oReport% 202005.pdf. 
210. For an excellent analysis, see Scorr WALLACE & DAVID CARROLL, THE IMPLEMENTATION AND 
IMPACT OF INDIGENT DEFENSE STANDARDS (2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesr/nij /grants/ 
205023.pdf. 
211. Nat' ] Comm. on the Right to Counsel. Case Study: No Representation by Counsel, 
http://www.thejusticeproject.orglpress/national-committee/22405.pdf (last visited Apr. r4, 2oo6) 
[hereinafter No Representation by Counsel]. 
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along without regard for the rights of the accused. Shockingly, there are 
still areas of the country that simply fail to provide defense attorneys to 
certain classes of poor criminal defendants at all. Particularly in light of 
the Court's most recent right to counsel decision in Alabama v. Shelton:" 
there are likely thousands who face criminal charges across the country 
with no lawyer at all. Two of the main findings of the ABA's recent 
comprehensive report on the status of the right to counsel are 
compelling: 
Lawyers are not provided in numerous proceedings in which a right to 
counsel exists in accordance with the Constitution and/or state law. 
Too often, prosecutors seek to obtain waivers of counsel and guilty 
pleas from unrepresented accused persons, while judges accept and 
sometimes even encourage waivers of counsel that are not knowing, 
voluntary, intelligent, and on the record. Throughout the country, 
indigent defendants who have not knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waived their right to counsel are denied representation at 
critical stages of the criminal process, in violation of constitutional 
requirements. To make matters worse, prosecutors and judges 
sometimes improperly encourage waivers of the right to counsel and 
subsequent pleas of guilty from unrepresented indigent defendants, in 
violation of disciplinary rules and national standards."' 
I. Invalid Waiver as Denial 
· Despite the "obvious truth" that "lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries,""4 a defendant may choose to waive her right to 
counsel."5 To be valid however, a waiver must be voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent. Given the presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights, the judge has an obligation to make a thorough 
inquiry into the particular facts of the case, including the background, 
experience, and conduct of the accused before finding that a defendant 
has waived the right to an attorney.2 ' 6 "This duty cannot be discharged as 
212. 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) (guaranteeing lawyers to misdemeanor defendants facing a 
suspended sentence). See generally Anne Endress Skove, N at 'l Center for State Courts. Indigent 
Defense Trends in 2003: The Wide-Reaching Effecrs of Alabama v. Shelton, 
http://www.Ncsconline.org!WC/Publications/KIS_IndDeCTrendso3.pdf (last visited May, 16, 2oo6). 
213. GIDEON's BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at 39· The Committee's own research, found in 
Appendix B of its Report, confirms this problem. 
214 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (196:3). 
215. Of course, a defendant does have an affirmative right to represent himself, but invoking the 
right to self-representation first requires a valid wa iver of the right to counsel. See Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 8o6, 814 (r975). Where a defendant has chosen to represent herself, t he judge has 
the additional obligation to assure the individual is made aware of the "dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation," before penniuing her to relinquish counsel. !d. at 835 . Although not adopted by 
all states, the Juvenile Justice Standards recognize the critical issue of waiving the right to counsel by 
recommending that the practice be prohlbited entirely in juvenile proceedings. See INsT. F OR JuD. 
ADMIN., ABA, JUVENILE JusncE STANDARDs: STANDARDS RELATING TO PRE-TRIAL CouRT PRocEEDINGS 
6.1A (19¢). 
216. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938). 
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though it were a mere procedural formality."" 7 Rather, a judge has a 
responsibility to ensure that an accused understands the nature of the 
charges against her, the range of possible punishment, possible defenses 
to the charges, and any other essential facts to ensure that the defendant 
truly understands the consequences of the waiver."8 Where a judge has 
not made certain that a defendant has knowingly waived his right to 
counsel, there is no valid waiver and thus, a denial of counsel must be 
found. 
The trial court's duty to insure that each defendant is fully advised of 
her rights and the consequences of waiving counsel is in direct conflict 
with the demands of crowded dockets and the desire to move cases. As 
one criminal judge admitted, 
In dealing with large calendars and pro se defendants inexperienced 
with the law and legal process, it's easy for judges to let their 
frustration get the best of them and look for ways to move the calendar 
along. There has been more than one documented case in Washington 
where judges have not fully advised defendants of their right to counsel 
and to trial by jury or have explicitly encouraged defendants to waive 
those rights in the name of efficiency.1' 9 
A city judge in Troy, New York was removed from the bench by the 
New York Commission on Judicial Conduct, in part for failing to advise 
defendants of their right to assigned counsel. He defended the practice of 
jailing defendants for several days without advising them of their right to 
counsel and then offering their freedom if they changed their plea to 
guilty. The judge explained at his disciplinary proceeding that he 
assumed the repeat offenders who came before him knew their rights, 
while others were not alert enough to understand what he would have 
said had he informed them of their rights."o 
In a Snohomish County (Washington) municipal court, one woman 
stipulated to facts sufficient to convict her, received a suspended jail 
sentence, a $soo fine, and a conviction on her record, all without ever 
speaking to an attorney. In the one minute and forty-seven seconds it 
took the judge to dispose of her case, the judge never inquired whether 
she understood her rights.m After a year of observing Washington courts 
the observer who documented that case concluded that "[e]very day in 
Washington courts, hundreds of people face criminal charges without 
217. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 722 ( 1948). 
2r8. !d. at 723-24. 
2!9. GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at 24 (quoting Judge Michael Speannan, Chief 
Criminal Judge, King County Superior Court (Seattle, Washington)). 
220. Gerald Stern, Violations of Basic Rlghrs May Constitute Judicial Misconduct. N.Y.L.J., Nov. 
15, 2004, at 4· 
221. Boruchowitz, supra note 123. 
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lawyers, and many of them plead guilty and go to jail, sometimes 
unaware that they have a right to a lawyer.""' 
A judge in a large municipal court in Ohio was heard to say, "You 
have a right to counsel in this case, but if you would like to resolve the 
matter today you may waive that right and plead guilty."213 Explicit 
threats intended to coerce waiver of counsel are rare, but the 
requirement that a waiver be voluntary requires more than the mere 
absence of explicit coercion.'24 The voluntariness of a waiver can also be 
questioned where the process imposes costs on the defendant for 
requesting representation, such as where a plea agreement is good only 
on the day offered or a request for counsel results in the defendant 
returning to jail until appointment and recalendaring."5 Comments from 
the bench can have an inappropriately chilling effect on defendants' 
exercise of their constitutional right to counsel and fuel the perception 
that a tacit rule of court is that those who ask for a lawyer are treated 
more harshly. As one court succinctly put it, "[A) plea entered on the 
basis of a sentencing agreement in which the judge participates cannot be 
considered voluntary. ""6 
At times, the lack of a valid waiver goes beyond an individual 
judge's failure to make the appropriate inquiry and is systemic in nature. 
In the Rhode Island district courts, the arraignment process is so 
confusing defendants regularly waive counsel without an appreciation of 
what they are doing. During arraignment, a video tape explaining legal 
rights is played for a large group of defendants. The tape informs the 
defendants that they have a right to counsel and will be referred to the 
public defender if they cannot afford counseL However, the video does 
not explain how or when the defendant can talk to the public defender. 
Some defendants may not even be aware that a public defender is a 
lawyer. After viewing the video, defendants are asked to enter a plea. 
The video does not explain that a not guilty plea must be entered before 
a defendant can be referred to the public defender. Many are under the 
impression that they must assert once and for all whether they are guilty 
or innocent. Most do not realize a not guilty plea can be changed after 
meeting with a lawyer. Throughout this process the defendants are not 
asked whether they want to waive their right to counsel. "The judge will 
generally make no inquiry whatsoever into the defendant's background, 
222. ld. 
223. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, ASSESSMENT OF INDIGEN'f DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN 01110 50 (19\P). 
224- See SHELDON KRANTZ ET AL., RIGHT To CouNsEL IN CRIMINAL CAsEs: THE MANDATE OF 
AJIGERS/NGERV. HAMLIN lo6--o7 (1976). 
225. ANN SKOVE, NAT'L CENTER FOR STATE CoURTS, ALABAMA v. Sm:J.m:v: T~m RIGHT TO CouNSEL IN 
MISDEMEANOR CASES RESULTING IN SUSPENDED Oil PROBATED SENTENCE (2003), a~·oi/a i.J/e Ql 
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/PublicationsiKIS_IndDefSheltonRes.pdf. 
2 26. Commonwealth v. Evans, 252 A.2d 689, 69<J (Pa. 1969). 
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57=1031 
the defendant's educational history, the defendant's mental or physical 
condition, or the defendant's prior dealings with attomeys."217 
Although the United States Supreme Court has declined to 
prescribe a specific script or formula for determining a valid waiver of 
counsel, judges still have an obligation to make an appropriate inquiry to 
determine that a defendant "knows what he is doing and his choice is 
made with eyes open.""8 Determining that a defendant has enough 
information to make an intelligent decision depends upon "a range of 
case-specific factors, including the defendant's education or 
sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the charge, and 
the stage of the proceeding."''9 Routine mass explanations through video 
tapes, forms, or canned presentations by judges or prosecutors are not 
sufficient to meet this standard.'30 
In addition, it is extremely unlikely that these mass information 
sessions are capable of addressing the individual collateral consequences 
of a guilty plea, which must be taken into consideration if a waiver is to 
be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The Argersinger Court's 
acknowledgment that even a defendant 's brief incarceration for a 
misdemeanor can result in "quite serious repercussions affecting his 
career and his reputation"'3 ' is an understatement compared to the 
complex array of additional punishments a defendant can face today. A 
minor drug conviction, for instance, can forever preclude welfare 
benefits, public housing, student-loans, voting, government services, 
hundreds of different types of jobs requiring licensing, and can mean 
mandatory deportation for an immigrant.'3' Repeat offenses can result in 
"career criminal" designation which can trigger harsh recidivist or three-
strikes sentences and lead to a felon's extended incarceration. These are 
precisely the case-specific factors that defendants need to discuss with an 
attorney before waiving their right to counsel or accepting a plea bargain. 
227 . Andrew Horwitz, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Law and the Reality in Rhode 
Island Disrrict Courr. 9 RooE!I WiLLIAMS U. L. REv. 409, 421-24 ( 2004). 
228. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S 77, 88 (2004). 
229- Id. 
230. "(A] mere routine inquiry -the asking of several standard questions followed by the signing 
of a standard written waiver of counsel-may leave a judge entirely unaware of the facts essential to 
an informed decision that an accused has executed a valid waiver of his right to counsel." Von Moltke 
v. Gillies, 332 U .S. 7o8, 724 (1948). For a description of mass arraigrunents, use of complex forms and 
the inappropriate involvement of prosecutors in waiver of counsel. see Gwt:o.v's BROKEN PRoMISE, 
supra note 39, at 24-25. 
231. Argersingerv. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,37 (1972). 
232. See WASH. DEFENDER Ass'N, BEYOND THE CoNVICTION: WHAT DEFENSE ATIORNEYs NEED TO 
KNoW ABOUT COLLATERAL AND OrHER NoN-CONFINEMENT CoNSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CoNVICTioNs 
(2005), available at http://www.defensenet.org/SN/UpdatedBeyondtheConviction.pdf. 
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2. Abuse of Plea Bargains 
Invalid waivers of counsel are frequently linked to plea bargain 
abuse.233 Few defendants waive counsel with the intention of representing 
themselves at a trial. Rather, most waive counsel and immediately plead 
guilty to take advantage of a deal being offered by the prosecutor or 
judge. Observers of Georgia courts describe a process involving mass 
arraignments in which groups of defendants are informed of their rights 
by a judge. The judge then leaves the courtroom and the prosecutors 
take over. Each defendant lines up to meet privately with the prosecuto r. 
Once each defendant has met with the prosecutor, the judge returns. At 
this point every defendant informs the judge that he would like to waive 
counsel and plead guilty.'34 
Despite national standards that call for judges to refrain from 
participating in plea negotiationS,23s judges sometimes play a more active 
role in the plea bargain process in order to resolve cases efficiently.' 36 
The Troy, New York judge described above used a combination of 
exorbitant bail and a taste of jail to coerce defendants into pleading 
guilty.237 [f a defendant indicated that she wanted to retain counsel or 
that she was too poor to do so, the judge set excessive bail and adjourned 
the case for a few days. Upon return to court, the judge asked whether 
the defendant would like to change the plea to guilty and be released. 
Most did, of course. This judge handled more than 3000 criminal cases a 
year, but in a three-year period, presided over only four trials.23R In 
upholding the judge's removal from the bench, the majority of a deeply 
divided New York Court of Appeals found that "coupled with a failure 
to advise these defendants of their right to assigned counsel, [the judge 's] 
imposition of punitive bail all but guaranteed tha t defendants would be 
coerced into pleading guilty: it was the only way to get out of jail."239 
Strikingly similar stories are playing out in courtrooms all across the 
country. In Rhode Island, a judge offered the defendant a six-month 
sentence for pleading guilty immediately. He warned the defendan t, 
233· For a comprehensive look a t coercive t actics employed by some jud ges in plea bargaining, and 
the negative impact of unprepared lawyers in the process, see generally Richard Klein, Due Proces., 
Denied: Judicial Coerdon in the Plea Bargaining Process, 32 HoFSTKA L. RLv. 13 49 ( 2004), and 
Stepha nos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Owside the Shado w of Trial, II7 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004). 
234. GmF.oN'S BKOKEN P KOMISE, supra note 39. at 24-25: CtuEF J USTICE' s CoMMISSION ON INDIGI:NT 
D EF .• THE STATUS or INDIG£NT DEFENSE IN G EORGIA: REPORT o r TilE CHIEF Jusn cF.' s CoMMISSION o N 
INDIGENT DEFENSP. PART II : IMPACT OF A I.AIMMo'\ v. SHEL TON IN GEORGIA 2 (2004). available at 
http://www.geo rgiacourts.org/aoclpress/idclidc_Report_II090 I04.pdf. 
235· STANDARDS f OR CRJMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS Of G UILTY 14-3-J(c), (d) (1999). 
236. F edcral judges are s trictly p rohibited from engaging in plea negotiations by the federal rules 
of criminal p rocedure. See FED. R. CRIM. P. I !(c)( 1) ("The co urt must not participate in these (plea 
negotiation) discussions ."). 
237- Stem , supra note 220. 
238. !d . 
239- In re B auer. 818 N.E:2d III3, III ? (N.Y . 2004). 
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however, that if the defendant demanded a lawyer he would probably 
receive three years of jail time.140 In Riverside, California, a judge told 
defendants, "[I]f you plead guilty today, you'll go home. If you want an 
attorney, you'll stay in jail for two more days and then your case will be 
set for trial and, if you can meet the bail amount, you'll be released."14 ' A 
juvenile court judge in Georgia candidly admitted that, "I tell the minor, 
I will up the sentence if you take it to trial, because you could have 
pleaded and saved us all this trouble. "'42 
The undeniable message to defendants is that they will be punished 
for exercising the right guaranteed to them by the Constitution. Without 
the assistance of counsel and afraid to request an attorney, many 
defendants plead guilty to avoid the risk of a harsher penalty. Statistics 
from Riverside, California provide a particularly disturbing example of 
this systemic failure. According to the NLADA, 4o-6o% of cases are 
disposed of at arraignment without counsel in Indio, a branch office of 
Riverside. In misdemeanor arraignments alone, 14,365 defendants 
pleaded guilty from October r, 1998 to September 30, 1999. Of those 
pleas, 12,350 were made without the assistance of counsel.143 
Even when defendants manage to get court-appointed counsel it 
does not guarantee they will avoid being pressured into plea bargains. As 
described in the parts on caseloads and compensation,144 "meet 'em and 
plead 'em lawyers," in the interest of speed and efficiency, may 
encourage a plea bargain that is not be the best choice for a defendant. 
Heavy caseloads, per-case fees, and payment caps create incentives for 
appointed counsel to dispose of cases as quickly as possible. For 
example, an attorney in Georgia working on a fixed contract model only 
went to trial three times in a four-year span. Over this same span, his 
clients pleaded guilty 313 times. It seems unlikely that all 313 defendants 
were best served by pleading guilty. This is especially true in light of the 
fact that many guilty pleas were entered after only a few minutes of 
discussion between the attorney and client. 245 
J. Eligibility Standards 
Although states have an obligation to provide attorneys for poor 
criminal defendants, neither Gideon nor the right to counsel cases that 
followed have offered any guidelines for determining who qualifies for 
240. GwEoN' S BROKEN PRoMISE, supra note 39, at 25. 
241. /d. 
242, ABA JuvENILE JusTICE CENTER F.T AL., G EORGIA: AN AssESSMENT OF AccF.ss TO CouNSEL AND 
QuALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY Pl!OCE~DINGS 31 (Patricia Puritz & Tammy Sun eds., 
2001) [hereinafter REPRF.S•:NTATION IN DELINQUENCY PRoCEEDINGS]. 
243. No Representation by Counsel, supra note 211. 
244- See supra Part V.A. 
245. Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the 
Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 825. 
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court-appointed counsel. National organizations suggest that counsel 
should be provided to those who are unable to obtain adequate 
representation without "substantial hardship."246 Even with such a 
standard, there is wide variation in how jurisdictions determine who 
qualifies for publicly funded lawyers. Overly restrictive criteria may deny 
representation to many defendants who are not financially capable of 
mounting an adequate defense without assistance. The myriad 
approaches to determining indigency that states have employed, and the 
wide variations in how these principles are enforced, result in unequal 
access to counsel across the nation. In short, a poor defendant denied 
appointed counsel in one state might be entitled to appointed counsel 
had she been charged in another jurisdiction.247 
In Wisconsin, a defendant must make $3000 or less to be appointed 
counsel. A person can qualify for food stamps and Medicaid but be ruled 
wealthy enough to retain his own attorney. It is estimated that each year 
I I ,ooo people who would be appointed counsel by standards used in 
other states are denied counsel by the state of Wisconsin.248 A judge in 
Kittitas County, Washington routinely denies counsel for college 
students because in his view an "able-bodied, employable young person 
with no dependants and virtually no debt [who] chooses to forgo 
available employment so that he can attain an college degree" is outside 
the definition of indigent. In one case, an unsuccessful defendant there 
had an annual income of $3600.249 In another instance, a judge denied 
appointed representation to a poor defendant when the contract lawyer 
questioned the defendant's eligibility because he had failed to list his 
wedding ring, a necklace and a wristwatch as assets on the application he 
submitted for representation.250 
Limiting eligibility to only the absolute destitute denies 
representation to a huge stratum of the population that is excluded from 
public counsel, but unable to afford private attorneys. As a result, these 
246. Bo th the Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems in the United Scates issued by the National 
Study Commission on Defense Services and the ABA defense servi~es standards utilize the substantial 
hardship approach. The NSC Standard 1.5, Financial Eligibility Criteria, states: "Effective 
representation should be provided to anyone who is unable, without substantial financial hardship to 
himself or to his dependents, to obtain such representation." The ABA Criminal Justice Standards, 
Providing Defense Services, Standard 5·7.1, indicates, "Counsel should be provided to persons who are 
fmancially unable to obtain adequate representation without substantial hardsltip." 
247· For an excellent discussion of the need for a more consistent standard for the determination 
of indigency and a thoughtful proposal for establislting a constitutional floor for eligibility, sec Adam 
M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pi//ar of Gideon, 8o IND. L.J. 571 (2005) . 
248. See Laura Parker, 8 Years in a Louisiana Jail, But He Never Went to Trial, USA TODAY, Aug. 
29,2005. at 1A (quoting the Public Defender of Madison, Wisconsin). 
249. Boruchowitz, supra note 123. 
250. SOUTHERN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PROMISES TO KEEP: ACIUEVING FAIRNESS AND EQUAL 
JUSTICE FOR THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES 11 (2000), available at http://www.nacdJ.org/pubHc.nsfl 
bs4oe98ee147eas4852569'7S005CC33517od377349CI684048Sl5699doos674di/$FILEflndigentRpt.pd(. 
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defendants have to go to extreme measures to secure counsel. James 
Daringer, a defendant accused of arson, found himself in this situation. 
He had a job earning $21,ooo per year, so he did not qualify for court-
appointed counsel, but because of debts and other liabilities he did not 
have enough money to hire a lawyer. He had to choose between 
representing himself in court and quitting his job so he could qualify for a 
public defender. Facing up to seven years in prison, Daringer chose to 
quit his job so he would meet the eligibility standards for the public 
defenders' office.,5 ' There is little sense in forcing defendants to render 
themselves unemployed, homeless, or without transportation in order to 
secure counsel, which ultimately could be more costly to the state than 
appointing counsel. Yet, there are many skeptics like the Kentucky 
legislator, a trial lawyer opposed to additional funding for state public 
defender offices, who commented, "I go to court many times and see 
people that take advantage of the public defender when I know I have 
similarly situated clients that borrow money or get help from family."' 52 
E. ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The challenges facing defenders, including overwhelming caseloads, 
lack of supervision and training, inadequate compensation and resources, 
and political pressure, all raise significant ethical issues for defense 
attorneys, prosecutors, and judges. Although professional standards for 
defenders are clear, systemic deficiencies push defenders to compromise 
their efforts on behalf of clients. These questionable compromises 
undermine ethical standards and, in tum, contribute to the denigration of 
the legal profession and the criminal justice system. Judges, prosecutors, 
lawyer disciplinary bodies, and defenders themselves are loath to call 
attention to these ethical failings. As one notable commentator 
concluded, "there is a huge chasm between what ethics rules demand and 
how lawyers actually represent indigent defendants."' 53 
Virtually every lawyer is governed by some version of the ABA's 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.'54 Although the rules are not 
251. Steve Silverman, Public Defense Not Always Without Cos£, PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, IlL). 
Mar. 19, 2000, at A3. 
252. Deborah Yetter, P11blic Defenders Swamped. CouRJER·J. (Louisville. Ky.). Nov. 28, 2004, at 
IA. 
253. Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 
EMOKY L.J. 1169. 1178 (2003). 
254. With the adoption of the original Canons of Professional Ethics in 19o8 the ABA began 
nearly roo years of leadership in providing model standards on lawyer ethics and professional 
responsibility. For a historical description of the committee process and the revisions and amendments 
over the years, see Preface to MoDEL RuLES OF I'RoF'L CoNDUCT (2002). The most recent 
comprehensive review and revision was undertaken in 1997 by the "Ethics zooo" Commission. 
Although there are significant differences in individual st ate codes of e thics, t he Model Rules are 
intended to serve as a national framework for implementation of standards of professional conduct. 
Thus a large majority of states pattern their standards after the Model Rules. 
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intended to exhaust all the moral and ethical considerations a lawyer 
may face, they provide a framework for the ethical practice of law and 
establish professional norms for legal representation.'55 Failure to adhere 
to a jurisdiction's ethics code may result in disciplinary action against an 
attorney, up to and including suspension or revocation of an attorney's 
license to practice law. The substandard legal representation that often 
results from the systemic problems plaguing public defense systems not 
only seriously injures poor defendants, but also forces defenders to 
violate their ethical and professional standards. This erosion of principles 
undermines the credibility and honor of the legal profession and 
corrodes the integrity of the criminal justice system. 
Ethically a lawyer is required to serve her clients with competence' 56 
and diligence.' 57 The lawyer must be thorough,'58 adequately prepared,'59 
and a zealous advocate on behalf of the client's interests.'oo Regular 
communication is expected in order to keep the client reasonably 
informed'6' and to respond to the client's reasonable requests for 
information.:>6' In addition, a lawyer is required to consult with the client 
regarding how the lawyer will pursue important objectives'63 and to 
explain matters to clients so that they may make informed decisions.'64 
In practice, the average lawyer working in an overburdened public 
defender office, or as an appointed or contract attorney whose 
compensation is so anemic that the hourly wage barely covers overhead 
expenses, may do none of these things. The problem ar-ises, for instance, 
with a lawyer carrying a misdemeanor caseload three times the size of 
the national recommended standards, who meets a client for the first 
time just before court is called into session. That attorney simply does 
not have the time or the resources to investigate, prepare, or 
communicate adequately with the client so that the client can make an 
255. In addition to these general ethical standards which pertain to all atto rneys, there ar e also 
specific professio na l standards for defense atto rneys which provide a more detailed guide to 
pro fessional conduct and performance. See NLA DA, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR C RIMINAL 
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (r997); ABA, STANDARDS FOR C RIMINAL JuSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION (1993); 
ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION (1993); ABA, STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL J USTICE: P ROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES ( 1992) . 
256. M oDEL R u LES o F P aor'L CoNDUCT R . 1.1 (2002) ("A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a clie nt. Competent representatio n r equires the lega l knowle dge . skill, tho ro ughness 
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representatio n.") . 
257. /d. R. 1.3 ( "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in re presenting a 
clie nt." ). 
258. /d. R. 1.1. 
259· /d. 
26o. /d. R. 1.3 cmt. r. 
261. /d. R. 1.4 (a)(J ). 
262. !d. R. 1.4 (a)(4). 
26). /d. R. 1.4 (a)(2). 
264- /d. R. 1.4 (b). 
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informed decision and the attorney can advocate zealously for his client's 
best interests. Even where the matters are not complex, sheer volume 
can preclude anything other than an assembly line approach, which falls 
far short of professional standards. Such is the case for the two contract 
defenders in Allen County, Indiana, who were assigned 2668 
misdemeanor cases last year."65 Each attorney makes less than $2ooo a 
month and maintains a private practice on the side. Not surprisingly, the 
overwhelming majority of defendants plead guilty; only twelve went to 
trial in a year.266 
Calling the practice unethical, chief public defenders in two 
jurisdictions, Broward County, Florida and St. Louis, Missouri, recently 
refused to continue the "meet 'em and greet 'em and plead 'em" 
approach.'67 In Broward County, public defenders will no longer be 
allowed to recommend plea agreements to clients at arraignments or first 
hearings unless the attorney has met with the defendant, established a 
relationship and has an opportunity to properly assess the case, the client 
and any plea offer."68 The change was made in acknowledgment that the 
prior practice of recommending a plea, often portrayed as a one time 
offer that would worsen over time, at a lawyer's first encounter with a 
client with almost no information about the case fails to meet ethical 
standards. Such an approach makes it nearly impossible to determine 
whether a plea is in a defendant's best interest or to fulfill the duty to 
explain the matter sufficiently for the client to make an informed 
decision. For this reason, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards require 
independent investigation: "Under no circumstances should defense 
counsel recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless 
appropriate investigation and study of the case has been completed, 
including an analysis of controlling law and the evidence likely to be 
introduced at trial."'69 
Similarly, in St. Louis the chief defender characterized 
representation of certain misdemeanor defendants as "unethical, 
unprofessional and unconstitutional."no As a result, he instituted a policy 
of no longer automatically representing defendants the first time they 
appear in court after having been arrested on misdemeanor charges. The 
chief defender concluded that it was not possible to "render 
265. Fred McKissack, Maximum Caseload: Misdemeanor Public Defenders Must Scramble, J. 
GAZETrE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Apr. 3, 2005, at 1 rA. 
266. /d. 
267. Geri L. Dreiling, 'Meet-and-Greet' Pleas Not Goud Enough, Public Defender in Florida Bans 
Long-Standing Practice. ABA JoURNAL EREPORT, June 24, 2005; Robert Patrick, Public Defender Rules 
Are Set 10 Change, St. LoUis Posr-DJSPATCII, July 3. 2005, at EI. 
268. Dreiling, supra note 267 
269. ABA. CRJ~tiNAL JuS'I•U STANDANilS, Standard 4.6 (1993). 
270. Patrick, supra note 267. 
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constitutional, ethical and professional assistance of counsel upon 
walking into court with no discovery, no opportunity for investigation 
and no opportunity to counsel the accused.'7' Both of these jurisdictions 
have simply recognized that, despite caseload pressures, ethics rules 
require more of defense attorneys than encouraging their clients to 
accept the prosecution's plea offers. 
The ethical dilemmas are not limited to misdemeanor court, 
however. They may arise wherever caseload pressures make it impossible 
for defenders to devote sufficient time to each case. Noting the trend of 
increasing caseloads without corresponding increases in resources, a 
legislative audit of the public defender agency in Alaska explicitly 
acknowledged a "heightened concern for professional ethics 
violations."'72 And, although the state expressed a willingness to defend 
its legal professionals against claims of such violations, the report 
candidly advised that "each attorney must weigh his/her ever increasing 
caseload and the demands from the public, against the poten tial of 
violating the professional code of ethics, resulting in disciplinary 
action."m That is a rather sta rk and appalling warning that ethical 
violations may be inherent in the job of public defender. 
Alaska is not alone in raising the alarm. The recent ABA report 
assessing the status of Gideon's mandate across the nation reached a 
simila r conclusion. It found that "defense lawyers throughout the country 
are violating these ethical rules by failing to provide competent, diligent, 
continuous, and conflict-free representation."' 74 As disturbing as it is to 
suggest that ethical viola tions are commonplace, it is even more alarming 
that courts and disciplinary authorities routinely overlook these breaches 
of professional ethics. The likelihood of any individual defender being 
subjected to discipline for violation of the minimum levels of compe tence 
or zealousness is smal1.'75 Most disciplinary agencies seem re luctant to 
bring charges against defenders whose conduct breaches ethical rules, ' 76 
perhaps because it seems unfair to blame an individual attorney when 
l 7 I - /d. 
272. D IV. oF LEG ISLATIVE Aun n , AlASKA DEPARTMENT Of ADMINISTRATION P u Buc DEFEND ER 
AGENCY CASE MANAGEMENT TIME STUDY A ND PERFORMANCE REVIEW 18 (1998), available at 
http://www.legaudit.state.ak.us/pages/audits/2ooo/pdff4530rpt.pdf [hereinafter ALASKA TIME STuov]. 
273· !d . 
274· GweoN'S B ROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at 20. "Lawyers who provide representation in 
indigent defense systems sometimes violate the ir professional duties by failing to furnish com petent 
representation. " /d. at 39· 
275 . William S . G eimer , A Decade o[Strickland"s Ti11 Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining 
of the Righrro Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BtLL RTs. J. 9 1. 162 ( 1995) {"While t he existence of unreported 
disciplinary action is certainly a possibility, a compute r search indicates no reported case of an 
a ttorney being disciplined for failures related to criminal defense.") ; see also Suzanne E . M ounts , 
Public Def ender Programs, Professional R esponsibilily, and Competent Representation , 1982 Wis. L. 
REv. 473, 499· 
27 6 . Green, supra note 253, at 1195. 
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the failings are more a function of systemic inadequacies. m The 
reluctance to sanction defenders of the indigent may also reflect the 
concern that sanctions could discourage other lawyers from accepting 
cases of indigent defendants. Such a result would exacerbate the problem 
of an already short supply of attorneys willing to take on this type of 
work.'78 
Another possible ethics enforcement mechanism, malpractice 
actions by defendants, is likely to be as unavailing as recourse to lawyer 
disciplinary bodies has been. Many states require that a plaintiff must 
first succeed in obtaining post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance 
of counsel before bringing a malpractice claim.'79 Moreover, some courts, 
including some that require post-conviction relief, have held that the 
plaintiff must effectively demonstrate her actual innocence, not just that 
she would have been acquitted save for the attorney's negligence.lilo 
Prosecutors and judges must also bear some responsibility in 
maintaining ethical standards within the criminal justice system, and the 
roles of both warrant further exploration. The prosecutorial ideal of 
seeking to "do justice," rather than just pursuing conviction of those who 
a re arrested, has long established roots in our legal tradition. In 1935, the 
Supreme Court eloquently expressed the contours of this duty in the 
277. ld. at 11¢--97. 
278. ld. 
279. S ee, e.g. , Levine v. Kling, 123 F.3d 580, 582-83 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Illinois law); Shawv. 
State. 816 P.2d IJ'jS, 136o (Alaska 1991); Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So. 2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1999); Berringer v. 
Steele, 758 A.2d 574, 597 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000); Morgano v. Smith, 879 P.2d 735, 737 (Nev. 1994); 
Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 565-66 (Or. 1993); Bailey v. Tucke r, 621 A2d 108. 115 (Pa. 1993); 
G ibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103, 117 (Tenn. 2001); Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 497"'98 
(Tex. 1995); Adkins v. Dixon , 482 S.E.zd 797, 80I -<l2 (Va. 1997). 
280. See Levine, 123 F.3d a t 582- 83; Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 P.3d 67o, 672-73 (Cal. 2001 ); 
Wiley v. County of San Diego. 966 P.2d 983, 985--87 (Cal. 1998); Gomez v. Peters, 470 S.E.zd 692,695-
g6 (Ga. Ct. A pp. 19¢); Kramer v. Dirksen, 695 N.E .2d 1288, 1290 (Ill. App. Ct. 19g8); Ray v. Stone, 
952 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997); Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 785--86 (Mass. 1991); 
Rodriguez v. Nielsen, 6o9 N.W.2d 368, 373--74 (Neb. 2000); Morgano, 879 P .2d at 738; Mahoney v. 
Shaheen, Ca ppiello, Ste in & G ordon, P.A., 727 A.zd 9¢ (N.H. 1999); Carmel v. Lunney. srr N .E.2d 
1126, 1128 (N.Y. 1987); Bailey , 621 A.2d at II5; Peeler , 909 S.W.2d at 497"'98; Falkner v. Fosha ug, 29 
P .3d 771, 773 (Wash. C t. App. 2001). Courts have identified, 
[v]a rious policies or justifications. . . for the exone ration rule, including: equitable 
principles against shifting responsibility for the consequences of the criminal's act ion; the 
paradoxical diffic ulties of awan iing damages ro a guilty person; theoretical and practical 
diffi culties of proving causation; the potential undermining of the postconviction process if 
a legal malpractice action overrules the judgme nts entered in the postconviction 
proceedings; preserving judicial economy by avoiding relitigation of settled mailers; 
creation of a bright line rule determining when the s tatute of limita tions runs on the 
malpractice action; availability of alternative postconviction remedies; and the chilling 
effect on thorough defense lawyering. 
Canaan v. Bartee, 72 P .Jd 911, 916 (Kan. 200J). Some courts have refused to adopt the "exoneration 
rule." See, e.g. , Mylar v. Wilkinson , 435 So. 2d 1237, 1238-39 (Ala. 1g83); Silvers v. Brodeur, 682 
N.E .2d !! rr , 8q~1R ( Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Duncan v. Campbell, 936 P.2d 863, 868 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); 
Kra hn v. Kinney, 538 N.E .2d 1058, 1o6o-{;1 (Ohio 1989). 
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seminal case of Berger v. United States, holding that: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary 
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done.28 ' 
Despite their duty to seek justice, there are prosecutors who 
zealously pursue their role as a representative of the government's 
interest in conviction, often to the exclusion of other interests. Indeed, 
some prosecutors are more likely to exploit defense incompetence than 
to take steps to guard against it.>8, For example, there are prosecutors 
who encourage quick guilty pleas as a way of clearing their dockets and 
maintaining high conviction rates with low costs. '83 
Most authorities hold that prosecutorial intervention in the face of 
ethical violations by defense counsel is only required if there is a 
constitutional violation, not if the performance of defense counsel is 
simply lacking. Indeed, reporting of substandard behavior of defense 
counsel by the prosecutor must be undertaken with care. There is a 
substantial concern that if the standards were too lax as to when a 
prosecutor could report a defense attorney for ethical violations, the 
procedure would become another litigation tactic. As a result, such 
action should only be taken if the prosecutor has clear and unmistakable 
knowledge that an e thical rule has been violated. ABA Standard 3-1.3, 
the Prosecution Function , provides that prosecutors should always use 
great restraint when tempted to comment on opposing counsel.284 
The role of judges in both monitoring and correcting ethical abuses 
by defense counsel is also worthy of further attention. Although judges 
have strong incentives to encourage the quick resolution o f cases and to 
sidestep the issue of the effectiveness of defense counsel in order to 
move the docket along, judges are uniquely situated to prevent ethical 
violations.285 The Supreme Court has recognized the role of the trial court 
as a protector of a defendant's right to counsel. 
[I)f the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its 
purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of the incompetent 
counsel, and ... judges should strive to maintain proper standards of 
28I. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
282. See Bruce A. G reen, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM U RB. L.J. fto7, 
637- 42 ( '999 ). 
283. ld. 
284. ABA C kiMINALJusncE STANDARDS, Standard J·I.J ( r993). 
285. See generally Richard Klein. The Relationship of the Court and Def ense Counsel: The lmpact 
011 Competent Representation and Proposals for Refom>, 29 B.C. L R llv. 531 ( r988); William W. 
Schwarzer. Dealing with Incomp etent Counsel- The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REv. 633 (r980). 
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performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal 
cases in their courts.:~&~ 
In appointing counsel, monitoring pretrial activities and evaluating 
counsel's preparedness, observing courtroom performance and 
participating in plea bargaining negotiations, the judge must be cognizant 
that "[i]t is the judge, not counsel, who has the ultimate responsibility for 
the conduct of a fair and lawful trial. "'87 
Regardless of the potential role prosecutors and judges might play in 
supporting ethical norms in the criminal justice system, defense attorneys 
themselves have a strict ethical obligation to control their workload in 
order to ensure that they can deliver competent representation. ' 88 Some 
courts have recognized the ethical conflict inherent in carrying an 
excessive caseload and meeting the professional obligations of 
competence and diligence. They support attorneys' efforts to manage 
their workload by either declining appointments or withdrawing from 
representation. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has suggested that 
if a public defender is overburdened, he may "at any time decline an 
appointment, and should decline to accept an appointment if [the 
defender] is not in a position to properly defend [an] action."'&.> Similarly, 
the California Court of Appeal stated, "[w]hen a public defender reels 
under a staggering workload . . . [he] should proceed to place the 
situation before the judge, who upon a satisfactory showing can relieve 
him, and order the employment of private counsel at public expense."' 90 
Courts have occasionally done just that. For example, the Florida District 
Court of Appeals has upheld a trial court order allowing a public 
defender to withdraw from representation in six felony cases because of 
an excessive caseload.'9 ' 
286. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
287. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333. 341-42 (1978). 
z88. Moon RuLES oF PRoF'L CoNDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (2) ("A lawyer's work load must be controlled 
so that each matter can be handled competently."); ABA C~tMINAL JUSTICE SrANDA~DS, Standards-
5-3(a) (1992) ("Neither defender organizations, assigned counsel nor contractors for services should 
accept workloads that, by reason o( their excessive size, interfere with the rendering of quality 
representation or lead to the breach of professional obligations."). The importance of controlling 
workload is espoused as one of the core principles in TEN PRINc iPLES OF A Pusuc DEFENSE, supra note 
rr2, at t ("Defense counsel's workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality 
representation."). 
289. lacona v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 6oo, 604 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
290. Ligda v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 744, 754 (Ct. App . 1970) (internal citation omitted); see 
also State ex rei. Escambia County v. Behr, 354 So. zd 974, 975-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
291. Behr, 354 So. 2d at 975-76. The court found that although the statute required that the 
defender represent all indigent defendants and did not provide any grounds to withdraw because of an 
excessive caseload, the statute could not be interpreted so mechanically. As a result of the devastation 
of Hurricane Katrina. along with the insufficient funding situation in Louisiana, prosecutions in New 
Orleans may need to be h alted as there are not enough defense lawyers available to handle the 
workload. See Parker, .•upra note 104. 
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Not all courts are as enlightened, however. When a highly regarded 
criminal defense attorney filed a motion seeking a dismissal for his client 
because Virginia's unwaivable caps on court-appointed fees created a 
conflict of interest, one judge responded with threats. 292 The attorney 
argued the low compensation paid to court-appointed attorneys created 
an overwhelming financial disincentive to mount a competent defense 
for an indigent client and thus generated an impermissible conflict of 
interest. Another judge, having read about the motion in the newspapers, 
greeted the lawyers in his courtroom with the announcement that any 
lawyer who had similar feelings would be removed from the court-
appointed list. The threat was clear, "challenge the fee caps at the risk of 
your livelihood. "'93 
1. Strickland and the Undermining of Ethical Standards 
Lawyers may often be stymied in their efforts to resolve the ethical 
dilemma of how to deliver competent representation in the face of 
unreasonable caseloads and few resources. Still, their efforts are further 
undermined by the case law surrounding ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. Constitutional decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment have 
established a standard for effective assistance of counsel that has been 
universally criticized as far less demanding than the ethical and 
professional standards governing defense attorneys."94 The result is that, 
rather than requiring defenders of the indigent to meet professional 
standards, the constitutional test for ineffective assistance sets the 
standard far lower and permits, and some argue encourages, deficient 
lawyering.195 As Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall observed, 
"'all manner of negligence, ineptitude, and even callous disregard for the 
client' pass muster under the Strickland standard.",¢ 
292. Editorial, Injustice Unchallenged, WASH. PosT, Feb. 22, 201.14, at B6. 
2 93· /d. 
294. Freedman, supra note 35- at 915 ("There is, of course, wide scholarly agreement that 
Strickland has neithef discouraged incompetent represe ntation nor prevented wrongful convictions."); 
see also Green, supra note 253, at r r86. 
295. Green, supra note 253, at 1185-<)0; see also Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts 
Can Do to Improve rhe Delivery of Criminal Defense Services , 63 U. P1rr. L RJ.:v. 293, 346 (2002) 
("(A]ll who have seriously considered the question agree that Strickland has not worked either to 
prevent miscarriages of justice or to improve attorney performance."); Geimer, supra note 275, at 4 
("Strickland has been roundly and properly criticized for fostering tolerance of abysmal lawyering."); 
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's Trumpet, 71 Fo~DHAM L REV. 1461, 1465 (2003) ("(T]he 
ruling has proved disabling to the right to effective assistance of counsel in practice."); Russell L 
Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor: fndigenr Defense and Effective Ani>·tunce, 42 BRA~ DEIS LJ. 435· 441 
(Z003/2004) ("[T]he test fails to assure even a minimal level of competence or effectiveness. In general, 
the Court appears to be quite willing to accept a low level of competence by indigent defenders."). 
296. Stephen B. Bright, fn D efense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Righrs on Behalf of Poor, Minority 
and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57 Mo. L. REv. 849, Boo (1992) (citing Remarks 
of Justice Thurgood Marshall to the Second Circuit Judicial Conference, Sept. r988). 
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The Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining 
when counsel is constitutionally ineffective in its 1984 decision in 
Strickland v. Washington:97 First, "a convicted defendant [who] 
complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance ... must show 
that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness."•')!! There are no specific guidelines for determining 
whether counsel meets an objective standard of reasonableness:~~~~ 
Instead, "[tJhe proper measure of attorney performance remains simply 
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms ... considering all 
the circumstances."300 The second element of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is that "any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be 
prejudicial to the defense."30' To satisfy the prejudice prong, the 
"defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of that proceeding would have 
been different. Reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome."30l 
Despite some strong rhe toric in support of competent 
representation,3"3 chilling examples abound of abysmal representation 
that was nevertheless upheld under this constitutional test.304 
Unbelievably, courts have relied upon Strickland to refuse to find 
ineffective assistance of counsel even where the defense attorney was 
silent during the entire trial, shared delusions about his involvement in a 
murder conspiracy with the jury, or was arrested on the way to the 
courthouse for driving with a .27 blood-alcohol content.305 
Not surprisingly, the two-prong Strickland test has been widely 
criticized as betraying the promise of Gideon. In practice the test is 
297- 466 u.s. 669 (1984)-
298. /d. at 687~8 
299. /d. at 688. 
)00. !d. 
301. ld at 692. 
) 0 2. ld. 
303. See, e.g., id. at 686 (" [T)he right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.") 
(emphasis added) : id. at 692 ("That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present a t trial alongside 
the accused. however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional command."). 
304- See, e.g., Vivian Be rger, The Chiropractor as B rain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital 
Cases, 18 N.Y.U . REv. L. & Soc. C HANGE 245. 245-49 (1991 ) (discussing the deeply dis tressing stories 
of Georgia capital defendants Jack House and Billy Mitchell) ; Bright, supra note 296, at 86o-6r 
(describing the case of a s ince-exe cute d defendant whose conviction w as upheld even though defense 
counsel later apologized to the client for being unde r significant stress during trial because a t the time 
he was on drugs and breaking up with both his wife and his lover); Roger Parloff, Legal Aid, Barely, 
H AllPEK's M AG., Mar. 1993, at 26 (citing examples of denial of ineffective assistance claims where 
defense attorneys were asleep, using heroin and cocaine throughout the triaL or drunk during the 
trial). 
305. Keith Cunningham· Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cr onic's 
Call ru Presume Prejudice from Rep resenrational A bsence, 76 TEMP. L. R Ev. 827, 83 1 (2003). 
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nearly impossible to meet?oo Thus, as courts continue to apply the 
demands of the analysis to attorney performance, the definition of 
acceptable lawyer behavior departs further and further from ethical 
standards and substandard lawyering is routinely upheld.307 
Although it is not particularly difficult to identify errors that an 
attorney made in the course of representing an indigent defendant, 
proving the prejudice prong is a hurdle most cannot overcome.3()1j One 
central problem is that the trial record, where the prejudice must be 
found, is itself a product of the defense attorney's deficient 
performance.309 As Justice Marshall, the single dissenter in Strickland, 
aptly observed, reviewing the record is unlikely to reveal how the 
defendant may have been prejudiced by an attorney's performance: 
[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a 
trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better 
if his lawyer had been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases can 
sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel. On the basis of a 
cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to 
ascertain how the government's evidence and arguments would have 
stood up against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-
prepared lawyer. The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact 
are exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the 
defendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the 
incompetence of defense counsel.J'" 
306. The practical problem was explained in an article laying out the review of recent criminal 
convictions in the San Jose area: 
A ttomey errors are not easily corrected. ln more than 1 oo cases, the 6th District Court of 
Appeal rejected challenges to the attorney's performance by issuing single-sentence orders 
that lacked explanation. Other cases saw the appellate justices repeatedly rationalize poor 
conduct. ln one instance, they suggested that an alcoholic lawyer's repeated absences and 
tardiness during trial may have been a knowing tactic to permit him time to sober up before 
the jury saw him. Twice, justices found no problem with lawye rs who could not legally 
represent their clients because they had been suspended hy the State Bar of California. 
Tulsky, supra note r8, at 3A. See generally Donald A . Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The 
Case for an Ex Anre PariJy Standard, 88 J. CRJM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY cz4Z, 284 { 1997) ("Under S1rickland, 
ineffective assistance is easily alleged but almost impossible to prove."); Kenneth Williams, Ensuring 
the Capital Defendant's Right to Competent Counsel: It's Time for Some Standards!, 51 WAYNE L. REv. 
129, 138 (2005) ("[l]t is almost as difficult to prove ineffective ness now as it was prior to Srrickland. 
Courts have been unwilling to find that an attorney's performance was deficient even in the most 
egregious cases .... "); Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent 
Defense , II3 HARV. L. REv. 2062, 2o68 (2000) {"lt is thus exceedingly difficult to win such a claim 
under the standard established in Strickland."); Kelly Reissmann, Comment, Our Syswm is Broken: A 
Study of the Crisis Facing The Death-Eligible Defendant, 23 N. lLL. U.L. Rllv. 43. 47 (:woz) ("The 
Strickland standard for ineffective counsel is almost impossible to meet. ''). 
307. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 305, at 83T . 
308. This is true despite the highly deferential standard the Coun applies to evaluating the 
strategic choices made by lawyers. Strickland establishes a "strong presumption" that a lawyer's 
performance falls "within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
689. 
309. Dripps, supra note 3o6, at 278. 
310. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J. , dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
1090 HASTfNGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5TI03I 
If, under the Strickland standard, courts can routinely refuse to find 
ineffective assistance of counsel even where there has been a clear 
breach of professional norms, then the erosion of those norms is 
unavoidable. The combination of the low constitutional standard with 
the reluctance of lawyer disciplinary bodies, prosecutors, judges and 
defense attorneys themselves to meet their ethical obligations has 
resulted in the evisceration of the right to counsel for poor criminal 
defendants. 
F. TRAINING, EVALUATION, AND SUPERVISION 
A lack of supervision of defenders impairs the quality of 
representation afforded poor defendants, as does the failure to evaluate 
counsel to ensure that the lawyer's training, experience, and ability 
appropriately match the complexity of the cases assigned. The absence of 
attorney standards can mean defenders of the indigent lack the 
qualifications to deliver competent criminal defense representation. 
Ongoing training and supervision are crucial in ensuring that defense 
lawyers develop and maintain their skills, particularly in specialized 
areas, and in ensuring that they be held accountable for the level of 
representation they provide to clients. 
r. Supervision 
Without practice standards, and the supervision and evaluation to 
enforce those standards, there is no mechanism to ensure the quality or 
adequacy of indigent defense services. The ABA's Ten Principles 
recognize this critical feature of an indigent defense system with 
Principle Ten: "Defense counsel is supervised and systematically 
reviewed for quality and efficiency according to nationally and locally 
adopted standards."3n As an initial step in assuring competence, 
however, defense attorneys must not be assigned to cases for which they 
lack the experience or competence.3 ' 2 As the sixth of the ABA's Ten 
Principles provides: "Defense counsel's ability, training, and experience 
[should} match the complexity of the case."3' 3 
The importance of matching an attorney's qualifications with the 
difficulty of the case has long been recognized in death penalty litigation, 
given the complexity and demands of capital defense. In that context 
attorney qualifications a re a common element of standards established 
through statute, state supreme court rule, or indigent defense system 
directive.3 ' 4 Yet, it is also inappropriate in the extreme to assign a rape 
3rr. See TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PuBLIC DEFENSE, supra note 112, at r. 
312. In fact, this is an ethical obligation as well as a practical consideration. See supra Part V.E. 
JIJ. See TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE, supra note I 12, at I. 
314- See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP"T OF JUSTICE. CoMPENDIUM O F STANDARDS FOR 
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS, VOLUME JIJ 81 (2000), available at hUp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
indigentdcfenseJcompendium/pdftxtlvolJ.pdf. 
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case where the defendant is facing a life sentence to an attorney who has 
never handled such a defense before, as has happened to multiple 
Montana defenders.3 ' 5 In Illinois, one capital defendant was represented 
by a real estate attorney. When asked if he had ever handled a criminal 
trial by himself, the lawyer responded, "Well, is paternity criminal?"3' 6 
Massachusetts, despite its serious problems in compensating and 
retaining lawyers, has established an excellent system for ensuring that 
attorneys have the knowledge, skills and experience to handle the cases 
they are assigned.3 ' 7 The Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) 
created a tiered certification process. Attorneys seeking appointment 
must verify their trial experience and CLE compliance. They must also 
provide recommendations from practicing criminal defense attorneys. In 
order to be certified as eligible to accept cases in superior court, an 
attorney must have tried at least six jury or six superior court criminal 
trials to verdict in the last five years as lead defense counsel. The 
applicant must fully describe the cases, including names, indictment 
numbers and charges, names of judges and prosecutors, dates of trials, 
and the major issues of each case, and offer as reference three criminal 
defense practitioners familiar with the applicant's work. The chief 
counsel of CPCS must individually approve each applicant. Attorneys 
seeking appointment in the district court in misdemeanor and concurrent 
felony cases must be admitted into a county bar advocate program and 
complete a five-day training seminar entitled "Zealous Advocacy in 
District Court." Attorneys must be reevaluated and recertified every 
four to five years?"! 
Even where an attorney's knowledge and experience are 
appropriate ly matched to her case assignments, counsel's performance 
still must be appropriately monitored and evaluated to ensure quality 
representation. Ordinarily, a public defender organization has a 
hierarchy of management in place that can respond and correct inferior 
performance. But, surprisingly, even public defender management may 
not deliver much supervision or performance evaluation to ensure 
competent representation. In Montana, for example, the chief public 
defender in one county admitted that he does not engage in any 
meaningful supervision. "I just try to address specific concerns as they 
315- NAT"L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Ass'N. AN ASSESSMENT OF INDIGENT Dfo'F.NSE s~~VICES IN 
MONTANA 35- 36 (2004) [hereinafter MONTANA REPORT). 
316. Marshall, supra note 35, at 959· 
317. For a complete description of the eligibility and certification requirements in Massachusetts. 
see Committee for Public Counsel Services, Certification Requirements. http://www.mass.gov/cpcs/ 
certreqsl (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
3 18 . See COMMITTEE FOR AssiGNED CoUNSEL SEKI/ICES, AsstGNED CouNSEL MANUAL: PouCJES AND 
PROCEDURES, Chap 3.2 (2004), available at hnp;//www.mass.gov/cpcs/manualslpcmanuall 
3_2Cerifica tionDistrictCourtCasesChap3Sept2204.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, zoo6). 
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come up .... I don't follow lawyers around and make sure that they're 
dotting all their I's and crossing their T's .... The individual attorneys 
monitor their performance. "3' 9 
Another Montana county chief defender carries the largest case load 
in her office, which precludes her from providing any meaningful 
supervision to subordinates.320 Good management here would include 
conducting in-court observations, reviewing case files, discussing theories 
of the case, directing training, and monitoring the overall work of the 
lawyers. All this is impossible to achieve where the supervisor also 
carries a full caseload. In Alaska, a legislative audit of the public 
defender agency noted the lack of supervision of attorneys within the 
agency and quoted one lawyer's assessment: "Everyone is on their own-
sink or swim. "321 
If effectively supervising public defenders within an office is 
sometimes problematic, holding appointed counsel and contract 
attorneys accountable for their performance presents an even greater 
difficulty. Without an independent supervisory check on defense 
attorneys, incompetent lawyers can be appointed repeatedly, even in the 
face of multiple bar suspensions or disbarments. In Illinois, attorneys 
who were previously or subsequently disbarred served as counsel for 
thirty-three defendants who received death sentences.'21 One of those 
lawyers had seventy-eight complaints lodged against him. Another 
attorney, who had been previously disbarred represented four 
defendants who received death penalties. The attorney was subsequently 
disbarred a second time.3'' 
Oversight is important in maintaining accountability. It is perhaps 
even more important that the supervision be provided by an independent 
entity rather than the judiciary or politicians. As discussed in the part on 
Independence/'• too often judges, burdened with overwhelming 
caseloads themselves, are more attuned to clearing the docket than to 
seriously considering whether an attorney has the requisite skills to 
mount a competent defense.J•s "[C]ourts may give preference in 
appointments to attorneys who dispatch cases expeditiously, without a 
level of motion practice, investigation, or pleas for expert assistance that 
319. See MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315, at 57· 
320. ld. 
32 r. ALASKA TIME STUDY, supra note 272. at 19. 
322. See Marshall, supra note 35 . at 959· 
323. !d. Foe a discussion of these problems, see generally REPORT OF THE GovERNOR's CoMMISSION 
ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT COMMISSION ON CAPITAl.. PuNISHMENT (April 2002}, avaifab/e a/ 
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reportslcommission_report/indexhtml. See also Williams, supra note 
3o6, at 145. 
324 See supra Part V.C. 
325. See supra Part V.A. 
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would slow dockets and drain limited funds."3' 6 In addition, popularly 
elected state judges are not immune from the pressures of campaigning 
and may favor those lawyers who contribute to their judicial 
campaigns. 3' 7 
2. Training 
If attorneys are to deliver effective assistance of counsel to poor 
defendants they, like all lawyers, must be competent, zealous 
advocates.3's Criminal law is a complex and ever-changing legal area 
requiring specialized knowledge and skills. As evidenced by the 
consistent call for regular, organized high-quality training in national 
criminal defense standards, initial training and ongoing education are 
crucial to ensuring that lawyers are capable of providing high-quality 
criminal representation.3' 9 The ABA's Ten Principles, which distill the 
myriad sets of national standards and identify fundamental elements of 
an effective system, advocate mandatory training.330 As former Attorney 
General Janet Reno succinctly put it, "training can make such a 
diffe renee. "33 1 
Despite the wide recognition of the common sense of providing 
adequate and ongoing training for defenders, jurisdictions all across the 
country fail to do so. This lack of training is often manifested by 
inadequate performance. A well-trained Cincinnati attorney described 
an inexperienced, court-appointed attorney as "oblivious" about 
managing the felony case to which he was assigned. "It was startling to 
me how little he prepared the case. It's because he's got no training. He's 
got a trial coming up on a serious felony, and he didn't know the basics of 
investigation, including that he should interview all potential witnesses 
326. Darryl K. Brown, Racioning Criminal Defense Em/clements: An Argument from /nsritutiona/ 
Design, 104 CoLuM. L. REv. 801, 812 (2004); see also, Marshall , supra note 35, at 958. 
/d. 
In far too many cases, these appointments are a form of patronage. having everything to do 
with connections, and nothing to do with qualifications. Indeed, there are many instances in 
which it appears obvious that judges arc choosing lawyers whom the judges t rust will not 
put up much of a fight and will keep the assembly line moving. 
327. See Brown. supra note 326, at 812 n.46. 
328. Competence is also the ethical standard for a lawyer's work. See MODEl. RULES OF P~oF'L 
CoNDUCT R. u (2002) ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill. thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation."). 
329. See NLADA, Defender Trainin g and Development Standards 12 (1997) for a preface listing a 
wide array of guidelines, standards and reports recognizing the critical importance of training for 
dcfcndeP.>. 
330. TEN PRJNC!PLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE , supra note I I 2, at I ("Defense coun~cl is provided with 
and required to attend continuing legal education. Counsel and staff providing ddense services should 
have systematic and comprehensive training appropriate to their areas of practice and at least equal to 
that received by prosecutors ."). 
331. Reno Remarks, supra note 25, at viii. 
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before trial.'m" Similarly, a Pennsylvania county judge admitted that the 
"younger attorneys are in way over their head[s]."333 The expert report 
prepared for systemic litigation in Montana found that "[t]here is no 
orientation program for newly hired indigent defense attorneys, no 
systematic and comprehensive training, and no technical assistance."334 A 
similar situation exists in New York. After monitoring public defense 
systems in multiple counties for over a year, the New York Civil 
Liberties Union concluded that the programs were unable to "provide 
sufficient, or sometimes any, training, supervision, or technical assistance 
to ensure that attorneys are equipped with the skills and knowledge to 
adequately represent their clients."335 Prior to 2004, in Virginia, there 
were neither formal training programs for public defenders or court-
appointed counsel, nor minimum qualification standards.336 Not 
surprisingly, one aspect of the problem is lack of resources to create 
training pmgrams where public defense dollars are in short supply and 
needs are great. In southwest Louisiana, for example, the public 
defender office had no program for professional development and was 
able to budget only $4000 per year for travel, very little of which was for 
professional training. In contrast, the jurisdiction's prosecutor's office 
spends approximately $10o,ooo a year for its staff to attend seminars and 
conferences. 337 
Introductory training for the newly hired lawyer, while vital, is not 
the only need, however. Ongoing specialized advanced training for more 
experienced lawyers is key to keeping skills current. For instance, as 
Janet Reno asserted, "understanding the latest technology used in crime 
analysis no longer is a luxury for an attorney."338 In implementing the 
new training standards required for court-appointed work in his state, 
Virginia Supreme Court Chief Justice Leroy R. Hassell concentrated his 
332. Nicole J . De Sario, The Quality of Indigent Defense on the 40th Anniversary of Gideon: The 
flamilton Counry Experience, 32 CAP. U . L REv. 43, 49 (2003). 
333- THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A STATEWIDE EVALUATION OF PuBLIC DEFENDER SERVICES IN 
PENNSYL\'ANJA 72 (2002) (hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA REPORT). 
334 See MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315. at 37· 
335- Testimony of Donna Lieberman, Executive Director of the New York Civil Libe rties Union , 
before The New York State Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense Services (Feb. J I, 2005), 
available at http://www.nyctu.org/indigent_de£ense_tstmny_o2I 105.html; see also Statement of E. 
Vincent Warren, Senior Staff Counsel, ACLU Found. Nat'! Legal Dep'l, before the New York State 
Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense Services 5 (Feb. 11, 2005), a>·uilable at 
http://www.aclu.orgiFilesPDFs/warren.pdf. 
336. VA. BAR Ass'N, REPORT ON VIRGINIA'S INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM 4 (2005) (discussing 
specialized training for capital cases mandated by legislation since 1991 ). A central charge of the newly 
established Virginia Indigent Defense Commission is ro establish and m onitor qualifications and 
training requirements for defenders. See VA. CoDE§ 19.2-16) .01 (2oo6),discussed infra Part VI.A.J. 
337· MICHAEL M. KuRTH & DAHYL V. BURCKEL, DEFENDING THE INDIGENT IN SoUTHWEST LoUISIANA 
24-25 (2003)· 
338. Reno Remarks, supra note 25. at viii. 
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energy on providing advanced skills for more experienced lawyers and 
sponsored a program exclusively for experienced practitioners.339 
The federal defender system, under the Criminal Justice Act,340 
provides a model for the delivery of training for defenders in recognition 
of the critical role training plays in maintaining proficiency in criminal 
practice.341 Federal defenders, regardless of their respective experience 
levels, have training opportunities. Those opportunities are tailored 
based on experience. New attorneys take a two-week class instructing 
them on the key aspects of their new roles as federal defenders. The 
course includes instruction on litigation and sentencing guidelines. 
Attorneys subsequently receive training at the National Criminal 
Defense College, intended as a follow-up to their initial training. At the 
Defense College, topics covered include trial advocacy, client interaction, 
investigation, motion practice, and use of experts.341 Similarly, state 
prosecutors recognize the importance of training and can utilize the 
resources and expertise of the National College of District Attorneys to 
provide prosecutors, their investigators and administrative personnel 
with specialized training.343 While prosecutors often benefit from the 
sophisticated training pmvided by "America's School for Prosecutors, " 
as it is known, state defenders rarely have the funds to take advantage of 
the defense-oriented training provided by the National Criminal Defense 
College, where federal defenders receive much of their training.344 
339- Supreme Court Training Session Offered for Skilled Lawyers Who Defend Indigenes in 
Criminal Cases; Basic-Skills Course Set by Indigent Defense Commission, VA. LAWYER, Feb. 2005, at 
I6-I7, available at http://www.vsb.org/publications/valawyer/febos/access.pdf; see also Indigent 
Criminal Defense Training, VA. LAWYER, June/July 2005, at 25, available at http://www.vsb.org/ 
publications/vaJawyer/julosfaccess.pdf (discussing the first seminar sponsored by the Chief Jus tice of 
t ttc Supreme Court of Virginia). The training focused on high-tech evidence such as DNA and drew 
350 on-site attendees and an a dditional roo videoconfer encc participants. /d . 
340. Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (rg64) (codified as amended at r8 U.S.C. § 3006A (2005)). 
The Act establishes the statutory framework for the indigent defense systems in each of the ninety-
four federal judicial districts. Each district court is responsible for designing a plan to provide legal 
representation for poor defendants, which may include a fede ral defender office or the appointment of 
panel attorneys. Currently eighty-nine federal districts are served by federal public d efenders, 
however, panel attorneys are still utilized to represent defendants who the defender office cannot 
represent due to workload or conflicts of interest . 
341. See Committee Defends Independence of Representation: A n Interview with Judge Patti 8. 
Suris, in THE THIRD BRANCH, NEWSLElTER OF THE FEDERAL Coui!TS, Apr. 2005, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/apro5ttblintcrview/index.html. 
342. For a general description of training and supervision within federal d efender programs, see 
lnga L. Parsons, "Making a Federal Case": A Model for Indigent Represencation, 1997 AtJN. SuRv. A~-
L. 837. 86r. 
343· For a description of the National College of District Attorneys, which is the training arm of 
the National District Attorneys A ssociation devoted exclusively to training prosecutors, and its course 
offerings, see http://www.law.sc.edu/ncda/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2oo6). 
344· For a description of the National Criminal Defense College and their training programs, see 
http://www.ncdc.net/coUege.html ( last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
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Even though the federal and prosecutorial training models remain 
elusive for many states, some states have been developing adequate 
training. A recent evaluation of the impact of standards found that 37% 
of county-funded systems and so% of state public defense systems with 
some or all state funding reported use of training standards.345 In 
addition, virtually every recent state reform effOTt has included 
recommendations or provisions for education and training for 
defenders.346 This reflects a wide recognition of the need for and 
importance of training. 
G. DEFENDER RESOURCES 
A lack of ancillary resources, critical to effective representation, 
plagues defender systems nationwide. The assistance of support staff, 
investigators, paralegals, social workers and independent experts is rarely 
available to the degree necessary to provide competent representation. 
The scarcity of defender resources usually stands in stark contrast to the 
prosecution's access to the additional resources and services of other 
governmental agencies, the costs of which are not reflected in their 
budgets. Although, as the United States Justice Department has 
suggested, it is difficult to measure accurately this disparity of 
resources,347 this gap undermines the validity and the effectiveness of the 
adversary system. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that there is more to competent 
representation than merely having an assigned lawyer. Meaningful access 
to justice includes the "raw materials integral to the building of an 
effective defense," and a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair where that 
access is denied.348 National standards have long recognized the 
importance of giving lawyers the appropriate tools essential to the 
defense function, including technology, facilities, legal research, support 
staff, paralegals, investigators, and access to forensic services and 
experts.349 The role of support staff is critical both to the quality of 
345· Scou Wallace & David Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense 
Standards, 31 S.U. L. REV. 245,273 (2004). 
346. See, e.g., REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS, supra note 242. at 26--27; MONTANA 
REPORT, supra note 315, at 36--39; TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE, supra note 22, at 46--47. An 
innovative program for training has been initiated in Virginia. The attorneys who seek to represen t 
indigent defe ndants are offered the opportunity to work alongside an experienced defense lawyer 
through a statewide mcntorship program. See Mentorship Program Developed for Indigent Defense 
Counsel, VA. LAWYER, Oct. 2005, at 20. And, in North Carolina, the statewide Office of Indigen t 
Defense Services has established "listservs" for defense lawyers to enable the sharing of information 
and e xpertise. See N.C. INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., supra note 209, at 6. 
347· See D E.FRANCES & LITRAS, supra note 29, at 3· 
348. Ake v. Oklahoma. 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) ("[M]e re access to the courthouse doors does not by 
itself assure a proper functioning of the adversary process." ). 
349· See ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL J USTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, Standard 5·!.4 
(1992): "The legal representation plan should provide for investigative, expert, and o ther services 
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representation a defender can offer and the cost-effectiveness of that 
representation. As one Alaska judge bluntly told legislative auditors, 
where there are inadequate support services, "failure is built in."35" 
I. Investigators and Support Staff 
Adequate investigation is the most basic of criminal defense 
requirements/5 ' and often the key to effective representation. An early 
study of public defender offices in the wake of the expansion of the right 
to counsel in Argersinger found that institutional resources were the most 
prevalent explanation for the variation in effectiveness scores among 
defender programs.w Specifically, an in-depth analysis of nine urban 
public defender programs found that success in the courtroom was 
frequently tied to the availability of investigators.353 Investigators, with 
their specialized experience and training, are often more skilled than 
attorneys, and invariably more efficient, at performing critical case-
preparation tasks such as gathering and evaluating evidence and 
interviewing witnesses.354 Without the facts ferreted out by an 
investigation, a defender has nothing to work with beyond what she 
might learn from a brief interview with the client. With such limited 
information regarding the strength and nature of the case, any attorney 
would be hard pressed to make the sensible strategic decisions necessary 
to adequately defend an accused or even have any leverage in plea 
bargaining. 
necessary to quality legal representation. These should include not only those services and facilities 
needed for an effective defense at trial but also those that are required for effective defense 
participation in every phase of the process." The ABA's Ten Principles address the importance of 
adequate resources for public defense; Principle Eight caUs for parity between defense counsel and the 
prosecution in resources such as technology, facilities, legal research, support staff, paralegals, 
investigators, and access to forensic services and experts. TEN PRINCIPLES or A PuBLIC DEFENSE, supra 
note 112, at). 
350. ALASKA TIME STUDV, supra note 272, at 3L 
35 1. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4·4-1 (1993) states: 
Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and 
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the 
event of conviction. The inve stigation should include efforts to secure information in the 
possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate 
exists regardless the accused' s admission or statements to defense counsel of facts 
constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty. 
352. Pa ul B. Wice & Peter Suwak, Currem Realities of Public Defender Programs: A National 
Survey and Analysis, IO CRIM. L. BuLL. I61 , I79 (1974). 
353- /d. at 16-]-68. 
354· In addition, it can be problematic for an attorney to interview witnesses alone. Should the 
need arise at trial to impeach the witness, the attorney may be put in the difficult situation of having to 
call herself as a witness as the only person who can testify to the earlier inconsistent statements the 
witness made during the investigative interview. Commentary to ABA Standard 5·L4 states: "[W)hen 
an attorney personally interviews witnesses, the attorney may be placed in the untenable position of 
either taking the stand to challenge the witnesses' credibility if their testimony conflicts with 
statements previously given or withdrawing from the case." ABA, CRIMINAL Jusno; STANDMIDS, 
PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, Standard 5-1.4 (1992). 
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Yet, all across the country, public defenders, appointed counsel and 
contract attorneys do not have access to appropriate investigative 
resources. A Montana public defender, with no investigative services, 
commented that he had to be a "private investigator . .. in addition to 
being the attorney, [making it] difficult to juggle the time necessary to do 
that."355 In Pennsylvania, most public defenders and contract attorneys 
cannot recall the last time they used an investigator, and one desperate 
public defender admits he encourages his clients to conduct their own 
investigations.356 A part-time New York county assistant public 
defender 's heavy caseload precludes him from spending any time on his 
assigned cases other than in court, so investigation is well beyond his 
reach.357 His frustration is shared by the full-time public defender who 
has neither the time nor the resources to investigate his cases either.358 
In many jurisdictions, appointed counsel and contract defenders 
must secure the approval of the court before incurring any fees for 
investigators or experts. Judges who have the authority to authorize such 
expenditures, however, are often reticent to expend taxpayer funds. 359 In 
Virginia, judges so rarely approve funds for investigators or experts that 
defenders simply have ceased to askY"' One Virginia attorney admitted 
that she does not use investigators because the state will not pay for 
them; shockingly, others confessed that they simply do no t conduct 
investigations because they lack the time and resources.36' A similar 
situation existed in Georgia, where attorneys commented that getting 
investigators, even in death penalty cases, was like "pulling teeth."3 , 
Hiring an investigator for a non-cagital case in Mississippi is possible 
only if the lawyer pays for it herself.l And, in Ohio a judge once refused 
to award funds for an investigator in a murder trial because one of the 
defense lawyers had been an investigator thirty years earlier.3114 
A recent survey of nearly 2000 felony cases in four Alabama circuits 
vividly illustrates the chilling effect this kind of systemic denial of 
investigative resources has on future requests. The contract attorneys 
355· M or<TANA R EPORT, supra note 31 5, at 20. 
356. T H E SPANGENBERG GROUP, A STATEWIDE E VALUATION OF PUBUC DEFENDER SERVICES IN 
PENNSYLVANI A 69 (2002) (hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA R EPORT). 
357· NAAC P L EGAL DEF. AND E DUC. FUND, I NC., TH.E STATUS OF I NDIGENT D EFENSE IN SCHUYLER 
Cour<TY 12 (2004). 
358. /d. 
359· R HODE, mpra note r3. at 129; NAAC P LEGAL D EF. AND EDUC. FUND, I NC., ASSEMBLY LINE 
J USTICE: MISSI SSIPPI 'S I NDIGENT D EFENSE C RISIS (I (2003) (hereinafter A SSEMBLY L INE JuSTICE). 
36o. INDIOEr<T DEFENSE IN VIRGIN lA, supra n ote 20, at 6]. 
36!. /d. 
362. G A. C HIEF J USTICf.'S COMMISSION ON I NDIGENT DEF., REPOI<T OF C HIEF J USTICE'S COMMISSION 
ON INDIGENT D EFEN SE P ART r 56, n. r91) {2002) (hereina fter G EORGIA CHIEF J USTICE REPORT). 
363. AsSEMBLY LINE J usTICE, supra n o t e 359. a t 6. 
364. D e Sar io, supra n o te 332, at 56. 
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there did not request investigators or experts in 99·4% of the cases.365 As 
a Texas defense attorney explained, "Formal denials of specific requests 
are rare. But this is because of an unwritten understanding that requests 
will only be made in cases of extraordinary need. Hence, although 
virtually every case requires some sort of investigation, the attorney 
himself must perform these tasks in an uncompensated or under-
compensated capacity."366 
One Pennsylvania public defender candidly admitted that the lack of 
investi~ator services available to defenders influences the outcome of 
cases? This is particularly true when the prosecution benefits from 
generally higher staffing levels and has the investigative resources of law 
enforcement available. In Kentucky, for instance, the chief public 
defender of a four-county area blamed insufficient staff for his office's 
inability to adequately represent clients. He pointed specifically to the 
state prosecutor's "huge investigative advantage" as a significant factor 
in the disparity and concluded that "[r]esources influence results."368 The 
lack of investigative services was identified as a major problem in 
Pennsylvania counties, particularly in light of the disparity of 
investigative resources available to the district attorneys and the public 
defenders. The 2002 evaluation concluded: "Juxtaposed with the vast 
resources of local law enforcement at the disposal of the District 
Attorney, the public defender who does not have investigative 
capabilities cannot put up a fair defense and begins at a disadvantage. "3&.~ 
2. Experts 
Defenders who seek the assistance of experts in defending their 
clients face many of the same hurdles as they do in securing help with 
investigation. While the prosecution frequently has at its disposal an 
assortment of government personnel such as crime investigation and 
laboratory professionals, psychiatrists, scientists, and doctors, defenders 
must rely on the state's witnesses or seek funds to compensate an 
independent expert of their own. Relying on the state's expert witnesses 
raises questions of independence.370 A Virginia public defender described 
365. GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at I g. 
366. BlfTCHER & MooRE, supra note 195, at r8. 
367. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 356, at 6g. 
368. Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. LJ. 363, 4oo-or (I 993). 
J6g. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 356, at 70. 
370. In explaining why the public defender needs adequate budget resources to retain outside 
experts, one report evaluating an Ohio county's public defender office put it this way: 
The public defender should never take at face value the State's evidence regarding ballistics 
tests, drug tests, or psychological evaluations, but should be able to verify those tests by 
re taining its own experts to conduct testing and testify in court. Their own independent tests 
may prove that their clients were not the 'shooters,' that the supposed 'cocaine' was really 
Pillsbury flour, and that the accused has an I.Q. of a four-year old. 
MARSHALL J. H ARTMAN ET AL., MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL REvmw OF THE MoNTGOMERY CouNTY 
IIOO HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. spo3r 
the state's lab experts as "cops with lab coats. They are openly hostile to 
us. Many of them think that their function is to support the 
prosecution. "37' 
Unfortunately, courts are often quite reluctant to give funds for 
experts. An appointed attorney in Georgia, having been denied an expert 
each of the twenty times he applied for one remarked, "If there was 
more money for experts, by God, my clients would not be in jail."372 One 
Virginia public defender described the difficulty in getting funds 
approved for experts this way: "It's as if judges are taking out their 
wallets themselves. They just say no."373 Similarly, Montana defenders 
are usually forced to rely on the state's experts because, as one defender 
put it, "Can't use them, can't get them. We just don't have the money in 
the budget."374 
Certainly not every case requires expert testimony, but independent 
professionals often are essential to challenge the state's evaluation of 
forensic evidence or competency. Even so, a study in Calcasieu Parish, 
Louisiana found only two instances in three years where experts were 
used by the public defender's office in defense of clients.375 Remarkably, 
one Virginia judge denied a public defender's request for a DNA expert 
in a seven-year-old murder case where DNA was the only remaining 
evidence. The judge was apparently swayed by the prosecutor's 
argument that the cost would have been too much of an expense to the 
state.376 
PUBuc DEFENDER OmcE 56-57 (2000). Another argument for the importance of independent experts 
is the rising tide of errors discovered in stale crime laboratories across the country. For instance, in 
response to an audit of its embattled crime lab, Virginia recently established a scientific review panel 
and ordered a review of more than 16o past cases. Christina Nuckols, Governor Appoims Panel to 
Oversee Virginia's Crime Lab, VrRGJNIAN-PILOT, Aug. 9, 2005, at 83. The Texas state laboratories are 
undergoing massive reviews because of widespread errors found receotly. Editorial, With Shoddy 
History, Texas Crime Labs Could Use Oversight, AUSTIN AM.·STATESMAN, May 16, 2005, available at 
http:/Jwww .statesman.comlopinionJcomenUed.itoriaUos/r 6crimelab_edit.htm l. 
37 I. INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20, at 64. 
372. GEORGIA CHIEF JusnCE REPQRT. supra note 362, at&--,. 
373· INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20, at 64. 
374· MONTANA RI':PO~T, supra note 315, at 21. 
375 - KuRTH & BuRCKEL, supra oote 337. at 24. 
376. INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20, at 65. Some states, such as North Carolina, 
have turned to statewide commissions to appoint and compensate experts. See lDS"s MAIN 
AccOMPLISHMENTS, supra note 209. Oklahoma employs a unique approach to ensuring that both public 
defenders and contract attorneys have access to t he appropriate experts. Each request is reviewed by 
the chief of psychological services or the chief of forensics to determine whether the evidence in a case 
warrants the services of an expert. These knowledgeable individuals are able to better t arget the area 
of expertise necessary a11d even negotiate better prices with a host of fee-based expert servict: 
providers. This ability to he lp attorneys focus their use of experts means that resources are used more 
efficiently and effectively. See Letter from James Drummond. Chlef, Non-Capital Trial Div .• Okla. 
Indigent Def. Sys., to Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus (Nov. 24, 2005) (on file with authors). 
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J. Other Resources: Support Staff andTechnology 
In addition to access to experts and investigators, defenders need the 
full complement of support services and technology that a modern law 
office would require. Secretaries and paralegals can assist with clerical 
and administrative tasks, client communication, and case preparation and 
free up time for legal work only the attorney can handle. In Lake 
County, Montana, neither of the two public defenders has a secretary or 
a paralegal, thus they either have to interrupt their work to answer the 
phone or ignore incoming calls.377 Alaska defenders complain of having 
their time consumed by filing, mailing, copying and other clerical tasks as 
a result of inadequate support staff. More than half of the defenders 
indicated that more than I o% of the tasks they routinely perform could 
be done by someone with less training, such as a secretary, paralegal, 
investigator, or other support staff. As one lawyer said, "I shouldn' t be 
doing clerical work. "378 
When defenders are forced to handle these support tasks themselves 
it exacerbates the problem of case overloads since a significant amount 
of the attorney's time is consumed by administrative tasks, which could 
be performed more cost-effectively by others. For example, the Alaska 
Judicial Council found that even though public defense attorneys and 
prosecutors appeared to spend similar amounts of time on their cases, 
the defense attorneys did so without the benefit of substantial 
investigative services or administrative support available to 
prosecutors.379 As a result, the Council recommended increasing these 
resources as a means of improving defenders' ability to handle increasing 
case loads.3So 
Defenders also need the proper tools to adequately represent 
clients, including the availability of legal research materials or electronic 
databases, computers and other equipment. However, equipment and 
resources that most law firms and prosecutor's offices take for granted 
are often denied to public defender offices. When the public defenders in 
Lake County, Montana need to do legal research, without the funds to 
subscribe to online legal research resources, they must drive seventy 
miles to the University of Montana Law School library.38' In 
Montgomery County, Ohio, the lack of basic equipment was so dire that 
some defenders resorted to bringing their personal computers to the 
office to prepare motions and mernoranda.382 The lack of equipment also 
hinders the efforts of the few support staff available to defenders. 
377· MOI'ITANA REPORT, supra note 315, a119. 
378. ALASKA T IME Sruov, supra note 272, at 3o-31. 
379· LARRY COHN ET AL., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA FELONY PROCESS: 1999 285 (2004). 
380. /d. 
381. See MONTANA REPORT, supru note 3 15, at 19. 
382. HARTMA N ET AL. , supra note 370, at 55· 
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Defenders must share county cars, and cell phones and digital cameras 
are just a few of the items denied to investigators from the San 
Bernardino County Public Defender Office, but provided to the 
investigators in the District Attorney's office.:lB3 A recent assessment of 
Virginia's public defender offices found, for example, that the offices 
"lack the most basic equipment necessary to run a modern law office. "364 
These lawyers have outdated computers, limited printing capabilities, no 
capacity to take digital photos or even view those from the medical 
examiner's office, no ability to retrieve criminal history information on 
their clients and no access to the technology that would enable them to 
utilize the multimedia capabilities of the circuit court. The public 
defender cannot keep up with the prosecutor's office technology and, 
therefore, is greatly disadvantaged.385 
Even public defender offices that have adequate basic technology, 
such as computers, case tracking software, and online research capabi1ity 
may find it impossible to keep up with the rapidly changing use of 
technology in the courtroom. In Connecticut, for instance, while the 
Division of Public Defender Services dedicated its resources to replacing 
outdated computer equipment and continuing to provide computerized 
legal research and case tracking information for its attorneys/l6 the Chief 
State's Attorney's Office established a special unit to educate 
prosecutors on the latest multimedia courtroom presentation 
techniques.387 Connecticut prosecutors are being trained on sophisticated 
legal software to present audio and visual evidence to make their 
arguments more compelling to juries. Each district in the state has 
acquired laptop computers outfitted with popular courtroom 
presentation software, theater-sized projection screens, an LCD 
projector, and document cameras, which can be used to project objects 
and documents.388 Prosecutors are learning to utilize all this while 
defenders are not. 
Without access to what the Supreme Court has called the "raw 
materials" of an effective defense,31!9 defenders cannot provide competent 
representation to indigent defendants. The result, sadly, is that criminal 
trials may become fundamentally unfair. Like the prosecution, defenders 
must have the appropriate tools to do their job, including technology, 
383. NAT'L L EGAL Am & DEFEN DER Ass'N, EvALUATION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONs: SAN 
BERNARDINO CoUNTY PUBLIC DEFF.NDER OFFICE 53 (2001). 
3!4- INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note 20, at 37· 
385. !d. at 38. 
386. CoNN. DIY. OF Pun. DEFENDER SERVS.. ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at 
http://www.ocpd.state.et.us/Content/Annual2oos/2oosChap6.htm. 
387. Martin B. Cassidy, Prosecutors Turning to Multi-Media to Make Case, GREENWICH TJM€ 
(Conn.), Aug. 28,2005. 
388. See id. 
389- Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,77 (1985) -
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facilities, legal research, support staff, paralegals, investigators, and 
access to forensic services and experts. Chief Justice Warren Burger 
wrote in 1972 that "society's goal should be that the system for providing 
counsel and facilities for the defense should be as good as the system 
which society provides for the prosecution. "390 In many places we have 
yet to make much progress in achieving that goal. 
VI. REFORMS TAKEN 
Many states have taken steps to improve systems that provide 
attorneys to poor people. Some of these offer real hope, but others seem 
doomed to failure based on inadequate government commitments. In 
this Part we consider changes instituted by legislatures and reforms 
resulting from litigation. 
A. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
Within the past several years Texas,391 Georgia/92 Virginia ,393 
Washington/ 94 and Montana,395 among other states such as North 
Carolina396 and North D akota,391 have all studied the key indigent de fe nse 
concerns and have passed le gislation modifying their criminal justice 
systems. Each of these sta tes provides a case study that illuminates the 
varying me ans state legislators have used to address problems involving 
the right to counsel. Since these changes are still in their infancy, their 
efficacy cannot easily be measured; neverthe less, each state is to be 
commended for at least establishing some structural changes, including 
some sort of oversight panel. 
I. Texas 
We begin with Texas, which may have the most detailed legislative 
response in the entire nation. 
The Texas F air Defense A ct of 200 1 established three found ational 
pieces needed for any criminal justice system: a comprehensive m andate 
for new local rules and standards to improve indigent defense, a b ody to 
administer statewide indigent de fense policies, and state funding 
dedicated to help counties improve indigent defense.398 
:wo. Argersinger v. Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25, 43 (1972). 
391. T exas Fair Defense Act, 2001 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ell. 9(>6 (West). 
392. GA. CODE A NN. § 17-12·1 (2004)-
393· 2004 Va. Legis. Serv. ch. 884 (West). 
394· 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 157. 
395· Mom . CODE ANN.§ 47 -I-IOI (2005). 
396. N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-49B (zoos). 
397· N.D. CENT. CooF. § 54·61-01 (2005). 
398. The Texas Fair Defense Act is a testament to what the efforts of a fe w determined individuals 
can achieve. Texas Senato r Rodney E llis first proposed the Act in 1999, but it was vetoed by then 
Governor George W. Bush. Reports by the Texas State Bar and Ihe Fair Defense Project helped to 
identify significant problems with indigent defense in Texas. Senator Ellis and members of the Fair 
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a. Statewide Comprehensive Mandate for New Local 
Rules and Standards 
Specifically, the Act sets forth five major legal requirements that 
counties must satisfy in the new system. Counties must create: (1) 
procedures for providing prompt access to appointed counsel; (2) fair 
and neutral methods for selecting appointed counsel; (3) qualifications 
for appointed counsel; (4) financial standards and procedures for 
determining when a person is indigent; and (5) procedures and fee 
schedules for appointed counsel, experts, and investigators.399 
b. Appointed Counsel, Public Defenders, and Compensation 
Section 6 of the Act specifies how lawyers are to be selected from a 
public appointment list, and that such assignments are to be "allocated 
among qualified attorneys in a manner that is fair, neutral, and 
nondiscriminatory."400 Though the Act provides that attorneys will rotate 
through the public appointment list, judges still make the actual 
selections and this raises a concern about the independence of such 
appointments if the guidelines are not followed. The judges of a 
particular county court will keep that county's appointed counsel list,4"' 
which also raises questions about the independence of such counsel. One 
mitigating consideration here is that counsel must actually apply to be on 
the appointed counsellist.402 Counsel who are to be appointed to capital 
cases must meet separate qualifications.403 
The Act takes into consideration that public appointment lists may 
not be the best option for all districts. Alternative selection programs 
must be approved by two-thirds of the judges within that county.404 The 
Act also creates a mechanism for the appointment of a public defender.4"5 
Compensation rates for private attomeys who provide indigent defense 
Defense Project, which was organized by Texas Appleseed, a non-profit public interest law 
organization, worked to reintroduce the bill that became law. Terry Brooks & Shubhangi Deoras, 
Texas Enacts Landmark Reforms, 16 CRIM. JuST. s6, 56 (Fall200I). 
399· TEX. CODE CRJM. PRoc. ANN. art 26.04 (Vernon 2002) (enacted). 
400. /d. 
40!. ld. 
402- !d. 
403· !d. art. z6.o52. 
404. S.B. 7, 77th Leg., 200r Tex. Reg. Sess., sec. 6 (West). 
405. The commissioner of courts or two or more counties may enter into a written agreement to 
jointly appoint and fund a regional public defender. The commissioners' court or courts will also 
specify the duties, qualifications, appointment procedures and other relevant items should they 
endeavor to appoint a public defender. The commissioners' courtS will select a public defender after 
having received proposals from government entities and non-profit corporations. Such proposals must 
include a budget, descriptions of personnel positions, maximum allowable caseloads, training 
information, anticipated overhead, and policies concerning im·estigators and experts. The total cost or 
the proposal may not be the only consideration in awarding the public defender contract, and in order 
to be eligible, the entity awarded the contract must be headed up by a chief public defender who " (r) 
is a member of the State Bar of T exas: (2) has practiced law for at least three years; and (3) has 
substantia l experience in the practice of criminal law." TEx. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 26.044. 
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are to be determined by the judges of the courts of a given county or 
judicial district, but no payment will be awarded until the attorney has 
submitted an itemized bill for services performed to the judge presiding 
over the case.406 The Act provides for an appeal process for attorneys 
whose bill is disapproved by the appointing judge."07 While the statutory 
system here makes sense, the presiding judge makes decisions about 
selection and compensation of attorneys. Thus, the independence of the 
appointed counsel may be subject to compromise, and the crucial 
element of independence remains a serious issue. 
c. Indigent Defense Task Force 
The Indigent Defense Task Force was established as a standing 
committee of the Texas Judicial Council.oll'8 The Task Force is composed 
of eight ex officio members of the judicial council including the Chief 
Justice of the Texas Supreme Court along with other members of the 
judiciary and legislature.409 Its mission is to 
improve the delivery of indigent defense services through fiscal 
assistance, accountability and professional support to State, local 
judicial, county, and municipal officials. The purpose of the Task Force 
is to promote justice and fairness to all indigent persons accused of 
criminal conduct, including juvenile respondents, as wovided by the 
laws and constitutions of the United States and Texas.' o 
The Task Force sets the poliCies and standards for indigent defense 
in Texas and may receive revenue so as to discharge its duties.4 " The 
remaining sections of the Act provide for counties to report indigent 
defense information to the Task Force. 
The creation of the Task Force is an important reform, but it is by no 
means the solution to the state's problems. Much of the funding for 
indigent defense remains with the counties, and Texas only spent $4.65 
per capita on indigent defense in Fiscal Year 1999.4 " Though the Task 
Force may add to funds provided at the county level from the Fair 
Defense Account, such additions would have to be substantial to 
400. S.B. 7, 77th Leg., 2001 Reg. Sess. sec. 8 (amending TEX. CODE CRJM. PRoc. ANN. art. 26.05) 
(Tex. 2001 ) . 
407- [d. 
4o8. TEX. Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 71.001. 
409. /d. § 7L05L The Task Force also has five members appointed by the Governor with the 
advire and consent of the senate; three are member.; of the judiciary, one is a criminal defense 
attorney, and the other is a public defender or an employee of a public defender. fd. 
410. Tex. Task Force on Indigent Def., Who We Are and What We Do, http://www.courts. 
state.tx.us/oca/tfid/whoweare.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2oo6). 
41 r. TEX. Gov'T ConE ANN. §§ 71.058, 71.06o. 
4 n. Brooks & Deoras, supra note 398, at 56. Texas ranked fony-eighth out of fifty states with this 
figure. 
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significantly improve this figure.4 ' 3 Moreover, having judges make up a 
majority of the Task Force raises independence questions. 
d. Evaluating the Changes 
In November 2003, the Texas House Committee on County Affairs 
was asked to perform an interim study of the impact of the new Act.4' 4 A 
year later, the Task Force funded a study by Texas A&M's Public Policy 
Research Institute to examine how the Fair Defense Act requirements 
have affected indigent service delivery and how county implementation 
strategies may affect counties' effectiveness in meeting these 
requirements.4' 5 
The key findings in the two studies are startling, leading to both 
optimism and pessimism: 
• "Statewide spending [is] up 50%."''6 
• The public has increased access to local practices and 
expenditures. 411 
• So far, there has been roo% compliance with state reporting 
requirements on expenditures and indigent defense plans.4 'H 
413. See Julie Anderson, Texas Fair Defense Act: State, Counties, Address Increased Cosls of 
Indigent Defense Services, CouNTY PROGRESS (Tex.), Apr. 2005, at ll, lJ. 
Jd. 
Since 2001, the approximate amount of money spent on indigent defense services in Texas, 
according to (state) reports, is as follows: 
• $gr.7 million in FYo1 (all county funds, prior to implementation of the Act) 
• $u3.9 million in FYo2 ($HJ6.7 million in county funds and $7.2 million in state funds) 
• $130 million in FYo3 ($u8.5 million in county funds and $r 1.5 million in state funds) 
• $139.6 million in FYo4 ($128 million in county funds and $11.6 million in state funds). 
Texas counties absorbed the remaining amount of increased costs: 
• FYo2: $15 million 
• FYo3: $26.8 million 
• FYo4: $36.3 million. 
414- See HOUSE CoMMITTEE ON CoU N"JY AFFAIRS, TeXAs HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INTERIM 
REPORT 4-5 (2004), available a1 http://www.house.state.tx.usfcommittees/reportsJ78interim/ 
county ~affairs. pdf (hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]. 
415. THE PuB. POLICY RESEARCH [NSTITliTE, STUDY TO AssESS THE IMPACTS OF THE FAIR DEFENSE 
Acr oN TEXAS CouNTIES (2005), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/oca!tfid/Study%2oto% 
2oAssess %2othe% 2olmpacts% 2oof% 2othe %2oFair% 2oD efense %2oAct %2oon %2oTexas% zoCount 
ies%2oweb%2oversion.pdf [hereinafter lMPACTh Or FDA]. The Institute was aided by a well-known 
criminal just ice professional, Dr. Tony Fabela, who is a member of the Nat ional Commitlee on the 
Right to Counsel. 
416. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 414, at 11. 
417. !d. 
418. See id. at 17. 
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• Texas is providing more defendants with indigent defense services 
since the Act was adopted.4' 9 
• State funding is not keeping pace with the increased demands for 
indigent services on county government!'" 
2. Georgia 
I 107 
In response to pressure hom study groups, media coverage, 
litigation, and the bar, the state legislature passed the "Georgia Indigent 
Defense Act" in 2003.42 ' Many provisions of the Act are similar to the 
Texas Act discussed above, but one important difference is that Georgia 
requires that each of the state's forty-nine judicial circuits have a circuit 
public defender office effective January 1, 2005.412 Furthermore, all 
circuit defender systems that did not opt out of the structure as described 
in the Act are funded by the state.423 This funding includes cases heard in 
the superior courts and juvenile delinquency cases, but other courts still 
rely on local government funding. Local governments do have the ability 
to contract with the circuit public defender to cover their indigent 
defense needs.414 
a. Circuit Public Defenders 
The Act describes in some detail how the circuit public defenders 
are to be compensated, the minimum staff size o f assistant public 
defenders' offices, which is based on the number of superior court judges 
in the circuit, and the type of additional personnel that may be hired, 
including investigators and administrative staff.425 Circuit and assistant 
419. In this short period, the number of individuals receiving appointed counsel has increased 
significantly. In FY 2004, 371,16-] adult defendants were served, up from 278479 during the first year 
of the Fair Defense Act. Overall costs increased nearly w% during the same timeframe, rising from 
$114 million in 2002 to $139 million in 2004. Despite these overall increases, however, attorney costs 
per case have risen a modest 3.3% per year-just enough to keep pace with inflation. See HousE 
CoMMJTl"EE ON CouJoiTY AFFAIRS, TEXAS H.R, A REPORT TO THE H .R. 79TH TEX. LEG .. available at 
http://www .house.state. tx. us/committeeslreportsl78interim/county _affairs. pdf. 
420. IMPACfS oF FDA, supra note 415, ats:z ("Statewide, both the number of indigent defendants 
requiring representation, and the overall costs associated with attorney fees have increased steadily 
since the inception of the FDA."). 
421. H.B. 770 (Ga. 2003), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legisl2oo3_04fversions/ 
htrno_HB_no_APP_I2.htm. In 2000, the Supreme Court of Georgia established the Chief Justice's 
Commission on Indigent Defense . The Commission has published two reports and has collected data 
on the State of indigent defense in Georgia. CHIF.f JuSTicE'S COMM'N ON INDIGENT DEf., THE STATIJS OF 
INDIGENT DEFENSE IN GEORGIA, REPORT oF THE CHIEF JusncE's CoMMISSION oN INDlGENT DEFENSE, 
PART 1 I (2002), available at hllp://www.georgiacourts.org/aoelpress/idelidchearings!idcreport.doc. The 
reports include findings and recommendations for improving the quality of indigent defense in 
Georgia, many of which were adopted in the 2003 legislation. The Reporter for the Commission, 
Professor Paul Kurtz, graciously reviewed an early draft of the materials in this Part. 
422. Ga. Pub Defender Standards Council, About Us, http://www.gpdsc.com/a boutus·main.htm 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2oo6). 
423. /d. (some Georgia counties that are not part of the system do receive state funding). 
424- ld. 
425. GA. CODE ANN.§§ 17·12-25 to 29 (2005). 
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circuit defenders are not allowed to "engage in the private practice of law 
for profit."416 Importantly, this means that those hired by the state as 
public defenders are full-time employees. 
While it is admirable that Georgia has endeavored to fund the 
personnel costs of the circuit public defender offices, these offices will 
not necessarily represent all the indigent defendants in Georgia. 
Moreover, the state will not provide funding for the overhead expenses 
of the circuit public defenders.427 Though lower court systems are to 
comply with the same standards as the circuit defenders,428 the financial 
burden falls to the locality. This does little to help poor counties 
adequately provide defense for indigents. Because the circuit defenders 
rely on the counties to fund their overhead costs, questions have been 
raised as to whether these offices will have adequate space, resources, 
and even phone service. 
The Act also sets out the process for selecting circuit public 
defenders. Each circuit has its own selection panel consisting of five 
members who have "significant experience working in the criminal 
justice system or who have demonstrated a strong commitment to the 
provision of adequate and effective representation of indigent 
defendants."419 The qualifications for a circuit public defender provide 
that the person must: 
(1) Have attained the age of 25 years; (2) have been duly admitted and 
licensed to practice law in the superior courts for at least three years; 
(3) be a member in good standing of the State Bar of Georgia; and (4) 
if previously disbarred from the practice of taw, have been reinstated 
as provided by law.430 
b. Georgia Public Defender Standards Council 
The Council was created as an independent agency within the 
judicial branch. It is "responsible for assuring that adequate and effective 
legal representation is provided, independently of political 
considerations or private interests, to indigent persons who are entitled 
!d. 
426. !d. § 17•12•33· 
427 !d. § 17·12-34· 
The governing authority of the county shall provide, in conjunction with the other counties 
in the judicial circuit and in a pro rata share according to the population of each county, 
appropriate offices, utilities, telephone expenses, materials and supplies as may be 
necessary to equip, maintain, and furnish the office or offices of the circuit public defender 
in an orderly and efficient manner. The provisions of an office, utilities, telephone expenses, 
materials, and supplies shall be subject to the budget procedures required by Article 1 of 
Chapter 8r of Title 36. 
428. fd. § 17·12-23(d). 
429. /d. § J7·I2·20(a). The Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the Chief Judge the Georgia 
Court of Appeals each appoint one member of the panel. 
430. !d. § 17-12·21. 
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to representation."43 ' The Council is made up of one member from each 
of Georgia's ten judicial districts,4)l and one circuit defender who has 
been elected by a majority of the circuit public defenders.433 
The director is responsible for the administrative needs of the 
Council as well as for training attorneys who provide defense to 
indigents.434 As its name suggests, the Georgia Public Defenders 
Standards Council is charged with establishing the requirements for 
indigent defense in the state of Georgia. Examples of such requirements 
are the caseload limits and staff sizes set by the Council.435 The following 
average case load limits are not to be exceeded ~per attorney per year): 
150 felonies (excluding death penalty cases),43 or 300 misdemeanor 
cases, or 250 juvenile offender cases, or sixty juvenile dependency clients, 
or 250 civil commitment cases, or twenty-five appeals to the Georgia 
Supreme Court or the Georgia Court of Appeals.437 As explained above, 
strict case load limits are essential to ensuring the quality of any indigent 
defense system. 
·Georgia, like Texas, has taken an important step toward ensuring 
the quality of indigent defense by passing its own indigent defense 
reforms. It is noteworthy that the state itself will fund the circuit public 
defenders and their personnel. Nonetheless, these offices will require 
local funding for their overhead costs, and they are not set up to 
represent all the indigent defendants in the state. 
4J l. ld. § 17-12-I. 
432- ld. § I7-1 2-3(b)(r) . Governor, Lieutenant Governor. the Speaker of the House , the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the Chief Judge of the Georgia Court of A ppeals each 
appoint two members of the Council. Which districts an official will appoint from rotates so that they 
do not keep appointing from the same two districts./d. §§ I7-I2-J(b)(2)(A), (B). 
433. ld. § 17-12-3(b )(3). Those appointing members of the Council should 
[s]eek to identify and appoint persons who represent a diversity of b~ckgrounds and 
experience, and shall solicit suggestions from the State Bar of Georgia, state and local bar 
associations. the Georgia A ssociations of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the councils 
repres.,nting the various categories of state court judges in Georgia. and the Prosecuting 
Attorneys' Council of the State of Georgia as well as from the public and other interested 
organizations and individuals within the state. 
Id. § I7-I2-3(c). Once again, as in other states, the judiciary dominates the membership of the 
Council. 
434· !d. § 17-12-5. The full responsibilities and qualifications for the council 's director are included 
in this section. 
435· ld. §§ q-12-8(b)(I), (3). 
4 36. Death penalty cases a re to be handled by the statewide Georgia Capital Defender. Georgia 
Public Defender Standards Council, About Us, http://www.gpdsc.comfaboutus-main.htm (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2006). 
437- Ga. Pub. D efender Standaxds Council, Standard for Limiting Case Loads and Determining the 
Size of Legal Staff in Circuit Public Defender Offices, available at http://www.gpdsc.com/cpdsystern-
standards-ma in.htm (last visited Apr. 14. zoo6) . 
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3· Virginia 
In 2004, the ABA published a lengthy report on indigent defense in 
Virginia.438 Among the findings of this report were that there was no 
"state entity that effectively advocates for indigent defense needs in 
Virginia" and that "inadequate resources and an absence of an oversight 
structure form the basis of an indigent defense system that fails to 
provide lawyers with the tools, time and incentive to provide adequate 
representation to indigent defendants."439 These conclusions have not 
been disputed. The report also noted that Virginia's unwaivable statutory 
fee caps were a "disincentive to many assigned counsel" that kept them 
"from doing the work necessary to provide meaningful and effective 
representation to their indigent clients. "440 The fee caps were, and still 
are, amazingly low. Maximum fees at the time were $112 for 
misdemeanors or juvenile cases eligible for jail or prison sentences; today 
they are $rs8.44' The state paid $1096 for felonies punishable by more 
than twenty years of confinement;w today the state pays $1235.443 The 
state offered only $395 for all other non-capital felony cases; today that 
figure is $445.444 These findings relate specifically to Virginia's assigned 
counsel system. Virginia also has a developing public defender system, 
but it fared no bette r under the report than the assigned counsel system 
did. The reviewers wrote that the Public Defender Commission was 
"more concerned with assuring the public and elected officials that public 
defenders can handle cases as cheaply or cheaper than appointed 
counsel" than advocating for more funding for indigent defense.445 
Soon after the release of this report, Virginia established the 
Virginia Indigent Defense Commission. The Commission was charged 
with setting standards and providing training for court-appointed 
attorneys, as well as taking over for the existing Public Defender 
Commission.44~ 
a. Appointed Counsel 
The Virginia Act specifies fairly detailed qualifications for appointed 
counsel in both misdemeanor and felony cases.447 The Commission also 
438. See INDIGENT DEFENSE IN V1 HGINIA, supra note 20. 
439· /d. at ii. 
440. /d. at iii. 
441. VA. CoDE A I'IN. § 19.2-163 (2005). As the report noted, while other states also cap fee s for 
appointed counsel, the caps in the other states are waivable and range up to $25,000 in non-capit al 
cases. A s of the writing of this Anicle, legislation is being discussed in Virginia to revamp the fee 
structure. 
442. INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA, supra note ~o, at 2. 
443· /d. 
444· VA. Coo£ ANN. § 19.2-163. 
445- INDIGENT DEFENSE IN V IRGINIA, supra note 20, at iii. 
446. VA. CoDE ANN. §19.2-163.01. 
447- In misdemeanor cases, counsel can be individuals who have been members of the Virginia 
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has the discretion to waive any of the above requirements for 
"individuals who otherwise demonstrate their level of training and 
experience."448 Once qualified to serve as court-appointed counsel, 
attorneys must complete six hours of continuing legal education every 
two years. 
The statutory standards for indigent defense are important, but 
Virginia continues to suffer from its inexcusable and unwaivable fee caps 
for court-appointed attorneys, still among the lowest in the nation,449 
though the legislature has approved a modest increase.450 Guidelines and 
standards are certainly necessary for improving the quality of indigent 
defense, but immense case loads cannot be avoided without dramatically 
increasing the funding for indigent defense. 
b. Virginia Indigent Defense Commission 
This new oversight commission was created by the state to set up 
requirements for court-appointed counsel and public defender offices. 
Half of the commission is made up of either legislative or judicial 
personnel, while at least three members are attorneys in private practice 
with an interest in indigent defense.45 ' The inclusion of attorneys in 
State Bar for Jess than a year and "have completed six hours of MCLE-approved continuing legal 
education developed by the Indigent Defense Commission." ld. § 19-2·16J.OJ . For one who has been a 
member of the bar for more than one year, he or she has to either have completed the six-hour course 
mentioned above, or "certify to the commission that he has represented, in a district court with the 
past year, four or more defendants charged with misdemeanors." ld. 
The requirements for appointed counsel in felony cases are understandably more stringent. 
Counsel in felony cases must be members in good standing of the Virginia State Bar. have completed 
the six-hour course mentioned above, and have served as lead or co-counsel in four felony cases from 
start to finish, including any appeals. For those who have been members of the Virginia Bar for more 
than a year and have tried four felony cases from start to finish including appeals with the past year, 
the six-hour course requirement and the co-counsel requirement are waived. Those in good standing 
for more than one year who can certify that they have been lead counsel in five felony cases from start 
to finish, including appeals, in the past five years can waive out of the four felony cases within the past 
year requirement. There are also specific requirements for those who seek appointment to juvenile 
and domestic relations cases. /d. 
448. /d. 
449· VA. INDIGEI'<I' DEF. CoMM'N, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2005), available at 
http://www.publicdefender.state.va.us!VaJDC%202005%2oAnnual%zoReport%znExecutive%zoSum 
mary.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2oo6). 
450. Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, About Us, http://www.publicdefender.state. 
va.us/aboutus.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2oo6). 
451. VA. CooE ANN.§ 19.2-t6J.o2. § 19-2-163.02 provides: 
The Virginia Indigent Defense Commission shall consist of 12 members, including the 
chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Courts of Justice; the chairman of the 
Virginia State Crime Commission; tbe executive secretary of the Supreme Co uri [of 
Virginia] or his designee; two attorneys officially designated by the Virginia State Bar; two 
persons appointed by the governor; two persons appointed by the Speaker of the House of 
Delegates; and two persons appointed by the Senate Committee on Privileges and 
Elections. At least one of the appointments made by the Governor, one of the 
appointments made by the Speaker, and one ot the appointments made by the Senate 
Committee on Privileges and Elections, shall be an attorney in the private practice with a 
demonstrated interest in indigent defense issues. Person who are appointed by virtue of 
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private practice and designees of the Virginia State Bar ensures that the 
legislative and judicial members will not be the only audible voices in the 
Commission. 
The Commission is responsible not only for setting the standards 
and developing training for those providing indigent defense, but also for 
overseeing the funding of any public defender offices created by the 
General Assembly.45, It is not clear from the Act, however, how much 
funding will be made available to distribute among the public defender 
offices. The Act was enacted too recently to gauge the legislative 
commitment to providing necessary financing to improve indigent legal 
services. 
The significance of the oversight and reporting functions of the Act 
should not be underestimated, but case load limits and adequate funding 
are crucial to improving the quality of indigent defense. The state here 
funds indigent defense without local government assistance.453 Without 
increased financial support for the public defender system, however, 
there will be no major improvement in the quality of legal services 
offcred.454 Moreover, because mandatory and low fee caps for appointed 
still counsel remain, private attorneys will still have an incentive to avoid 
trial and to spend as little time as possible in service to their indigent 
clients. 
4· Washington 
In 2004, the Seattle Times published a series of articles that brought 
to light the urgency of the indigent defense crisis in the State of 
Washington. The series highlighted the severe problems in some counties 
caused by the prevalence of flat-fee contracting and correspondingly high 
caseloads and inadequate funding.455 Given the series' documentation of 
ld. 
their office shall hold terms coincident with their terms of office. All other appointments 
shall be for terms of three years. 
452. Va. Indigent Def. Comm"n. Agency Directory, http://www.publicdefender.state.va.us/ 
agencydirectory.htm {last visited Apr. r4, 2006) (providing a listing of Virginia"s Public D efender. 
Capital Defender and Appellate Defender offices). 
453- Compare with states such as Washing10n, which only fund at the appellate level. Alabama, 
Tennessee, Arkansas. Kentucky. West Virginia. and Florida also fund indigent defense at the state 
level for hath appeals and trials. 
454· Unfortunately, reforms in Virginia appear to be off to a rocky start, as seen by the resignation 
of the Chief Public Defender of Fairfax County after less than one year in the position. She said that 
even after legislative reforms her office had so many clients (more than 8ooo last year) and so few 
lawyers (only twenty) that the attorneys could not adequately represent the defendants at trials and on 
appeal. She further complained that the Indigent Defense Commission was not treating the office 
fairly. The Executive Director of the Commission responded by stating that " inadequate funding has 
been a long-standing. statewide problem. not limited to Fairfax. [We need to have] local and state 
policy-makers . . . properly fund indigent defense services in Virginia." Jackman, SCipra note 8. · 
455· Ken Armstrong et al.. Attorney Profited, but his Client>· Lost, SEATILE T tMES. Apr. 5 2004, at 
AI [hereinafter Armstrong, Auorney Profited]; Ken Armstrong et al.. Frustrated Attorney, 'You Just 
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these serious difficulties, the legislative efforts at reform seem limited 
and curious. Several years ago, Washington passed legislation that set up 
the Office of Public Defense ("OPD"). At first glance, this reform 
appears to be a major step forward. Upon review, however, the 
legislation is surprisingly narrow in scope. 
The OPD was created " [i]n order to implement the constitutional 
guarantee of counsel and to ensure the effective and efficient delivery of 
the indigent appellate services."456 The State of Washington funds the 
OPD as an "independent agency of the judicial branch. "457 What is 
striking here, however, is that Washington established the OPD to 
oversee indigent defense only at the appellate level and not at the trial 
level: 
The Office of Public Defense administers state funds appropriated for 
appellate indigent defense, develops administrative procedures, 
standards, and guidelines for appellate indigent defense services, 
recommends criteria and standards for determining and verifying 
indigency, coordinates with the Supreme Court and the three Courts of 
Appeal to determine how attorney services should be provided, and 
provides studies and recommendations to the Legislature regarding 
indigent defense services in Washington State.'58 
This is a serious concern. While the state has the non-profit 
Washington Defender Association, which was "created in 1983 to 
promote, assist, and encourage public defense systems which insure that 
all accused persons in every court receive effective assistance of 
counsel,"459 Washington still lacks a statewide trial court equivalent of the 
OPD.46o Simply, Washington has no single source for disseminating 
Can 't Help People', SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 6 2004, at AI; Ken Armstrong ct al., The Empty Promise of 
an Equal Defense, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 4 2004, at AI [hereinafter Annstrong, Empty Promise]. With 
costs rising for indigent defense , several counties initiated low-bid, flat fee contract systems in which a 
lawyer takes all of the indigent defense cases in a jurisdiction for a fixed fee. A rmstrong, Empty 
Promise, supra , at AI. Although national standards recognize that contracts may be a component o f 
an indigent defense system, these types of low-bid contracts awarded primarily on the basis of cost are 
prohibited. STANDARDS fOR CRIMINAL JUSTtCE: PROVIDING D EFENSE SERVICES 5-3. 1 (1992). They create 
a financial disincentive for attomeys to provide adequate representation since the attorney must 
handle all referred cases and also pay for all services such as investigation and expert witnesses. 
Armstrong, Empty Promise , supra, at A I. 
The situation in the sta te of Washington is striking, for serious problems certainly exist, as 
reflected in the Seattle Times series. However, when members of the Committee conducted a site visit 
to the Defender Association in Seattle, the King County defender program, they found that many 
aspects of that defense system worked extremely well. Committee Site Visit Report (on file with 
authors) . 
456. WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 2.70.005 (2005). 
457· ! d. 
458. See generally WASH. STATE O FFICE OF PuB. DEF., ANNUAL REPORT I o-II (2003), available at 
http:l/www.opd.wa.gov/Publications/Annual%2oReport12003%2oAnnual%2oReport.pdf (providing 
the OPD Client Communications Protocol Guidelines). 
459· Wash. Defender Ass'n, Home Page, http://www.defensenet.org/ (last visited A pr. 14, zoo6). 
46o. Unfortunately, Washington is not alone in taking this limited approach. Michigan , Illinois, 
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information about indigent defense at the trial level, nor does it have any 
oversight commission considering the trial process in the state. 
The OPD staff and members of its advisory committee are similar in 
composition to the other state entities discussed above.46 ' Once again, the 
appointment of committee members by the governor and the judiciary 
raises concerns that the commjttee will be serving interests other than 
that of providing constitutionally adequate indigent defense. 
5· Montana 
Montana took a great leap forward in overhauling its indigent 
defense system when its legislature enacted extensive reforms in 2005. 
This groundbreaking legislation created a statewide public defender 
system, and Montana became the first state in the nation to follow the 
ABA's Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System as a guide to 
its criminal defense reform.463 
Although the deficiencies of Montana's county-based system were 
documented in a comprehensive report almost thirty years ago,463 a class-
action lawsuit filed by the ACLU in 2002 spurred the passage of the 
Montana Public Defender Act of 2005. The suit, filed against the state 
and seven counties, alleged that the delivery of the right to counsel in 
those counties was plagued by constitutional deficiencies. One of the 
plaintiffs was a young woman who had been detained in jail for seven 
months, during which her attorney failed to initiate an investigation into 
the charges against her. Another plaintiff had been detained for more 
than six weeks without having had a detailed conversation with his 
attorney about the facts of his case.464 
Specifically, the action alleged that the state had abdicated its 
constitutional duty to ensure effective lawyers for the poor by delegating 
the indigent defense function to its counties without sufficient funding or 
oversight. As a result of the state's abdication, county programs were 
plagued by serious deficiencies, including a virtual absence of adversarial 
and Idaho all have s tate funded appellate s)"items with no financing or serious oversight of trial 
systems. 
461. See generally WASH. REv. CooE ANN. § 2.7o.oi0-.030 (2005). Concerns over independence 
may arise upon examining the selection process for the OPD director since the position is appointed 
by the State Supreme Court. from a list submitted by the advisory committee. /d. § 2.7o.oro. The 
advisory committee is made up of individuals designated by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Washington, the Governor, the Washington State Bar Association, the Court of Appeals E xecutive 
Committee, and the President of the Senate . /d. § 2.70.030. 
462. See Maurice Possley, Montana Aims to Fix Public Defender System: State's Effort is First to 
Usc Guidelines Suggested by ABA, CHJ. TRJB., June 21, 2005, at 11. 
463. See MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315, at 22 & n.12 (citing NAT'L CENTER FOR DEF. MGMT., 
MOI'-'TANA STATEWIDE DEFENDER SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT STUDY (1976)). 
464- See Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Files Oass-Action Lawsuit Against 
Montana's Indigent Defense Program (Feb. 14, 2002), available a1 http://www.aclu.org/CriminaUustice/ 
CriminaUus tice.cfm?ID=9695&=48. 
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advocacy, high attorney caseloads, the inability of lawyers to 
meaningfully confer with their clients or to develop a defense, lack of 
investigatory and expert services, excessive plea bargaining, and 
unnecessary pre-trial incarceration. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief 
requiring the state to provide adequate representation for poor Montana 
defendants.465 
Acting as an expert witness, the NLADA prepared a comprehensive 
evaluation of Montana defense services and found little had changed in 
the nearly thirty years since the first national report had documented the 
shortcomings of the system. The 2004 assessment concluded that the 
"defense system in Montana delivers ineffective, inefficient, unethical, 
and conflict-ridden representation to the poor."¥>6 It documented 
significant problems such as inadequate funding and resources, a lack of 
independence from political interference, poorly supervised and 
inexperienced attorneys struggling with excessive caseloads, and 
inconsistent eligibility standards for representation.467 
On the eve of trial, the ACLU and the state agreed to postpone the 
trial to allow the state legislature to act to remedy the situation. As part 
of the agreement, the state attorney general lobbied lawmakers to create 
a state commission and a chief state public defender to establish and 
oversee a system of regional public defense offices.468 In the face of 
mounting pressure to act, including statements encouraging systemic 
reform by the Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court:69 the 
legislature approved a sweeping new law that was heralded as a national 
model for providing defense lawyers for poor defendants.470 
The new legislation not only mandates an independent oversight 
commission, but empowers the commission to set standards for defender 
education, training and experience, caseloads, access to support services 
such as paralegals and investigators, and performance criteria and 
evaluation. Although the new law pumps an additional two million 
dollars per year into the system to fund these dramatic structural 
changes, even those celebrating the reform acknowledge that significant 
465. See Amended Complaint, White v. Martz, No. C DY-2002-133 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct Apr. 
14, 2002), available at http:J/www.aclu.org!FilesPDFs/white -martz%2oamend%2ocmplt.pdf. 
ld. 
466. MONTANA REPORT, supra note 315, at 13- 14. 
467. ld. at 4-5· 
468. Kowalski, supra note g. 
469- ld. Chie f Justice Gray stated 
There 's no uniformity, there's no consistency. Jt isn't efficient and these systems are not 
necessarily ensuring quality defense for indigent defendants across the state .... I'm hopeful 
that the Legisla ture in the 2005 session will draw up some kind of systemic approach to a 
public defense program. It will be a major legislative package and it won't be cheap. 
470. See Possley, supra note 462. 
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fiscal challenges remain.47 ' The Act provides a one-year transition period 
and requires the new system to be operational by July 1, 2006.472 
Like reforms in other states, the reforms in Montana are still too 
new to fully evaluate. Nonetheless, Montana's new standards-based 
system provides an impressive precedent for other states considering 
reform. Montana's experience also further highlights the contribution the 
ABA Ten Principles can make in educating policymakers and shaping 
effective systems. In addition, the role of litigation cannot be overlooked 
as a key component in capturing the attention of legislators and 
precipitating change. 
B. REFORMS IN DIRECT RESPONSE TO JUDICIAL RULINGS IN LITIGATION 
Where a state's political branches have refused to act in response to 
evidence of an inadequate indigent defense system, reformers have 
increasingly turned to the courts for relief. As a result, over the last 
twenty-five years a significant amount of litigation has sought remedies 
for an assortment of problems plaguing indigent defense systems.473 The 
cases have targeted the adequacy of attorney compensation, excessive 
caseloads, the overall system of providing counsel, and which level of 
government, state or local, must bear the expense of providing lawyers 
for poor criminal defendants:74 
The first wave of litigation, initiated primarily by attorneys, focused 
on the property rights of the appointed lawyer, raising "takings" 
arguments under the Fifth Amendment and resisting the view that 
criminal defense lawyers have a professional obligation to represent poor 
defendants even without compensation.475 Over time, the challenges have 
become broader, with a shift in emphasis from the rights of appointed 
attorneys to the rights of defendants to receive an effective defense.476 In 
the context of defendant rights, funding remains a central question, but it 
is linked to the variables that negatively affect a defender's performance, 
such as unreasonable caseloads and lack of resources. 
Commentators have had an ongoing debate about the effectiveness 
of litigation in achieving enduring, systemic reform of indigent defense 
systems.477 Nevertheless, litigation has produced significant victories in 
471. See Jennife r McKee, ACLU Lauds Montana Plan to Fix Public Defender Syslem, BILLINoS 
GAZEITE, June 9. 2005 , available at http://www.billingsgazette.net/articlesl2oo51o61o91state/ 
export2I0559-1XL 
472. See Montan a Public Defender A ct, Mont. Code Ann.,§ 47-1-ro1 (2005). 
473· See Lefstein, supra note 35. at 849--5 L 
474- !d. at 849-50 nn.66-6g (collecting cases). 
475 - Wright, supra note 6o, at 244- 45 ; see also State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214, 1217 (N.H. 1983) 
(holding failure to reimburse criminal defense attorneys for their services constitutes a taking in 
violation of state and tederal constitutions). 
476. Wright, supra note 6o, at 245. 
477- Compare Wright , supra note 6o. at 25 1 (reformers should be "wary about the power of 
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which state courts have acknowledged the constitutional inadequacy of 
indigent defense systems and ordered reform. These victories, however 
limited in their long-term impact, suggest that litigation may have a 
significant role to play in precipitating change. For instance, the state 
supreme courts of Arizona,478 Oklahoma,479 and Louisiana.jl)o have each 
provided powerful precedent, if not sustainable practical results, in 
finding their systems deficient and subsequently sparking legislative 
action.48' 
I. Arizona 
In State v. Smith, an· individual criminal defendant challenged 
Mohave County's contract defense system.481 Smith argued on appeal 
from his burglary and assault conviction that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel due to his attorney's "shocking, staggering, and 
unworkable" caseload.483 Although the Arizona Supreme Court did not 
find that Smith's attorney was incompetent, it used the occasion to assess 
the deficiencies of the Mohave County indigent defense system, which 
utilized a bid system to award public defense contracts to private 
attorneys. This system awarded contracts to the lowest bidders, but failed 
to consider the time required to effectively represent clients; the support 
costs such as investigators, paralegals, and secretaries; and the experience 
or skills of the attorney before awarding a contract. 
litigation to improve defense funding in the long run. ") , and Note, Effectively /neffecrive: The Failure 
of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, JJ8 HARv. L. REv. I7JI, 1751-52 (2005) 
(litigation has been unsuccessful in generating sustainable structural or fundamental change to 
indigent systems in the long·run), and Bernhard, supra note 295, at 335 (arguing that courts can and 
will act to improve the quality of criminal defense services), with Gideon 's Promise Unfulfilled, supra 
note 3o6, a t 2o63 ("(T)he best short-term means for overcoming this political process failure and 
improving the quality of indigent defense is litigated reform."). 
478. See State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1384 (Ariz. 1984). 
479· See State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d IISO, 1163 (Okla. 1990). 
48o. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 78o, 79 1 (La. 1993). 
481. Of course, these are not the only cases to result in significant reform. See, e.g., United States 
ex rei. Green v. Washington. 917 F. Supp. 1238, I271-82 (N.D. IU. r<)96) (finding delays in appellate 
representation by state defender office are caused by state underfunding of appellate defenders and 
that lengthy del ays are presumptively unconstitutional); Arnold v. Kemp, 8r3 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Ark. 
1991) (finding legislatively-imposed fee caps on court-appointed a ttorneys for indigent clients 
unconstitutional); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1139 (Fla. 1990) 
(indicating that although court cannot order the legislature to provide certain funds for criminal 
defense, if funds arc not available within adequate time court will order immediate relea~e pending 
appeal of certain bondable felons); In re Pub. Defender's Certification of Conflict, 709 So. zd 101, 103-
04 (Aa. 1998) (affir ming order that bars a Florida public defender's office from accepting new cases 
be~ause of excessive backlog); State ex rei. Stephan v. Smith. 747 P.2d 8r6, 849 (Kan. r987) (holding 
that state has obligation to offer counsel to indigents charged with felonies and to pay such counsel at 
non-confiscatory rate); N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n v. Stare, 763 N.Y.S.zd 397, 414 (Sup. Ct. 2003) 
(granting a permanent injunction and prompting an increase in fees for appointed counsel). 
482. 68r P.2d 1374, 1378-79 (Ariz. 1984). 
483. /d. 
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As a result of the low-bid contract system, defense counsel routinely 
accepted caseloads far in excess of the NLADA caseload guidelines. The 
court relied on NLADA guidelines in concluding that Smith's attorney's 
caseload was "excessive, if not crushing."$l For example, Smith's 
attorney handled a "part-time" caseload of 149 felonies, 160 
misdemeanors, twenty-one juvenile cases, and thirty-three other cases in 
the year Smith was convicted, in addition to a private civil practice.485 The 
court concluded that "an attorney so overburdened cannot adequately 
represent all his clients properly and be reasonably effective. "-t&i Smith 
also asserted that the attorney spent "only two to three hours 
interviewing the defendant and 'possibly' six to eight hours studying the 
case."4R1 
The Arizona Supreme Court found that Mohave County's bid 
system violated defendants' due process rights and right to counsel, and 
ordered that all subsequent convictions obtained using the same 
procedure were presumed to be a Sixth Amendment violation. The state 
would carry the burden of rebutting this presumption until it improved 
the bid system. The rule applied to any county that utilized a method of 
appointment that failed to take into consideration the caseload factors 
identified by the court including the time required to effectively 
represent clients; support costs such as investigators, paralegals and 
secretaries; and the experience or competency of the attorney.488 
Shortly after the decision, Mohave County adopted a new system 
where court-appointed attorneys were paid by the hour, more than 
doubling the cost of the previous low-bid system.4119 However, the long 
term effect of the court's strong statement about excessive caseloads and 
implicit endorsement of the NLADA caseload standards is uncertain. A 
1993 study found a wide range of noncompliance with Smith, with some 
counties continuing to handle caseloads at twice the level or above than 
required by the court.490 In 1997 the President of the Arizona State Bar, a 
criminal defense lawyer, lamented the hollow promise of Gideon and 
commented that in Arizona "indigent defendants are often led into court 
by attorneys who are devastatingly overloaded by cases, who are 
compensated too poorly to allow anything but a rudimentary review of 
484 !d. at 1380. 
4S5. !d. 
486. ld. at 1381. 
487. !d. at 1378. 
488. /d. at 1381, 1384. 
489. Caroline A. Pilch, State v. Smith: Placing a Limir on Lawyers' Case/oad~· . 27 ARIZ. L. REv. 
759· 7&7 (1985)· 
490. THE SPANGENRERG GROUP, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN ARIZ ONA 7 (1993). 
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the situation, or are completely inexperienced and untrained in the 
criminal arena."49' 
2. Oklahoma 
Systemic reform of Oklahoma's indigent defense system was spurred 
by the state supreme court's decision in State v. Lynch.49' In 1989, two 
attorneys appointed to represent an indigent capital murder defendant 
requested fees far in excess of the statutory maximum of $3200.493 The 
trial court approved the fee request, holding the fee cap unconstitutional. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, finding the cap unconstitutional 
as applied to defendants because such a low rate of compensation was a 
taking of private property.494 
Although the court "invite[d] legislative attention to this 
problem,"495 it relied on the judiciary's "direct and inherent constitutional 
power to regulate the practice of law"4<1i and established an interim set of 
attorney fee guidelines. Embracing the concept of parity, the court set an 
hourly rate for appointed defense attorneys that was tied to that of local 
prosecutors. "In order to place the counsel for the defense on an equal 
footing with counsel for the prosecution, provision must be made for 
compensation of defense counsel's reasonable overhead and out-of-
pocket expenses."4<n 
In response to Lynch, the Oklahoma legislature undertook sweeping 
reform of the state's criminal defense services. Within a year, the 
legislature enacted the Criminal Defense Act, which established a new 
state agency, the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System (OIDS) to provide 
trial, appellate and capital post-conviction criminal defense services to 
poor defendants.4<J& In addition, the Act instituted major changes in the 
funding and delivery of defense services at trial and on appeal.499 
Unfortunately, the promise of this potentially transformational structure 
has never been wholly fulfilled. 
During its relatively brief history, OIDS has continually struggled 
with a lack of fiscal support, which has interfered with its mission and 
compromised its effectiveness. According to its 2004 Annual Report, the 
agency has repeatedly been forced to seek supplemental appropriations 
from the legislature and struggles with yearly budgetary shortfalls. In 
491. Michael L Piccarrcta. The Promise of Gideon. ARIZ. Arr'Y, Mar. 1997, at ro. 
492. 796 P.zd Irso {Okla. 1990). 
493. !d. at 1153- 54. Lynch was convicted, but sentenced to life in prison, rather than to death as 
the prosecution had sought. The lawyers reques ted fees and expenses of $17,073 ·03 and $10,995-00. !d. 
494. /d. at I 152-54. 
495· /d. at n6r. 
496. ld. at n62. 
497· /d. at l!6r. 
498. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 1355-1369 (West 2000). 
499· /d. 
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order to address funding reductions, OIDS has had to eliminate 
positions, furlough employees, and refuse to enter into contracts with 
conflict counsel, despite the fact that these drastic measures "hindered 
the agency's ability to effectively represent its clients. " 5"" In fact, shortly 
after its creation, lack of funds nearly resulted in a shutdown of the 
agency when the original funding mechanism, an additional fee on traffic 
tickets, failed to generate enough revenue to meet the OIDS payroll. 50' 
3· Louisiana 
In Louisiana, the challenge originated with a single overworked 
public defender who petitioned the court for help with excessive 
caseloads and lack of investigative assistance in his office in New 
Orleans.502 At the time he was assigned to represent Leonard Peart on 
rape, robbery, and murder charges, the defender was also responsible for 
approximately seventy other felony cases, and had a trial scheduled for a 
different client on every available court date. Moreover, his clients 
routinely waited in jail one to two months before he was able to meet 
with them for the first time.503 
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the trial court's 
finding that the New Orleans indigent defense system was 
unconstitutional, it found that caseloads were so excessive and 
investigative resources so limited that clients were "not provided with the 
effective assistance of counsel the Constitution requires."504 Like the 
Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Smith, the Louisiana court created a 
rebuttable presumption that indigent defendants represented by 
overworked public defenders are not receiving effective assistance of 
counsel.5~ The court required pretrial hearings on whether lawyers could 
effectively handle the number of cases assigned to them. It also 
prohibited prosecutions from going forward in cases where effective 
assistance could not be provided because of a lawyer's workload and lack 
of resources.500 
In the years following Peart, the legislature did increase funding to a 
degree. The state supreme court created the first statewide indigent 
defense commission, charged with promulgating and enforcing indigent 
defense qualification and performance guidelines throughout 
Louisiana.507 Despite these positive steps, however, over time the funding 
500. OKLA. INDIGENT Dllf. SYS., ANNUAL Rlli'O~·r 1-4 (2004}, available at 
http://www.ok.gov/-oids/reports/ann_rpt_2004-Pdf. 
sor. /d. at 3-
502. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993} 
503- /d. 
504. !d. at 790-
sos. /d. at 783. 
so6. !d. 
507- See TRIAL-L£VEL INDIGENT DEFENSE, .<llpra note 2Z, at s8. 
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has failed to keep up with heavy caseloads,5"8 and a recent assessment of 
indigent defense in Louisiana found that the "trial-level indigent defense 
system in Louisiana is rife with systemic deficiencies."509 In addition, 
"Peart motions" have not been a particularly effective tool for criminal 
defendants. 5 '" 
4· The Promise 
These three celebrated cases provided the impetus for much needed 
reform and compelled three state legislatures to provide some additional 
funding in the short term. In the long run, however, even these strong 
judicial pronouncements were seemingly unable to sustain enduring 
structural or fundamental change to indigent defense systems.s" It 
remains to be seen whether legislative action generated by more recent 
cases will have a more enduring impact. For instance: 
• In response to a class action lawsuit filed by the ACLU against the 
State of Montana, the state legislature enacted groundbreaking public 
defender legislation in June of 2005. Montana' s Public Defender Act is, 
as noted above, the first in the nation crafted with the intent to 
construct a system based on the ABA 's Ten Principles of a Public 
Defense Delivery System.5" 
• The Massachusetts' state legislature passed legislation in July 2005 
that made significant changes to its system of indigent defense and 
substantially increased funding, partly in response to Lavallee v. 
Justices.5' 3 The changes include increased pay for court-appointed 
lawyers, restrictions on the number of hours the state will compensate 
attorneys, additional defender positions, and the creation of a 
commission to study the idea of decriminalizing certain misdemeanors 
to reduce caseloads and relieve docket pressure.''~ 
508. Note, supra note 477, at 1738. 
509. TRIAL·LEVEL )NOIGENT DEFENSE, supra note ll, at 58. 
510. Note, supra note 477, at 1737. 
5 r I . For an assessment of the shortcomings of these cases, see id. 
512. Mike Dennison, Public Defender System Cited as National Model, GREAT FALLS TRIB., June 8, 
2005, at 17A: see also Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Hails Montana's Public 
Defense Bill as Leading National Trend (June 8, 2005), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
CrirninalJustice/CriminalJustice.cfm?ID= 1841 t&c=48. For a full diswssion of the Montana response 
to the ACLU class action, see s11pra, Part VJ.A. 
5 r3. 812 N.E. ld 895 (Mass. 2004). The Lavallee suit was filed on behalf of unrepresented indigent 
criminal defendants in Hampden County./d. at~- The county was experiencing a critical shortage of 
lawyers available for appointment due to the low rates of compern;ation. /d. As a result, indigent 
defendants were being held in custody without counsel. /d. at 902 n.JO. The coun concluded that 
petitioners were being deprived of their right to counsel and subjected to severe restrictions on their 
liberty and other constitutional interests. The court held that upon a showing that counsel was not 
available to represent an indigent defendant despite good faith efforts, the defendant could not be 
kept more than seven days and the criminal case against such a defendant could not be continued 
beyond forty· five days. 
514 See MASSACHUSETTS REPORT, supra note 109, at 5· 
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• In State v. Citizen,5 '5 the Louisiana State Supreme Court declared 
that the state legislature, rather than local governments, is responsible 
for providing adequate resources for public defenders.516 Where 
adequate funds are unavailable, defense counsel can request that the 
prosecution be halted.5' 7 Several months after the decision, and in the 
face of mounting national criticism of the state's indi~ent defense 
system and the state Chief Justice's calls for reform; 18 the state 
legislature took some initial steps to address the significant funding and 
structural issues. The legislature passed a small funding increase and 
approved legislation that authorized information gathering and 
standardizing of the definition of a "case" and defining what it is to be 
indigent. 519 
5· The Risks of Litigation 
Not all litigation has resulted in positive outcomes for reform. The 
danger in bringing such challenges is that the plaintiffs will fail in their 
efforts to persuade the courts to intervene, thus inadvertently bolstering 
a flawed system and making subsequent challenges that much more 
difficult. Such is perhaps the case in Mississippi, where the state supreme 
court recently rejected a county's challenge to the state's refusal to 
provide any funding to pay for lawyers for indigent criminal 
defendants. 51" 
Quitman County, an impoverished Delta community, sued 
Mississippi, alleging that the state law requiring local governments to pay 
for indigent defense was a violation of the United States and Mississippi 
Constitutions.52' The state supreme court rejected the county's 
contention, however, refusing to find the state's failure to provide any 
funding for indigent defense unconstitutionaLl1 1 In fairly unsympathetic 
language, the court's majority said if the county was concerned about 
indigent defense, it could have budgeted more for it. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
State and local governments have had more than forty years to 
respond to Gideon's trumpet call, yet the evidence is overwhelming and 
undeniable that many states have simply failed to meet their 
515. 8<)8 So. 2d 325 (La. 2005). 
516. /d. at 336. 
517. !d. at 33~-39 . 
518. In his State of the Judiciary Address delivered before the Joint Session of the U>uisiana 
Legislature on May 3. 2005, the Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court. Pascal F. Calogero, J r., 
called for imme diate indigent defense reform. "We have taken steps in the past to make the right to 
counsel real and meaningful in Louisiana. Unfortunately, these efforts have not proven to be 
adequate. Much more needs to be done." !d. 
519. Mark Ballard, Se1wte Sendv Indigent Defense Bill to Blanco, THE Aovoc. {Baton Rouge, La.), 
June 21,2005, at SA. 
520. Quitman County v. State, 9 10 So. 2d 1032, 1048 (Miss. 2005). 
521. ld. at 1034. 
522. ld. at 1041. 
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constitutional obligation to provide competent legal representation to 
criminal defendants who are unable to afford an attorney. The 
comprehensive national research by the National Committee on the 
Right to Counsel provides compelling support for the conclusion that 
that we have a true constitutional crisis. Although some parts of the 
country have started model approaches to providing indigent defense 
services, the overall picture is bleak. The pervasiveness of this failure is 
particularly shocking in light of the decades of repeated attempts to call 
attention to and repair the deep flaws in indigent defense systems across 
the nation. We can no longer afford to ignore the denial of constitutional 
rights to the very vulnerable in our society, nor can we tolerate the 
resulting erosion of the integrity of the criminal justice system and the 
legitimacy of criminal convictions. 
There has been no shortage of recommendations for improving 
indigent defense systems over the years. In fact, the ABA Ten Principles 
of a Public Defense Delivery System provides an excellent blueprint of 
the fundamental criteria necessary to construct an effective public 
defense system. The recommendations that follow, however, go beyond 
the familiar recitation of the necessary ingredients of an effective system; 
they also suggest ways in which groups or individuals might go about 
generating these much needed reforms. 
The recommendations begin with the essentials of an effective 
indigent defense system: an independent structure within which 
competent attorneys labor for adequate compensation, under reasonable 
working conditions, and with the proper tools necessary to deliver 
competent representation. A key component, of course, is that these 
essentials be funded at adequate levels. 
A. INDEPENDENT STRUCTURE 
RECOMMENDATION 1: Establishing an independent, statewide 
nonpartisan authority responsible for the defense function should 
be the cornerstone of any reform of a state's indigent defense 
system. 
The imperative of independence is not only reflected in the 
commitment to this goal in national standards, but is vital to insulate 
defenders from political and judicial pressures. Defense counsel cannot 
be vigorous advocates for their clients when their compensation or 
continued employment depends upon catering to the predilections of 
judges or legislators, and political pressure can distort the attorney-client 
relationship. At a minimum, judicial oversight creates serious problems 
with the perception of and opportunities for abuse. Just as the 
prosecution represents the government with autonomy and executes its 
responsibilities with relatively little interference from the judiciary or the 
legislature, so should the defense. 
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In addition to insulating the defense function from political and 
judicial pressures, a statewide oversight entity provides a mechanism for 
achieving many of the key components of an effective public defense 
delivery system and should: 
• establish attorney qualification standards; 
• coordinate eligibility standards to ensure consistency of access to 
public representation; 
• facilitate appropriate appointments, matching attorney experience 
with the complexity of the cases; 
• monitor and evaluate attorney performance and track caseloads; 
• develop and provide training, both to entry-level defenders and 
advanced practitioners; 
• provide access to technology and other resources; and 
• serve as an advocate in the political process and provide a voice for 
the support of indigent defense. 
With greater capacity for centralized management of defenders' 
services, an independent oversight body can provide uniformity in the 
quality of representation by insisting that defendants be represented by 
capable attorneys, mandating reasonable working conditions, and 
providing the proper tools for effective representation. 
B. COMPETENT ATTORNEYS 
RECOMMENDATION 2: States must establish and enforce standards for 
attorneys who represent poor criminal defendants, including 
minimum qualifications, training, and performance 
requirements. 
Without competent attorneys, no system of public representation of 
poor defendants will be successful. Regardless of the type of delivery 
system a state chooses to provide indigent defense services-contract, 
court-appointed, public defender or some hybrid-states should ensure 
that each defense attorney has at least minimum qualifications in 
criminal defense. A tiered system of qualifications required for 
appointment for different levels of cases, depending on the experience 
and training of the attorney, would be ideaL It would ensure that a 
defender has the requisite knowledge and skills to deliver competent 
representation to a defendant, whether the case is a simple misdemeanor 
or a complex felony matter. Monitoring and evaluating defenders based 
on performance standards would also guarantee that attorneys provide 
effective representation and meet professional and ethical expectations. 
June 2oo6) THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 1125 
c. CASELOADS 
RECOMMENDATION 3: States must establish and enforce appropriate 
workload limits to prevent the overburdening of defenders and 
avoid undermining the quality of representation they are able to 
deliver. 
Even the most dedicated and able lawyers cannot provide effective 
representation to their clients when they have simply too many clients. 
States have a number of options to control workloads, such as caseload 
standards, decriminalization, and alternative justice programs: 
I. Caseload Standards 
To ensure that defenders have sufficient time to devote to each 
client, states must control workloads. The most direct route is to 
establish caseload limits. Although national caseload standards are 
available, states should consider their own circumstances in defining a 
reasonable defender workload. Factors such as the availability of 
investigators, level of support staff, complexity of cases, and level of 
attorney experience all might affect a workable definition. Data 
collection and a consistent method of weighing cases are essential to 
determining current caseloads and setting reasonable workload 
standards. 
2. Decriminalization to Reduce Crowded Dockets 
States can take steps to reduce crowded dockets by decriminalizing 
certain non-serious misdemeanors, e.g., operating a vehicle with a 
suspended license, or with no license or insurance; shoplifting; disorderly 
conduct; disturbing the peace; or trespassing. States could reevaluate 
those misdemeanors that carry possible jail time, but for which 
incarceration is rarely sought or imposed, and treat them as civil 
infractions. This would serve several purposes. By reducing crowded 
court dockets, decriminalization can relieve some of the pressure on 
courts to move cases through the system quickly at any cost. In turn, this 
would provide judges with additional time to devote to more serious 
cases. In addition, removing these cases from the criminal docket would 
lighten the caseload of defenders and prosecutors, and also reduce the 
funds needed to provide state-funded defenders. The savings could then 
be used to fund other needs in a resource-starved defense system. 
J. Alternative Justice Programs 
States could expand the use of alternative justice programs such as 
diversion into drug courts, mental health courts, or alternative treatment 
programs. Problem-solving courts, such as community, domestic 
violence, drug, and mental health courts, may hold promise for reducing 
caseloads. These alternative courts generally stress a collaborative, 
multidisciplinary problem-solving approach, rather than an adversarial 
one. Their goal is to address the defendant's underlying psychosocial 
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issues by providing appropriate treatment or services as a way of 
reducing recidivism. Although some observers debate the proper role 
and ethical obligations of a defense attorney in this novel setting, the 
potential benefits for poor defendants and defender workloads are 
worthy of study and consideration. 
D. COMPENSATION 
RECOMMENDATION 4: Fair compensation, including adequate 
overhead and a fair fee, should be paid to all publicly funded 
defenders. 
It is fundamentally unfair to expect lawyers to perform increasingly 
demanding work when they are inadequately compensated. The financial 
burden imposed on publicly funded defenders compromises the quality 
of representation they provide. Inadequate compensation results in a 
scarcity of qualified attorneys willing to represent poor defendants and 
raises significant access to justice questions. In pursuing this goal of fair 
compensation, states should consider: 
I. Salary Parity with Equivalent Prosecution Attorneys (Where 
Prosecutors are Fairly Compensated) 
Salary parity is more than just a question of economic fairness. 
Parity also eliminates the appearance that the government values the 
defense function is valued less than the prosecution function. Equalizing 
compensation between defenders and prosecutors acknowledges the 
equivalent roles the two play in the criminal justice system. 
2 . Law Student-Loan Forgiveness Programs for Public 
Defenders and Pprosecutors 
Low pay and significant law school student-loan debt leave many 
defenders and prosecutors struggling financially and discourage many 
talented lawyers from careers in public service. Loan forgiveness 
programs, similar to those offered to doctors, nurses, and teachers, 
reduce a certain portion of student-loan debt for those who work in 
underserved areas. This would make it easier to attract and keep good, 
experienced lawyers as public defenders and prosecutors. 
E. PROPER TOOLS 
RECOMMENDATION s: States must equip their indigent defense systems 
with the appropriate tools to enable a defender to deliver 
competent representation. This includes staff support, such as 
investigators, paralegals, and secretaries; technology and research 
capabilities; and access to independent experts and other 
professional services. 
r. State-Provided Resources 
Without access to the raw materials and support services a lawyer 
needs to mount an effective defense, defenders cannot provide 
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competent representation and criminal trials become fundamentally 
unfair. Frequently, public defenders also face a considerable gap 
between the anci11ary resources provided them and those available to 
prosecutors. This creates an uneven playing field. Providing these 
defender resources is often more cost-effective and efficient than 
saddling an already overburdened defender with clerical or 
administrative tasks in addition to an overwhelming caseload. The 
quality of representation improves where resources are available. With 
appropriate resources, lawyers are able to conduct more thorough 
investigations, produce and file pretrial motions, challenge the 
government's evidence with an independent expert, or simply 
communicate more frequently with clients. Providing the support and 
resources state defenders desperately need may be an apposite area for 
federal involvement. 
2. Federal Resources 
The federal government should establish an independent, federally 
funded defender resource center to assist and strengthen state and local 
indigent defense systems. Such a center could help states provide 
competent criminal representation for poor defendants by offering 
training, support, research assistance, brief and motion banks, advice on 
identifying and using experts and other services. Twenty-five years ago 
the ABA recommended the creation of just such a resource center. 
Establishment of a non-profit Center for Defense Services continues to 
be ABA policy.5 ' 3 The Center's mission would be to strengthen the 
services of publicly funded defender programs throughout the nation. A 
federal resource center of this nature could collect and analyze data and 
conduct research, sponsor pilot programs, award grants, and explore 
other ways to assist state and local governments in providing indigent 
defense services. 
VIII. GENERATING REFORM 
The essential recommendations outlined above, namely an 
adequately funded, independent structure within which competent 
attorneys labor under reasonable working conditions with the proper 
tools necessary to deliver competent representation, are neither new nor 
particularly visionary. We know how to structure, staff and fund an 
effective indigent system. Despite four decades of repeated calls for 
reform, many states have failed to take action. The challenge is not in 
knowing what to do to address the indigent defense crisis, but rather how 
523. ABA STANDING CoMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, REPORT WITH 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO TilE ABA HOUSE or DELJ::GATES 121 (Feb. 1979), available at 
http://www.abanet.orgllegalservices/sclaid/defenderfpolicy.html (recommending the creation of a 
federa l Center for Defense Services); see also GwEo.v·s BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 39, at 4 2. 
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to compel state legislatures and executives to establish, fund, and support 
a constitutionally adequate indigent defense system. Unfortunately, 
appealing to constitutional sensitivities has not worked in the face of 
strained state budgets, political pressures, a lack of a constituency to 
advocate for poor criminal defendants, and the popularity of "tough on 
crime" rhetoric. 
The Committee was not content to merely join the chorus for reform 
that has continually gone unheeded. Rather, the recommendations under 
consideration include a host of potential actions concerned citizens and 
policymakers might undertake to motivate state legislatures to address 
the deficiencies in their indigent defense systems. The task of protecting 
the rights of poor defendants, and thus ensuring the fairness of our 
courts, the legitimacy of criminal convictions and the integrity of criminal 
justice, requires the concerted effort of all. Federal, state and local 
governments, prosecutors, defenders, judges, bar and professional 
associations, law firn1s, law schools, and the media all have a ro le to play 
in upholding the promise of Gideon. 
A. SUSTAINED MEDIA ATIENTION FOCUSED ON THE INJUSTICES OF A STATE 
SYSTEM, PERHAPS HIGHLIGHTING INNOCENT VICTIMS, E xoNERATlONS OR 
THE ROUTINE DENIAL OF JUSTICE 
This type of sustained , negative attention serves as both a public 
education campaign and a shaming process and has been successful in 
states as diverse as Massachusetts, Georgia, and Washington.524 In 
addition to calling attention to the problems in a defense system, media 
exposure can help build a constituency for reform. Compelling stories 
about how the system failed innocent clients or the unfairness of 
assembly line justice educate the public and capture its interest. In 
combination with the broad public support for the Sixth Amendment, 
the media spotlight may provide sta te legislators the support they need 
to take action. 
B. INITIATE OR THREATEN SYSTEMIC LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE 
C o NSTITUTIONAL SuFFICIENCY oF TH E SYSTEM 
A significant amount of litigation throughout the country has 
targeted the delivery of indigent defense services. Although not all of it 
has been successful, important se ttlements in Pennsylvania and 
Connecticut, significant victories in New York, Massachusetts, and 
Montana, and favorable rulings in Arizona, Oklahoma, Florida, and 
524. Such negative atte ntion may ultimately turn out to be successful in Virginia as well. The 
legislature there is considering restructuring its p rogram of compensating counsel in light of comments 
by a " Washington, D.C. law finn lthat) says it is poised to file a ... class-action lawsuit over a 
compensation system that ranks last in the nation." Hugh Lessig, Virginia Warned on Poor's Legal 
A id, D AILY PRESs (Hampton Roads, Va.), Feb. 2 , 2oo6, at A 1. 
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elsewhere suggest that systemic litigation has the potential to spur 
legislative action and to educate the public about the failiJ1gs of a given 
system. Law firms can make a significant contribution by providing pro 
bono assistance for these efforts. 
c. THOSE WORKING IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM SHOULD TAKE 
INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTION TO ENSURE THAT THEIR ETHICAL 
AND PROFESSIONAL OBLIGATIONS ARE NOT COMPROMISED AS A RESULT 
OF THE PRESSURES FROM THE SYSTEMIC FAILURE OF THE DEFENSE 
FUNCTION 
If all players in the criminal justice system vigilantly guard against 
violating their own professional codes of ethics, despite the pressures to 
take shortcuts, we would have strong support for the provision of 
appropriate indigent defense services. 
In keeping with their ethical obligations, for example, attorneys 
could refuse to take cases where adding to their caseloads threatens their 
ability to provide competent representation. Judges and prosecutors 
could be more vigilant in guarding against plea bargaining abuse and 
invalid waiver of the right to counseL Furthermore, all participants in the 
criminal justice system should report observed ethical violations to 
disciplinary bodies. 
D. STATE AND LocAL BAR AssociATIONS SHOULD TAKE AN ACTIVE RoLE 
IN ADVOCATING FOR REFORM OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS AND 
PROVIDE LEADERSHIP lN THOSE REFORM EFFORTS 
State and local bar associations are well positioned to provide 
leadership for necessary reforms of indigent defense systems. As 
participants in the criminal justice system, bar members can monitor the 
defense function and call attention to misconduct or ethical violations by 
prosecutors or judges. As a respected institution within the larger 
community, a bar association can help educate the public, propose, 
reform and provide a much-needed voice on behalf of poor criminal 
defendants. 
Bar associations can also establish active and effective disciplinary 
bodies to create enforceable standards for defense lawyers, judges, and 
prosecutors so that the ethical violations in indigent defense systems can 
be remedied. 
E. ACADEMICS SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE THE CASE AND AGITATE FOR 
THE RE-EVALUATION OF THE S TRIC KLAND STANDARD TO FACILITATE A 
MORE EFFECTIVE REVIEW OF CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE AsSISTANCE OF 
CouNSEL 
A change in the law defining ineffective assistance of counsel would 
open an avenue for reform effectively choked off by the stringent 
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Strickland standard. If the Strickland barrier were reduced or removed, 
criminal defendants could successfully challenge the quality of their 
government-provided representation in the context of collateral review. 
Post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance claims would influence 
the expectations for, and presumably improve, attorney performance at 
the trial level. 
CoNCLUSION 
The problems explored in this Article, and in the work of the 
National Committee on the Right to Counsel, demonstrate without 
question the crisis of the American criminal justice system in terms of 
providing lawyers for poor people.525 The problems are very real and will 
only get worse unless action is taken.5' 6 With these proposals, we hope 
real change can occur. The only way to effect such change is to have a 
discussion that goes beyond the limited groups that have raised these 
questions in the forty-year period since Gideon v. Wainwright. One 
commentator has stated the matter well: 
How can those in power be persuaded to use that power to confront 
the continuing crisis in indigent representation? There is no answer to 
this quandary, but it is clear that the campaign to enhance public 
support for indigent defense services must be framed in a manner that 
resonates with groups broader than the traditional progressive 
communities that have long championed the rights of criminal 
defendants. 527 
We believe that recommendations outlined here, and under 
consideration by the National Committee on the Right to Counsel, are a 
good first step toward having that serious discussion. 
525. Barbara Babcock's comments are fully supported by what we found: 
I was giving speeches on Gideon as a promise broken-how th.e Court had guaranteed a 
body with a Jaw degree next to the defendam but had failed to breathe life into that body. 
How too many public defender offices s tart idealistically and then are overwhelmed by 
rising caseloads and receding funding, until no amount of dedication will suffice to do a 
good job in the routine cases. 
Baboock, supra note 35, at 1515; see also Goldstock et al., supra note 6o, at 18, referring to the 
"starving of Gideon" which "not only threatens wrongful convictions and even executions, it starves 
America's sense of justice .. .. The Jaw requires that a defendant, even the poorest defendant be 
represented." As stated by one experienced state judge: 
Bench and bar alike are forced to tum a blind eye to the deficiencies in the current system. 
Many indigent defense attorneys, underpaid and overworked, cut corners and unwittingly 
or even intentionally violate their personal and professional responsibilities. Gradually they 
be corn e insensitive to the effects of inadequa te representation on a whole class of persons 
alienated from the basic guarantees of due process and effective access to the courts. 
Cooks & Fontenot, supra note 35, at I<J1· 
526. Last year the poverty rate in the U.S. went up more than 12%-more than 37 million people 
now live in poverty. Associated Press, U.S. Poverty Rate Rises to 12.7 Percent, CBS NEws, Aug. 30, 
2005, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/o8/Jo/ap/business/mainD8CABQ08I .shtml . And, about 
8o% of all criminal defendants are poor. See HARLOW, supra note 12, at t. 
527. Marshall, supra note 35, at 963~· 
